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 Abstract 
I identify and analyse an emergent sub-genre of contemporary literature by women that 
I am calling ‗New Femininities‘ fiction. This fiction is about the distinctly feminine 
experience of contemporary domestic life written by women about the lives of 
heterosexual female characters that are married or in committed partnerships, often with 
children. These texts are concerned with the nature of the self, with a self that is plural 
and ‗in process‘, and make use of particular narrative devices – ironic voice, unreliable 
narration, free indirect discourse, and interrogative endings that exceed their roles as 
simply telling stories. ‗New Femininities‘ fictions allow their language the necessary 
freedom to multiply meanings and enact the narrative conflicts they raise and by so 
doing, undermine the binary oppositions which structure a gendered world. In this 
dissertation, I argue the models of existing criticism would do a disservice to these texts 
because much of the criticism either overvalues the theoretical and ignores the 
literariness of the text or seeks to identify a ‗feminine‘ language the definition of which 
serves to reinforce and revalue patriarchal notions of femininity. The readings that this 
fiction requires necessitate a negotiation with established models of feminist literary 
criticism. I attempt to identify the characteristics of their style that allows them to 
straddle binary oppositions and to look at the language these authors use without having 
to label it ‗feminine‘ and by so doing establish, build, or reinforce a boundary with 
some undefined ‗masculine‘ language which stands in for all occurrences that are not 
‗feminine‘. Additionally, I attempt to forge a transformed, adapted concept vocabulary 
for dealing with this group of writers. To this end, I make use of various discourses to 
show how the different authors either negotiate with that discourse or prove its 
inadequacy to describe or explain these new femininities. 
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Introduction 
Rachel Cusk, in a 2009 article in The Guardian, ‗Shakespeare‘s Daughters‘, argued 
that, eighty-one years after A Room of One’s Own, Virginia Woolf‘s call to women 
writers to ‗write as women write, not as men write‘ taking into account that women‘s 
values ‗differ very often from‘ men‘s values, is still relevant.1 Cusk maintains that 
women writers who pay attention to their difference from men, their distinctly female 
experience of ‗domesticity and motherhood and family life‘ of ‗babies [and] 
mediocrity‘ face rejection from other women, publishers, and the world at large.2 Rita 
Felski argues that some ‗aspects of women‘s lives – motherhood, romance, the love or 
friendship of other women – are often seen as lacking in literary and philosophical 
glamour. They have been deemed minor, not major‘.3 She assigns this discrepancy in 
part to the reluctance of men to read novels written by women. ‗A recent British survey 
found that women are more willing to read novels by male authors than men are to read 
the works of women. Rather than women giving up their bi-textuality, men surely need 
to increase theirs‘.4 Thus, she identifies a hegemonic homo-textism. Not only is there a 
                                                             
1 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, Great Ideas Series, (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 85-86. 
2 Rachel Cusk, ‗Shakespeare‘s Daughters‘, The Guardian, Review, Saturday 12 December 2009, p. 2-3. 
3 Rita Felski, Literature After Feminism (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
p. 17. 
4 Felski 2003, p. 49. 
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reluctance to read what Norman Mailer called the ‗lady-book‘,5 but perhaps even more 
so, there is a resistance to reading domestic fiction. As Mona Simpson asserts: ‗We are 
still, despite thirty years of feminism, a culture that considers the word ―domestic‖ 
when applied to fiction to mean ―tamer‖ and even ―less‖‘.6 For a brief period in the 
1960s and 1970s, feminism concerned itself not only with the domestic, but with 
revaluing domestic novels as well. The ‗consciousness-raising‘ novels and ‗mad 
housewife‘ novels of that time led many women readers into the Women‘s Liberation 
Movement. However, at the end of the 1970s, with more women moving into the 
workforce, novels about housewives went into decline and feminist attention turned 
away from domestic novels of realism toward more utopian (or dystopian) science 
fiction and women‘s detective fiction and the domestic and domestic fiction began to be 
disregarded by feminism. 
The domestic novel continues to be discounted. When Ali Smith and Toby Litt 
edited the annual Arts Council Anthology of new writing in 2005 they contended that 
‗the submissions from women were disappointingly domestic, the opposite of risk 
taking‘.7 When she was chair of the Orange Broadband Prize for Fiction in 2007, 
Muriel Gray complained about the ‗lack of inventiveness and imagination‘ of the 
entries: ‗it‘s hard to ignore the sheer volume of thinly disguised autobiographical 
writing from women on small-scale domestic themes such as motherhood, boyfriend 
                                                             
5 Norman Mailer, ‗The Mary McCarthy Case: A Review of The Group‘, The New York Review of Books, 
17 October 1963 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1963/oct/17/the-mary-mccarthy-case/ 
[accessed 17 September 2011] 
6 Mona Simpson, ‗A Quiet Genius‘, Atlantic Monthly 288.5 (2001), 125-136 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2001/12/simpson.htm [accessed 30 May 2011], paragraph 12 
7 Suzi Feay, ‗The Big Question: Is Muriel Gray right … do female writers today lack imagination?‘, The 
Independent, 20 March 2007 http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/features/the-big-
question-is-muriel-gray-right-do-female-writers-today-lack-imagination-440969.html [accessed 25 June 
2010], paragraph 4. 
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troubles and tiny family dramas‘.8 The assumption that domestic novels must be 
autobiographical because women writers lack imagination is, according to Domna C. 
Stanton, ‗age-old‘ and ‗pervasive‘ because it is assumed that ‗women could not 
transcend, but only record, the concerns of the private self‘.9 Gray qualifies her 
statement by admitting that some domestic novels have been extraordinary, ‗Of course 
it would be ridiculous to suggest that personal experience should never be plundered by 
novelists. The list of those geniuses who have done so is long, […] but they have used 
them to create bigger, ambitious tales, that speak louder‘.10 Unfortunately, Gray does 
not explain how one distinguishes between ‗small scale domestic themes‘ and the 
‗bigger, ambitious tales, that speak louder‘; what does the ‗louder‘ novel sound like? 
What does it look like? Her ‗tiny, random‘ list of ‗geniuses‘ featured Jane Austen, Doris 
Lessing, and Alice Walker: authors whose novels located the bigger issues within their 
attention to the small scale. Many readers failed to perceive some of the ideological 
concerns that they were exploring. For example, Austen‘s novels were, and continue to 
be, often read as romances. Thus, that a domestic novel might contain genius is often 
overlooked when it concerns itself with the home life of a woman and even more so if it 
is a married woman who spends some of her time at home with her children. It is 
assumed that such a novel‘s concerns will be limited to the mundane and that it will not 
experiment with style; that middle-class domestic lives are uninteresting. However, as 
Emma Parker has argued, ‗the domestic sphere remains a central part of the lives of 
most women, and it thus remains a legitimate subject of fiction.‘11 In this dissertation, I 
                                                             
8 Muriel Gray, ‗Women Authors Must Drop Domestic Themes‘, The Guardian Books Blog, 21 March 
2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk.books/booksblog/2007/mar/21/womenauthorsmustdropdomest [accessed 
25 June 2010], paragraph 2. 
9 Domna C. Stanton (ed.), The Female Autograph: Theory and Practice of Autobiography from the Tenth 
to the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987), p. 4, quoted in Maria Lauret, 
Liberating Literature: Feminist Fiction in America (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 98. 
10 Gray 2007, paragraph 3. 
11 Emma Parker, ‗―The Proper Stuff of Fiction‖: Defending the Domestic, Reappraising the Parochial‘, in 
Contemporary British Women Writers, ed. by Emma Parker, Essays and Studies vol. 54 (Suffolk: D.S. 
Brewer. 2004), p. 14. 
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will identify and analyse an emergent sub-genre of contemporary literature by women 
that I am calling ‗New Femininities‘ fiction. This fiction is about the distinctly feminine 
experience of contemporary domestic life written by women about the lives of 
heterosexual female characters that are married or in committed partnerships, often with 
children. These authors experiment with style and, although their novels are concerned 
with ‗small‘ domestic lives in which little changes, work to undermine the ideology of 
domestic femininities.  
I would like to begin my discussion of New Femininities fiction by defining the 
central term that underlies my approach to these novels: negotiation. Christine Gledhill 
defines negotiation as ‗the holding together of opposite sides in an ongoing process of 
give-and-take […] Meaning is neither imposed, nor passively imbibed, but arises out of 
a struggle or negotiation between competing frames of reference, motivation and 
experience‘.12 She uses as her example the television show Cagney and Lacey which 
made use of the generic properties of buddy films, cop shows, soap operas, and 
women‘s films to create a program that responded to the issues raised by feminism 
while still conforming to mainstream concerns. Stuart Hall argues that negotiation 
allows a text to ‗operate[…] with exceptions to the rule‘ of the mainstream.13 Cagney 
and Lacey‘s audience, Gledhill holds, would be well-versed in the conventions of its 
various genres and would find pleasurable the ways in which the show breaks the rules. 
She contends that ‗[a]pproached from this perspective, the cultural ‗work‘ of the text 
concerns the generation of different readings; readings which challenge each other, 
provoke social negotiation of meanings, definitions and identities‘.14 Readings which 
                                                             
12 Christine Gledhill, ‗Pleasurable Negotiations‘, in Female Spectators: Looking at Film and Television, 
ed. by E. Deidre Pribram (London: Verso, 1988), p. 67-8. 
13 Stuart Hall, ‗Encoding/Decoding‘, in Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 
ed. by Stuart Hall, et al (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p. 137.  
14 Gledhill 1988, p. 74. 
5 
 
recognise these negotiations ‗work with the pleasures of the text, rather than 
suppressing or deconstructing them‘.15 Negotiation, then, allows an author to rethink 
and reimagine without having to reject; she can use the language of the mainstream to 
tell new stories that maintain the pleasures of the old ones. New Femininities fiction 
expresses a desire to negotiate rather than reject domestic novels, romance, and 
femininity. 
‗Femininity‘ was originally a term coined by patriarchy to position female 
humans as inferior, weak, and dependent. Femininity has been associated with, in a 
negative mode, ‗undesirable attributes‘ such as dependency, passivity, masochism and a 
propensity for maternal ‗smothering‘ and in a positive mode with ‗gentleness, 
sensitivity and nurturance‘.16 It is also the term against which, as Clare Hanson argues, 
feminism defined itself.
 17
 Thus for my purposes, it is a term that must operate ‗under 
erasure‘. Stuart Hall explains that terms are put under erasure because: 
[T]hey are no longer serviceable – ‗good to think with‘ – in their originary and 
unreconstructed form. But since they have not been superseded dialectically, 
and there are no other, entirely different concepts with which to replace them, 
there is nothing to do but to continue to think with them – albeit now in their 
detotalized or deconstructed forms, and no longer operating within the 
paradigm in which they were originally generated. The line which cancels 
them, paradoxically, permits them to go on being read.
18
 
Femininity is ‗still good to think with‘, but to do so one needs to redefine one‘s terms. 
Toril Moi defines ‗femininity‘ as ‗a set of culturally defined characteristics‘19. Ruth 
                                                             
15 Gledhill 1988, p. 87. 
16 Paulina Palmer, Contemporary Women’s Fiction: Narrative Practice and Feminist Theory (New York 
and London: Harverster Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. 14-16. 
17 Clare Hanson, ‗Fiction, Feminism and Femininity from the Eighties to the Noughties‘, in 
Contemporary British Women Writers, ed. by Emma Parker, Essays and Studies vol. 54 (Suffolk: D.S. 
Brewer. 2004), p. 25-26. 
18 Stuart Hall, ‗Introduction: Who Needs ―Identity‖?‘, in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. by Stuart Hall 
and Paul du Gay (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: 1996), p. 1. 
19 Toril Moi, ‗Feminist, Female, Feminine‘, in The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of 
Literary Criticism, ed. by Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p. 
104. 
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Robbins expands this definition and posits that ‗[f]eminine is a sociological category 
which defines the behavioural characteristics associated in different contexts and at 
different times with female biology; feminine describes gender, and tends to suggest 
that gender is not the natural attribute of sex‘.20 Femininity is a performance of the 
gender associated with people in possession of female biology, although the actual 
possession of that biology is optional. Robbins argues that ‗Whatever ―feminine‖ is, it‘s 
clearly not quite secure or fixed‘ nor is it an inborn characteristic of female humans.21 
She argues that ‗if femininity is not innate, it can be rewritten, re-imagined, constructed 
along different lines‘.22 Thus, femininity can be separated from its connection to sexism 
and patriarchy by employing it to signify particular performances of the gender 
‗woman‘ that are performances of femininity simply by being an individual‘s 
performance of ‗woman‘.  
I choose to speak of ‗femininities‘ in order to encompass the multiple ways in 
which femininity can be performed. To borrow Robbins‘ wording, the plural form of 
femininities disrupts the notion of ‗feminine‘ as a single category with clear limits, 
rewrites the category as something potentially subversive, and suggests that femininities 
are multiple, could be anything, anywhere, and are uncontainable.
23
 The femininities 
encountered in this fiction are not all the same, they are different, singular, individual. 
Marnina Gonick argues that ‗Traditional femininity is being undone […] even as it is 
being rearticulated through an ever increasing array of contradictions, the juggling of 
which has always shaped experiences of femininity‘.24 These performances of gender 
are a negotiation, she argues, ‗between a gendered subjectivity achieved through an 
                                                             
20 Ruth Robbins, Literary Feminisms (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 6. 
21 Robbins 2000, p. 4. 
22 Robbins 2000, p. 111. 
23 Robbins 2000, p. 3. She uses this wording to discuss her choice to use the term ‗feminisms‘. 
24 Marnina Gonick, ‗Old Plots and New Identities: Ambivalent Femininities in Late Modernity‘, 
Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 25 (2004), p. 207. 
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apparently autonomous agency on the one hand and a relationality built on multiplicity 
on the other‘.25 Femininity is a performance and negotiation of gender norms and 
strategic transgression of these norms, a transgression which, if repeated often enough 
and by enough different performers, becomes assimilated into those very norms. 
My use of the phrase ‗New Femininities‘ echoes Stuart Hall‘s concept of ‗New 
Ethnicities‘ in which ‗new‘ is not about consumption or marketing, but points to 
emergent and developing identities. Hall coined the term in an effort to explain the 
effect of ‗the politics of representation‘ on black cultural issues. No longer was it 
possible to speak about the ‗black experience‘ without taking into consideration ‗very 
different histories, traditions and ethnic identities‘.26 His new formulation of ‗ethnicity‘ 
was as a way to speak about issues facing ‗black‘ people without erasing their 
differences. Borrowing from Hall‘s rousing call for the recuperation of ‗ethnicity‘ from 
‗its place in a system of negative equivalences‘, I believe many of the same arguments 
can be used in a recuperation of ‗femininity‘. The female subject is constructed 
historically, culturally, politically – and the concept which refers to this is ‗femininity‘. 
The displacement of the ‗centred‘ discourses of the West entails putting in question its 
universalist character and its transcendental claims to speak for everyone, while being 
itself everywhere and nowhere. Women are, to borrow Hall‘s phraseology, femininely 
located and their feminine identities are crucial to their subjective sense of who they are 
and colour their perceptions. This is precisely the politics of femininities predicated on 
difference and diversity.
27
 
                                                             
25 Gonick 2004, p. 207. 
26 Stuart Hall, ‗New Ethnicities‘, in ‘Race’, Culture and Difference, ed. James Donald and Ali Rattansi 
(London: Sage, in association with the Open University, 1992), p. 252. 
27 Hall 1992, p. 257-258. He uses ‗ethnicity‘ where I have inserted ‗femininity‘. 
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‗New Femininities‘ is also a term used by media and cultural studies in a series 
of seminars from 2005 to 2007 in the UK that sought to ‗open up questions about the 
ways in which gender is lived, experienced and represented‘. Rosalind Gill and 
Christina Scharff, in the introduction to a collection of media studies essays on ‗New 
Femininities‘ published in 2011, explain that ‗speaking of ―femininities‖ is a way of 
highlighting the social production and construction of gender and avoiding essentialism 
[…] What new questions, we wondered, might the notion of femininities allow us to 
ask? What new insights or possibilities?‘28 This is very much the way in which I utilise 
the term to think about fiction. However, media and cultural studies locate the term in 
such a way as to gesture toward a notion that these ‗new femininities‘ are indicative of a 
‗postfeminist‘ world in which women are now repudiating feminism, suffering 
backlash, and reverting to prefeminist ideals of femininity.
29
 They locate their evidence 
of new femininities in Western political discourses, employment, media stories, 
advertising and men‘s magazines, sexual slavery and trafficking, and the mainstreaming 
of pornography.
30
 Estella Tincknell argues that the limited social and political gains that 
women have made in the twenty-first century are ‗paralleled by a renewed discursive 
emphasis on femininity as a pathological condition, this time recast as a relentless drive 
for physical perfectibility‘.31  These new femininities are bodily performances of 
femininity through consumption of beauty products, plastic surgery, and an ideal of 
fitness and sexiness even for pregnant and older women and which are sold to, and 
swallowed whole by, women through advertisements, magazines such as Shape Fit 
                                                             
28 Rosalind Gill and Christina Scharff, ‗Introduction‘, in New Femininities: Postfeminism, Neoliberalism 
and Subjectivity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 2, original emphasis. 
29 See their discussion of postfeminism in Gill and Scharff 2011, p. 3-4 
30 Rosalind Gill and Jane Arthurs, ‗Editors‘ Introduction‘, Feminist Media Studies 6 (2006), p. 443. 
31 Estella Tincknell, ‗Scourging the Abject Body: Ten Years Younger and Fragmented Femininity under 
Neoliberalism‘, in New Femininities: Postfeminism, Neoliberalism and Subjectivity, ed. by Rosalind Gill 
and Christina Scharff (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 83. 
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Pregnancy, and reality television programming like ‗Ten Years Younger‘ and ‗Extreme 
Makeover‘.  
However, I believe such readings underestimate women‘s abilities to negotiate 
with the images of women put forth by the media and advertising and their ability to 
comprehend that the ideals are an illusion achieved through the use of PhotoShop, false 
eyelashes, and hair extensions. As Imelda Whelehan asserts, ‗there have to be more 
complicated readings than this which avoid the trap of seeing women either duped into 
one representation or liberated by another‘.32 A feminism that views women as 
unwitting dupes who take on the ideologies of beauty, sexuality, and femininity 
wholesale seems to be a patronising feminism that positions the enlightened critic above 
the average consumer victim woman and who views her with pity for her gullibility. 
Whelehan argues that the ‗third wave‘ is made up of women ‗who are not duped by the 
glossy-magazine-speak of their day, but like their foresisters have to live out the 
realities of a patriarchal ideology which lags behind the progress suggested by the 
material gains in women‘s lives‘.33 This third wave feminism is composed of ‗a 
generation educated into post-structuralism and with slightly more interrogative views 
on identity than early second-wavers, with a much more inclusive and sophisticated 
approach to popular cultural forms‘.34 Shelley Budgeon asserts that third wave 
feminism approaches ‗popular culture simultaneously as a site of pleasure and an object 
of critique‘ and seeks the places where ‗lived contradictions‘ reveal the instabilities of 
gender categories: 
Particular attention is given to those sites in which lived contradictions 
associated with new femininities reveal the instabilities of gender categories 
                                                             
32 Imelda Whelehan, ‗Sex and the Single Girl: Helen Fielding, Erica Jong and Helen Gurley Brown‘, in 
Contemporary British Women Writers, ed. by Emma Parker, Essays and Studies vol. 54 (Suffolk: D.S. 
Brewer. 2004), p.39. 
33 Whelehan 2004, p. 39. 
34 Whelehan 2004, p. 39. 
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and create the possibility for reclaiming femininity through the reappropriation 
and resignification of dominant codings of femininity‘.35  
Budgeon‘s examples of where third wave feminism locates these sites is in the 
reclamation of terms such as ‗S-M, pornography, the words cunt and queer and pussy 
and girl‘ as well as the underground music community. But rather than locating power 
in the riot grrls movement, ‗zine culture, or in underground musicians, New 
Femininities fiction makes use of the sites that are the bastions of traditional definitions 
of femininity – marriage, motherhood, and the domestic. It is in the difference between 
a focus on youth culture and a focus on mature women‘s relationship to the domestic 
that makes the concerns of the New Femininities fiction something new. The formal 
devices this fiction utilises, by working to disrupt binary oppositions, like idealised 
third wave feminism, ‗insists on the necessity of straddling binaries and working with 
the contradictions that result‘.36 The women that populate these texts are negotiating 
between a sense of autonomy and the dependence that domestic life entails – both being 
relied upon and relying on others, and living with the contradictions that this entails.  
Barbara Risman resists the label ‗new femininities‘ and queries: ‗But why is it 
that any group of human beings with vaginas should have their collective norms called 
a type of femininity? […] Why categorize innovative behavior as new kinds of gender, 
new femininities and masculinities, rather than notice that the old gender norms are 
losing their currency?‘37 How are the identification of new kinds of gender performance 
and the recognition of the decline of older performances mutually exclusive? Why not 
refer to new negotiations of femininity that neither completely reject nor completely 
embrace traditional forms as ‗new femininities‘? Risman does not offer another term or 
                                                             
35 Shelley Budgeon, ‗The Contradictions of Successful Femininity: Third-Wave Feminism, Postfeminism 
and ‗New‘ Femininities‘, in New Femininities: Postfeminism, Neoliberalism and Subjectivity, ed. by 
Rosalind Gill and Christina Scharff (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 280 and 283. 
36 Budgeon 2011, p. 280. 
37 Barbara J. Risman, ‗From Doing to Undoing: Gender as we Know it‘, Gender and Society 23 (2009), p. 
84. 
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way of discussing these changes except for a concept of ‗undoing gender‘ which she 
borrows from Judith Butler. ‗Undoing gender‘ seems to suggest that these new 
performances make the gender binary disappear rather than renegotiating its 
boundaries. However, I would argue that this ‗innovative behaviour‘ constitutes 
individuals who are simultaneously doing and undoing gender. ‗New femininities‘ are 
negotiations of gender which create new versions of femininity that are individual and 
particular and not necessarily ‗normal‘. Ellen Rooney asserts that women are ‗always 
already raced, classed, and sexualised, and by contradictory processes, which introduce 
differences within every construct of identity, so that there is no singular woman reader, 
or singular white woman reader, or singular black woman reader, or singular lesbian 
reader‘.38 There is no singular feminine or domestic woman. 
The texts by British, Irish, and Canadian writers that I include in my New 
Femininities genre – Rachel Cusk‘s Arlington Park (2006), Anne Enright‘s The 
Gathering (2007), Tessa Hadley‘s Accidents in the Home (2002), Zoë Heller‘s Notes 
from a Scandal (2003), A.L. Kennedy‘s Paradise (2004), Charlotte Mendelson‘s When 
We Were Bad (2007), Alice Munro‘s Hateship, Friendship, Courtship, Loveship, 
Marriage (2001), Runaway (2004), and Too Much Happiness (2009), Julie Myerson‘s 
The Story of You (2006), and Ali Smith‘s The Accidental (2005) –explore new 
femininities that are simultaneously a response to features of contemporary Western 
life, a refusal of romantic paradigms, and a challenge to the ideal of sexual fulfilment as 
the only female goal. Without becoming what Nicci Gerrard calls the ‗feminist novel of 
awakening‘,39, or embracing what Paulina Palmer identifies as ‗the ―role-model‖ 
                                                             
38 Ellen Rooney, ‗Introduction‘, The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Literary Theory, ed. Ellen 
Rooney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
39 Nicci Gerrard, Into the Mainstream: How Feminism Has Changed Women’s Writing (London: 
Pandora, 1989), p. 113. 
12 
 
tradition of women‘s fiction‘,40 they turn a sober, and at times chilling, eye on female 
desire, romantic love, motherhood and sexual competitiveness. The result is not always 
comfortable reading. Most importantly, these novels share, I contend, a repertoire of 
marked stylistic features— unreliable narration, an ironic voice, the use of free indirect 
discourse, and interrogative endings – that work to call into question authentication by 
narration, wreck the boundaries between binary oppositions, rethink sentimental 
domestic fiction in a negotiation with contemporary and traditional mores, unseat the 
comfort and safety of the domestic, and undermine notions of truth, identity, and 
meaning by suggesting that these concepts are impossible to define and are constantly 
‗in process‘. These texts are not pioneering the use of these formal techniques nor are 
they doing anything brand new with them. Rather they utilize their form in order to stir 
up the contradictions that underpin their characters‘ lives. No longer necessarily yoked 
to the home, they still remain conflicted by the pressures of the institutions of 
heterosexual marriage and motherhood. They lead lives that show the contradictions 
that second wave feminism was unable to solve – how to square heterosexual desire and 
motherhood with an autonomous sense of self.  
Their use of formal techniques that can be found in postmodern novels – second 
person narration, unreliable narration, and paralepsis (characters who know things that 
they could not possibly know) –  rather than undermining their status as realist novels 
works to introduce contradiction and to draw attention to ‗the surface complexity of 
languages (discourses)‘.41 Susan Watkins argues that part of the postmodern condition 
is a loss of belief in overarching theories or explanations: 
In post-modernity most people no longer believe in the explanatory power of 
any one of these narratives [metanarratives of religion, scientific theories of 
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progress, economic and social theories, and psychological theories], or in the 
way of looking at the world they imply […] Humans no longer seem to be the 
rational, unified creatures, capable of sound judgement and ethical behaviour 
that we believed them to be in the modern period. Instead, they become 
fractured, inconsistent and irrational beings who are forced to turn to a 
multiplicity of small-scale, local explanations to account for the various 
phenomena they encounter.
42
 
The attention that New Femininities fiction pays to small-scale, local conditions and 
their comfort with the fractured, inconsistent and sometimes irrational behaviour of 
their characters is their postmodern response to feminism. They are not rejecting it, but 
can no longer believe in a ‗women‘s writing of self-discovery‘, to borrow Imelda 
Whelehan‘s terminology.43 As Maggie Humm argues, ‗The characteristic of 
postmodernism most specific to feminism is that it works within the very system it 
attempts to subvert‘.44 Rather than subverting feminism, these novels highlight the 
impossibility of the metatheory of feminism; the impossibility that a one-size feminism 
could fit anyone, even white, middle-class, heterosexual women.  
This fiction fits securely into the traditions of woman-centred novels, feminist 
fiction, and the wider tradition of realism. They are the descendants of the mad 
housewife novels and consciousness-raising novels of the 1960s and 1970s and are the 
serious sisters of the chick lit and mumlit novels of the 1990s and 2000s. They are 
informed by queer theory which, to use Palmer‘s words, ‗has its basis in the perception 
that sexuality and sexual practice, rather than being ―natural‖, are cultural constructs‘.45 
Robbins asserts that ‗white women in white-dominant societies do not see themselves 
as having a race that needs analysis at all. Similarly, heterosexual women tend not to 
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analyse their sexuality, taking it as a natural ―given‖‘.46 However, these novels use the 
tools of queer theory to call into question the ‗normality‘ and givenness of white, 
middle-class, heterosexual femininity and to suggest that the hegemonic ideal of white 
womanhood does not fit, nor is it liveable for, any woman. They negotiate with all these 
literary traditions and critiques in order to offer an insight into the contradictions at the 
root of domestic postmodern life. Although these texts confine themselves to the 
domestic concerns of white, Western, heterosexual, middle-class women, their concern 
with the nature of identity and ‗femininity‘ is compelling. The women that people this 
fiction lead lives that are isolated and limited by their confinement to a middle-class 
domestic space. They have few friendships and no contact with people of other 
ethnicities or sexualities. Yet, this isolation allows them the luxury of thinking about 
their ‗selves‘, the luxury of contemplating the questions: ‗Who am I? What am I?‘ that 
are raised by attempting to fulfil the roles of wife and mother. These texts exceed the 
norms of the institutions of motherhood, marriage, and self. They push the boundaries 
while depicting lives that remain fairly static. 
One of the genres that the New Femininities fiction negotiates is the feminist 
novel. Gayle Greene argues that regardless of an author‘s political affiliations, ‗we may 
term a novel ―feminist‖ for its analysis of gender as socially constructed and its sense 
that what has been constructed may be reconstructed – for its understanding that change 
is possible and that narrative can play a part in it‘.47 They must concern themselves with 
‗female solidarity‘, according to Maria Lauret, and have a vision of female community 
and a ‗demand for an autonomous political space for women‘.48 Lisa Maria Hogeland 
suggests that ‗A feminist novel in [the opinion of some feminists] must perform a 
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systemic critique of patriarchy rather than merely depict individual character flaws‘.49 
Numerous studies identify as the core texts of feminist fiction Doris Lessing‘s The 
Golden Notebook (1962), Sylvia Plath‘s The Bell Jar (1963), and Jean Rhys‘s The Wide 
Sargasso Sea (1966). Marilyn French‘s The Women’s Room (1977), Erica Jong‘s Fear 
of Flying (1973), Lisa Alther‘s Kinflicks (1976), and Rita Mae Brown‘s Rubyfruit 
Jungle (1973).
50
 What these novels share is a concern with the lives of women, with 
their sexuality, their domesticity, their aspirations, and the conditions which curtail their 
freedom and happiness. Lessing, Plath, and Rhys‘s novels are often called ‗prefeminist‘ 
because their publications predate the beginning of the Women‘s Liberation Movement 
(1967) and are identified as the texts that were read and discussed in the early days of 
the movement – Sylvia Plath is seen as ‗the archetypal victim of patriarchy‘51 and 
Lessing‘s novel is quoted extensively by Greene in her discussion of the tradition of 
feminist fiction. Hogeland terms the novels of the seventies ‗consciousness raising 
novels‘. These novels worked in conjunction with the women‘s movement to radicalise 
women‘s views of their lives under patriarchy and to encourage them to begin 
collective action.  
Hogeland contends that second wave feminism was a literacy, ‗a way of reading 
both texts and everyday life‘ that recognized the ideologies that underpinned patriarchy 
and effected women‘s daily lives.52 She attributes the explosion of feminism in the first 
half of the 1970s to the spread of this literacy through the reading of the 
‗consciousness-raising‘ novel. According to Hogeland, the CR novel served to 
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‗interpellate their readers as feminist readers‘.53 She holds that CR novels follow a 
particular overplot. The female protagonist undergoes an experience of ‗reflexive 
perceptions‘ that help her to begin to recognize Betty Friedan‘s ‗problem that has no 
name‘. This experience leads her to begin changing her life. In the process of 
determining ‗that marriage and motherhood are no longer solutions for her‘, ‗she works 
through a series of confrontations with individuals and institutions that try to keep her 
in her place‘ – friends, family, doctors, husbands, educators. 54 However, she argues, 
‗the realist novels [of feminism of the 1970s] about heterosexual women tend to 
critique individual marriages and relationships rather than institutions‘ of marriage and 
motherhood. Only rarely do they ‗develop a political edge anything like that in the 
radical feminist analyses being published at the same time‘.55 The New Femininities 
fiction resists the ‗reflective perceptions‘ and the epiphanic recognition of the ‗problem 
that has no name‘ but they end up being a critique of the institutions of marriage and 
motherhood by exploring the dynamics of very individual and specific marriages and 
family lives.  
Whelehan asserts that CR novels fill a need that feminist discourse was unable 
to satisfy. ‗[F]eminist discourse had trouble giving positive expression to love, sexual 
attraction, and maternal feelings, because these emotions were regarded as tied up in the 
mystifications of patriarchal ideology‘. However, ‗the CR novels portrayed them in all 
their ambiguity‘.56 New Femininities fiction shares with the CR novel its concern with 
the contradictions, the love/hate, of settled domestic life, and its resistance to the 
‗classic romance ending‘. CR novels usually end, in Hogeland‘s words: 
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with ‗the doubt, uncertainty, and inconclusiveness which are the experience of 
many women in this era‘. The CR novel ends on the verge of changes, or in the 
early stages of changes, in the protagonist‘s life. These endings reflect the 
widespread sense in the seventies that the Women‘s Liberation Movement‘s 
effects were only beginning to be felt. [The unfinished ending] serves as well 
to invite readers to ‗read in‘ their own changes to finish the narrative.57 
Similarly, New Femininities fiction often ends on the verge of change. However, if, in 
the 1970s, the novels ended inconclusively because of a sense that Women‘s Liberation 
has not quite solved the equation of heterosexuality and empowerment, the New 
Femininities fiction ends interrogatively because it is a problem that remains unsolved. 
Lauret asserts that ‗one of the distinguishing features of feminist realism is a Utopian 
dimension to even the grimmest tale of women‘s suffering‘.58 Thus, although feminist 
fictions present love, sex, and mothering in all their ambiguity and refuse to solve the 
problems that their characters face, they maintain a sense of being on the verge of a new 
world in which things will be improved. This Utopian dimension is one that is not 
shared by the New Femininities fiction. They depict love, marriage, and motherhood in 
all its contradictions without any sense that the world is on the verge of a 
transformation for the better. 
The time that many New Femininities fiction characters spend in these fraught 
relationships and in the home, while continuing to maintain working identities as 
writers, postgraduate students, and part-time teachers, means that their narratives share 
much with the subgenre of CR novels, the ‗Mad Housewife novel‘. The ‗Mad 
Housewife‘ novels trace their beginnings to Lessing‘s The Golden Notebook. These 
novels flourished between 1962 and 1975 when stories about housewives seem to fall 
out of favour because of what, Hogeland suggests, ‗might be seen as a shift in who 
counts as an ―ordinary‖ or ―average‖ woman‘.59 The ‗Mad Housewife‘ novels concern a 
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phenomenon remarked on and experienced by Lessing‘s Anna Wulf while canvassing 
for the Communist Party. She is greeted by ‗lonely women going mad quietly by 
themselves, in spite of husband and children or rather because of them. The quality they 
all had: self doubt. A guilt because they were not happy‘.60 These housewives going 
quietly mad populated much of the CR novels of that time. The protagonists are 
intelligent, capable women who are driven mad by the realities of domesticity. 
According to Whelehan: 
The central protagonists of these ‗mad housewife‘ novels are well educated, 
intellectually questing and often artistically inclined women. Their marriages 
are based on the solid foundation of compatibility and companionship. They 
freely enter into these partnerships, secure in the knowledge that this is a new 
era of equality and self-definition and that their marriages will be different to 
that of their parents. These are not novels of breadth and incident; much of the 
drama takes place in the women‘s heads or arises in the narrating of the most 
mundane of incidents.
61
  
New Femininities fiction fits this description as well. Intelligent and well educated, 
these women entered marriage expecting equality and difference from their parents‘ 
marriages, and their novels are not ones of breadth and incident. Similarly, both ‗Mad 
Housewife‘ novels and New Femininities fiction share an interest in the price to self of 
domesticity. Whelehan contends, ‗That the women quite often are frustrated artists, 
writers, or would-be intellectuals makes the point that it is the life of the mind which 
domestic quietude so often quashes‘.62 These ‗Mad Housewife‘ novels name, in 
Greene‘s words, ‗not only the housewife‘s malaise but also articulat[e] areas of 
women‘s lives that were formerly taboo[…] female sexuality, pregnancy, child rearing, 
women‘s relation to their bodies, ‗body image‘, eating – starving, fasting, purging, 
gorging‘63 The New Femininities fiction resists this obsession with the body, the 
                                                             
60 Doris Lessing, The Golden Notebook (London: Flamingo, 1993), p. 161, quoted in Watkins 2001, p. 
66. 
61 Whelehan 2005, p. 75-76. 
62 Whelehan 2005, p. 7-8. 
63 Greene 1991, p. 60. 
19 
 
requisite abortion, the fumbling sex with a lover, and menstruation; topics which were 
revolutionary for the CR novels to confront and which became almost obligatory.
64
 I 
would argue that they resist them because the female body as site of conflict is not what 
interests these texts. Rather, they are interested in the conflicts in subjectivity and 
identity which arise from simultaneously attempting to occupy the roles of wife, 
mother, and self. They are uninterested in consciousness-raising. Greene dismisses 
novels that do not perform consciousness-raising as ‗postfeminist‘ (for example, 
Margaret Atwood‘s Cat’s Eye (1988)), but I would argue that because they lack CR, she 
misreads them – she is unable to see the value of stories of femininity which are not 
about empowerment and which do not portray women as heroines or victims, but are 
about survival and about the darker side of what it means to be a woman. Greene seems 
to identify feminist fiction with a desire for big sweeping changes – the New 
Femininities fiction is concerned with the small negotiations that make a life liveable.  
In the 1980s, the feminist bestsellers moved away from the domestic sphere into 
the realm of bonkbusters or ‗sex and shopping‘ novels in which the heroines held 
powerful, well-paid jobs and ‗children are as likely to be abandoned or absent from the 
main space of the narrative while the heroine plays out her bid for ultimate power in 
whatever business empire she finds herself‘.65 The protagonists, like actual 
businesswomen of the 1980s, dress in clothing that amplifies their gender while 
coopting the masculine suit. Whelehan argues that this worked to defuse the sense that 
by taking up power that traditionally belonged to men they were attempting to be men: 
‗Femininity was exaggerated to neutralize the overt masculinity of the roles that such 
high-achieving businesswomen occupied‘.66 I would argue that it is because of the 
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conflicts between motherhood and a high-powered career that the bonkbusters ignore 
children who spend their dependency with nannies and out of their mother‘s thoughts; 
how would she achieve her quest for power if she were hurrying home to put her 
children to bed. She has the money to hand domesticity over to paid help.  
At the same time as the ‗bonkbuster‘, Lauret identifies a strand of feminist 
fiction which she calls ‗backlash fictions‘ that seem to repudiate the gains of feminism 
by critiquing their flaws.
67
 Her examples include Margaret Atwood‘s The Handmaid’s 
Tale (1985) and Sue Miller‘s The Good Mother (1986). She sees this trend as reflecting 
Judith Stacey‘s contention that feminism had retreated from the politics of patriarchal 
domination and embraced the New Right‘s focus on family. Stacey identifies ‗a shift in 
priorities and ideology‘ which ‗enable[d] feminists to retrieve the pro-life, pro-family 
moral principles from the political Right‘ accompanied feminism‘s move into 
conservatism.
68
 This new conservative feminism was characterised by three features: 
First, it promotes a ‗pro-family‘ stance that views sexual politics, and 
particularly the politicisation of personal relationships, as threatening to ‗the 
family‘. Second, it affirms gender differentiation and celebrates traditionally 
feminine qualities, particularly those associated with mothering. Finally, the 
new conservatives believe that struggle against male domination detracts from 
political agendas they consider more important.
69
 
The focus on home and family of the New Femininities fiction does not arise from this 
conservatism. They do not present family as ‗the last haven in a bureaucratic capitalist 
and totalitarian socialist world‘ – they depict domesticity in all its difficulty and 
contradiction – but they refuse to reject the family either.70 Family and domesticity are 
realities which these characters must negotiate, with all of the special seriousness which 
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my argument attaches to that term. They do not revalue traditional femininity, but rather 
offer a negotiated version which is able to wreck the boundaries between the gendered 
binaries allowing their characters to occupy both sides – mind and body, passive and 
active, and head and heart. Finally, they do not ignore male domination, but evaluate 
the new masculinities of sensitive, helpful, involved husbands and fathers. Despite their 
change from the rigid and macho men of the CR and ‗Mad Housewife‘ novels, marriage 
is no less fraught; equality is still elusive. Here, too, they negotiate and neither embrace 
and romanticise heterosexual relationships and men nor reject them.  
In the 1990s, chick lit became the best-selling genre of woman-centred fiction. 
Supposedly offering narratives of female ‗choice‘, which surprisingly seem to mirror 
‗normative notions of femininity‘71, these contemporary novels in fact focus almost 
exclusively on acquiring a romantic relationship with a man, simultaneously 
infantilising their narrators and offering (once again) sexual identity as the only 
‗authentic‘ female identity. Crucially, as Rosalind Gill and Elena Herdieckerhoff argue, 
this is a ‗femininity [that] is defined as a bodily property, rather than a social structural 
or psychological one‘.72 This bodily femininity ‗is depicted as requiring endless self-
surveillance, monitoring, dieting, purging and work‘ and it is the presence of this 
‗unruly body that needs constant disciplining‘ that is, according to Gill and 
Herdieckerhoff, constitutive of the chick lit novel.
73
 Heroines are, despite a 
commitment to career, naïve and passive, frequently in need of rescue, and destined for 
a ‗happy ever after‘.74 This concern with femininity as a bodily property parallels the 
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bodily obsession of the Mad Housewife novels and is, again, an obsession that the New 
Femininities fiction resists. 
Whelehan argues that chick lit is the descendant of the CR novel of the 1970s. 
They, she contends, are evidence that ‗once again women writers of popular fiction 
[are] returning to the domestic to articulate a view of contemporary women‘s lives as 
bounded by home and family rather than work and ambition‘.75 She argues that 
although it seems that chick lit rejects the notion of the personal being political, ‗you do 
not have to read many of these texts to observe a shared note of anxiety about the fate 
of femininity after feminism and the culture of achievement it has seemed to breed‘.76 
These are not novels that have necessarily turned away from feminism, but rather do 
not know how to negotiate femininity in a postfeminist era. Their attention to issues of 
feminism is not the only parallel:  
There are moments when the sentiments expressed in these books collide with 
those of the feminist bestsellers, not least because, in many cases, the narrative 
journey is primarily emotional. Through it, she comes to understand the limits 
placed upon her as a woman. The contemporary answer to encountering such 
obstacles is to find a very individual way round them, rather than rail against 
the system, but what is the reader to make of these new kinds of open endings? 
[The endings allow] the possibility of a dual reading, but [are] ultimately 
conservative.
77
 
Their individual efforts to bypass the limits placed upon them by the gender ‗woman‘ 
allow them to rehabilitate the romance story and eke out happy endings for themselves. 
What is conservative about their ‗happy endings‘ is that, although the novel has located 
real issues about gender limitations, the ending in romantic entanglement allows the 
heroine to ignore this knowledge and submerge herself in happily ever after. What their 
encounter with the limits of gender illuminates, Whelehan argues, is the questions that 
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Second Wave feminism was unable to answer ‗around relationships, sexuality, and 
romantic love‘.78 She asserts that ‗[h]eterosexuality dominated the debates in the 
Women‘s Movement – both in its association with male power and institutional 
practices of oppression, such as marriage, and in debates about how women might seek 
liberation through sex‘.79 The question of how to square heterosexuality with feminism 
was left ultimately unanswered and ‗[f]eminist politics became increasingly silent on 
the topic, leaving women to negotiate privately the best solutions they could‘.80 Thus, 
chick lit is not a rejection of feminism per se, but rather an attempt at negotiation 
between romance and heterosexuality on one side and feminism and autonomy on the 
other. Their solutions are unsatisfying because they entail ignoring the conflicts. This 
approach to conflict is one of the ways in which New Femininities fiction exceeds chick 
lit; they resist the happy ending because the contradictions will not simply go away. 
Whelehan identifies a subgenre of chick lit which she calls mumlit. Mumlit is 
made up of novels concerned with heroines who are married and have children. 
‗Partnered and settled, these women find that men are now part of the problem and that 
monogamy, which implicitly underpins the chick lit narrative, is hard work‘.81 Much 
like their chick lit sisters, these women have fantastic jobs, but whereas the chick litters 
struggle with the notion that work is not enough, mumlit protagonists struggle with 
attempting to navigate their lives while being torn between work and home. Whelehan 
argues that ‗mumlit inevitably beckons to more serious topics through the depiction of 
the ways in which women suddenly have little choice about their destinies when the 
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realities of childcare set in‘.82 What they reveal is that motherhood and work make 
demands that the protagonists cannot reconcile with each other: 
It seems that in chick lit, like Hollywood, there is no benign way to present the 
career woman, since all these texts, conservative or otherwise, vividly depict 
the incompatibility of motherhood and work; yet the novels seem to offer 
implicit critiques of the system that treats women who reproduce with 
contempt.
83
 
The contempt that she identifies at the root of the economic and social system that 
discounts maternity underlies the problems with domesticity after second-wave 
feminism. Women are fed conflicting stories about motherhood: on the one hand it is 
portrayed as the pinnacle of feminine achievement with an intelligent and well-adjusted 
progeny who can only be properly parented by their secure attachment to their mothers 
and on the other hand, motherhood is viewed as thankless, boring, and degrading; it is 
beneath well-educated women who are meant for something better. Whelehan 
ascertains a discrepancy between form and content – mumlit‘s concerns chafe against 
the lightheartedness of chick lit: ‗At least for the singleton there is the gloss of the 
romance, however ironically narrated; mumlit presents problems less easy to shrug off 
with a little whimsical humour‘.84 The New Femininities fiction resists whimsical 
humour in order to avoid shrugging off the problems of the contradictions of the happy 
housewife and the miserable harridan in the home. Additionally, where the mumlit 
novel suppresses the gravity of the issues it has raised, ending ‗in predictable chick lit 
style, which doesn‘t just offer a happy resolution to the lovers but ends with traditional 
social events such as weddings or christenings‘,85 the New Femininities fiction resists 
the conventional public expressions of marriage and motherhood as capable of tying up 
the loose ends that the texts elucidate. 
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 New Femininities fiction arises, too, from the tradition of feminist novels, but 
unlike chick lit and mumlit, they do not offer love as the solution or the reward; 
romantic, conjugal, and maternal love are not adequate compensation nor do they make 
the difficulties ‗all worthwhile‘. However, New Femininities fiction does not reject love 
either. They allow their characters to continue to desire love and even to believe in it 
while simultaneously exposing the contradictions of the love plot. Like the feminist 
novels, New Femininities fiction ends without resolution. Hogeland argues that the CR 
novels‘ open endings served to allow readers to draw their own conclusions and make 
their own choices. New Femininities fiction‘s interrogative endings work to call into 
question the satisfaction of any of the previous endings – reconciliation, independence, 
rejection of love, marriage or birth ceremonies, embracing of love, sexual freedom, 
renunciation of sexuality, because none of these are adequate. Because they negotiate 
with romance and feminist fiction, a reader might hope for love and understanding and 
a return to the bosom of the family or escape to some semblance of freedom, but these 
novels resist such resolution. Simply working from home cannot circumvent the 
contradictions of marriage and motherhood – New Femininities fiction‘s protagonists 
are already there and the contradictions are just as difficult to negotiate and the 
dissatisfactions continue.  
Lorna Sage identifies a ‗new – revisionist – realism‘ that she calls ‗the novel of 
the middle ground‘.86 She associates Iris Murdoch, Edna O‘Brien, Margaret Drabble, 
and Mary McCarthy with this kind of novel and argues that this realism, rather than 
being a conservative move in order to reinstate women in the confines of domesticity, 
worked to unsettle just as effectively as the anti-realism that was being valued by 
postmodernist critics. She connects it to the history of nineteenth-century realist novels: 
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Perhaps after all the traditional novel was rightly anti-utopian? Density, detail, 
particularity, local truths, all the paraphernalia of representation acquire a new 
urgency and poignancy now that they have lost a large part of their prestige. 
This revaluation of realism has something nostalgic about it, of course. But it 
also reflects dissent: a protest on behalf of fiction-as-family, as the middle 
ground where genders and generations can be pinned in focus together. We 
arrive back home, but home has changed.
87
 
The New Femininities fiction takes place in this changed home and are protesting 
fiction-as-family. Home is no longer the haven of the ‗happy housewife‘ yet it is also 
not a place from which one can simply walk away; its contradictions adhere and are the 
contradictions of postmodern gender ideology. Women are empowered and fabulous, 
but they are still the domestic workhorses and the sources of love and nurturing of the 
next generation. This exploration of contradictions places these novels firmly in the 
realist tradition of the nineteenth century with George Eliot, Henry James, and Gustave 
Flaubert. As Norma Clarke argues, ‗Throughout the nineteenth century, novelists had 
explored the contradictions in women‘s lives, the lack of fit between ideal and reality, 
the stranglehold of myth and ideology‘.88 Even if the myths and ideology of what it 
means to be a woman have changed, they continue to exercise a stranglehold on their 
gendered subjects. 
I started out wanting to look at novels about married women to see if it was 
possible to square marriage and motherhood with gender studies. I began to look at 
novels that had a married woman as the central protagonist and found myself 
particularly attracted to novels of domestic stasis; novels that maintain a close focus on 
the interior life confined within a domestic setting. Some of the protagonists do travel, 
but never on holiday, rather they travel in order to retrieve a brother‘s body or to go to 
Canada for alcohol rehabilitation. Thus, New Femininities fiction ends up being about 
                                                             
87 Sage 1992, p. 71. 
88 Norma Clarke, ‗Feminism and the Popular Novel of the 1890s: A Brief Consideration of a Forgotten 
Feminist Novelist‘, Feminist Review 20 (1985), p. 93, quoted in Whelehan 2005, p. 65. 
27 
 
particular works rather than authors. However, there are some authors, Anne Enright for 
example, who tend to write fiction and nonfiction whose concerns and aesthetics are 
with new domestic femininities. I also wanted to retain a focus on novels written by 
women, because just as I think the domestic deserves attention, I equally believe that 
women writers deserve notice. Perhaps I should qualify the term ‗women‘ as 
functioning in erasure as I am not asserting that one can easily group all biological 
females together in a universal container, still the category continues to be useful to 
think with. Nor am I asserting that New Femininities fiction could only be written by 
biological females. Men could write New Femininities fiction if they are open to the 
contradictions and performances of femininities that negotiate with the traditional and 
the feminist while neither fully rejecting nor embracing either. As novels accrued, I 
found that the ones that held my attention, fascinated and perplexed me, were 
concerned with the nature of the self, with a self that was plural and ‗in process‘, and 
made use of particular narrative devices – ironic voice, unreliable narration, free 
indirect discourse, and interrogative endings – that exceeded their roles as simply 
telling stories. The relationship between these narrative devices and exploration of self 
and gender then became the focus of my project expanding its boundaries to address 
work that is not about married women as central characters, or, in the case of A.L. 
Kennedy‘s Paradise, is not about a married woman at all.  
Emma Parker cites a debate within the Orange Prize at its inception in 1996 
which contended that British women‘s writing was dreary, parochial, and confined to 
the domestic while American women‘s writing was sharper and vigorous. She quotes 
Val Hennessy‘s assertion that ‗American women writers seem to be more energetic and 
exciting. They seem to be able to lift themselves out of their own domestic routine in 
their books. They go away from all that, move out of their own spheres and go further 
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abroad for their experiences‘.89 I would question whether what these critics found 
lacking in British women‘s domestic fiction might not be what Lauret identifies as 
definitive in American realist texts, ‗Utopian elements which posit the possibility of 
social change‘.90 The British novel resists the American impulse to envision a brighter 
and better future. It is exactly this anti-Utopian impulse which I found most valuable in 
the texts that I have chosen to examine as representative of New Femininities fiction. 
These fictions put the contentions about British versus American fiction to the test – are 
small domestic novels dreary and parochial or do they prove that one does not need to 
go abroad to write ambitious stories; that the redemptive self is not the only interesting 
story? All the New Femininities writers are British except Alice Munro who is 
Canadian and whose writing embraces not just the domestic, but the small town and the 
insular, repeating the same stories again and again, while always managing to say 
something new and fresh, and Anne Enright who is Irish and makes use of 
claustrophobic domesticity to upset the gendered mind/body binary. I would argue that 
Canada and Ireland inhabit a middle ground between Britain and the United States and I 
identify these authors‘ affinity with small-scale British domestic fictions. New 
Femininities fiction proves not only that the domestic is worthy of attention, but that the 
small domestic British woman-authored novel is able to do remarkable things. 
However, just as my criteria expanded to allow in other types of fiction, novels 
were eliminated which seemed to fit my original criteria. For example, Lionel Shriver‘s 
We Need to Talk About Kevin seemed to be a perfect fit with my topic. Her narrator, 
Eva, is married with children, she utilises an ironic voice, she is an unreliable narrator, 
and the novel concludes in an arguably interrogative fashion. However, her use of the 
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narrative devices does not allow her novel to exceed the role of simply telling stories. 
She is not comfortable with the necessary contradictions, both formal and within 
content, with which New Femininities fiction is centrally concerned. Another example 
that helps to elucidate my elimination process is Fay Weldon‘s She May Not Leave. 
Weldon makes use of a fascinating postmodern narrative technique; her first person 
narrator also tells the story of her granddaughter‘s marriage and motherhood in third 
person narration making use of paralepsis. Grandma appears to be all-knowing and all-
seeing in relation to her granddaughter‘s life. However, the novel fits much better with 
the tradition of consciousness-raising novels. At its conclusion, Hattie realises that she 
finds marriage and motherhood unliveable and would rather leave them to the ruthless 
women willing to fight for them. This epiphanic realisation and rejection of marriage 
and motherhood illuminates the novel‘s lack of subtlety and comfort with the 
discomfort of contradictions in women‘s lives and, like the conclusions of the mumlit 
novels, feels artificially imposed in the name of a feminist happy ending. It does not 
actually resolve the issues it has raised; it sidesteps them.  
The ‗New Femininities‘ fictions allow their language the necessary freedom to 
multiply meanings and enact the narrative conflicts they raise. By doing so, they 
undermine the binary oppositions which structure a gendered world. These works are 
ahead of theory. They do a clever job of being both highly appealing to female 
readership while situated in a complex way with feminism – and even have something 
pleasurable to offer literary critics in their masterful uses of narrative devices. I argue 
that the models of existing criticism would do a disservice to these texts because much 
of the criticism either overvalues the theoretical and, as Robbins repeatedly points out 
in her analysis of literary feminisms, ‗forgets the literariness (the forms and language) 
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of the literary text‘,91 or seeks to identify a ‗feminine‘ language the definition of which 
serves to reinforce and revalue patriarchal notions of femininity. The readings that this 
fiction requires necessitate a negotiation with established models of feminist literary 
criticism.  
Robin Mills, Lynne Pearce, Sue Spaull, and Elaine Millard identify three major 
stages in the development of feminist theory: ‗first, a critique of male canonical writing, 
complaining about the negative images of women; secondly, a concentration on the 
establishment and tracing of a female literary tradition, re-valuing those texts which had 
been written by women; and thirdly, a calling into question of gender difference‘.92 One 
of the foundational texts of feminist literary criticism was Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar‘s The Madwoman in the Attic The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century 
Literary Imagination (1979) which used the metaphor of the madwoman as the key to 
female authorship. However, they had to ignore other metaphors in the works they 
analysed in order to make madness seem to be the most fitting explanation. As Mills et 
al argue, ‗The main problem […] with Gilbert and Gubar‘s mode of analysis is that it 
appears to assume a universal archetypal female subject which ignores the changing 
modes of femininity which become possible at particular historical moments‘.93 Nor 
does the madwoman metaphor offer much to a reading of the New Femininities fiction. 
Elaine Showalter with A Literature of Their Own:British Women Novelists from 
Charlotte Brontë to Doris Lessing (1977) introduced Gynocriticism ‗whose aim‘, 
according to Mills et al, ‗was not only to read women‘s literature for its portrayal of 
women‘s experience […] but who sought to identify an authentic female voice in 
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women‘s writing: a style and genre which was distinctly female‘.94 However, the search 
for an authentic female voice once again ignores the differences of women in order to 
create a unified history. The notion of a female voice often leads critics into the morass 
of attempting to pin down what exactly would constitute a female voice. How would it 
be different from a male voice? And what is it about women that makes them different? 
Answers to these questions have led to over-valuing what has traditionally been 
patriarchy‘s definition of the feminine: passivity, relationality, and the body. The third 
stage, post-structuralists represented by Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Julia 
Kristeva, called into question any division based upon gender because it is ‗socially 
produced, through language and through the interaction of different discourses. Thus, 
no meaning is always already there‘.95 Thus there is no intrinsic gender, ‗―masculinity‖ 
and ―femininity‖ do not pre-exist the discursive processes that give them meaning: they 
are constructed through those processes‘.96 This is a powerful theoretical position to 
reach, but one that proved difficult to negotiate in practice. 
Hélène Cixous in her experimental essay ‗Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways 
Out/Forays‘ (1975) called attention to the power of language to revolutionise gender 
relations by identifying that ‗dual, hierarchized oppositions‘ lay at the root of patriarchy 
and organise discourse. She posits that the only truly creative people are those who can 
reconcile the different genders within themselves. She calls for an l’écriture féminine 
that writes in such a way as to exceed the rules of discourse, that overflows them; a 
writing that comes from a connection to the mother and is written in her milk. This 
writing can be produced by both men and women, as her example of James Joyce 
exemplifies, but Cixous argues that women are much more likely to be able to write this 
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way because of their experience of otherness. I will argue that her call to transgress the 
boundaries of binary oppositions does not require a discourse that is excessive and 
poetic as this might imply, and as Cixous‘s choice of examples seems to suggest. The 
formal features of the New Femininities fiction answer this call by writing in ways that 
straddle the boundaries between binary oppositions of gender without setting down on 
either side. To use Cixous‘s examples, the use of unreliable narration, free indirect 
discourse, an ironic voice, and interrogative endings allows the characters in these 
novels and short stories to be both active and passive, head and heart, intelligible and 
palpable. They can fulfil Cixous‘s call to occupy both the body and the mind but 
without having to gush or babble in a feminine language that is somehow more ‗natural‘ 
to women. 
The basis of Cixous‘s argument for l’écriture féminine is powerful and 
persuasive. The root of patriarchy is a division of the world into couples and that one 
who embraces within her self qualities that fall on both sides of the binary oppositions 
attains a ‗bisexuality‘ that Cixous defines as ‗the location within oneself of the presence 
of both sexes, evident and insistent in different ways according to the individual, the 
nonexclusion of difference or of a sex‘.97 This bisexuality is one which recognises that a 
person never fully occupies one side or the other of the binary oppositions. Women 
have qualities that are gendered masculine and men have ones that are gendered 
feminine. Embracing this ‗bisexuality‘ is the basis of Cixous‘s écriture féminine. Kari 
Weil explains that Cixous‘s theoretical practice is strongly informed by Jacques 
Derrida. She asserts that ‗[t]he term ‗écriture‘ itself is one that Derrida uses to 
correspond to the notion of différance and refers to a process of textual production in 
which meaning is never fully present, never totalizable, but, rather, always deferred or 
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in process‘.98 Therefore, although Cixous identifies that patriarchy divides the world 
into two, through Derrida she is aware that these binaries are illusory. Ruth Robbins 
argues that in Cixous‘s écriture féminine, ‗[t]he binary relationship that appears to 
affirm the presence and meaning collapses, not into meaninglessness, but into a 
different and deferred set of possibilities that is not foreclosed (already decided and 
fixed)‘.99 The binary relationship can no longer limit definitively, but instead opens up 
possibilities to think differently. 
However, the question of how to straddle or subvert these binaries without 
situating oneself on one side or the other was a fundamental problem of second wave 
feminism. This difficulty resulted in theories that either embraced the feminine/negative 
side of the binary, finding value in the characteristics that had traditionally defined 
women‘s inferiority, or that worked to upset these binaries and allow women to occupy 
the masculine/‘positive‘ side, asserting that women possess these characteristics and are 
just as valuable as men. Kari Weil argues that the position French feminists found 
themselves in, wanting to use the tools of Derrida, but wanting to retain gender as a 
useful category, was a difficult one:  
As we turn to the notion of ‗feminine writing‘ we begin to see the difficult line 
which French feminists tread, wanting, on the one hand, not to collude with a 
system of thought which has constructed identities such as femininity only to 
subordinate them, and on the other hand, to discover or, at least, imagine a 
different ‗feminine‘ which has been heretofore oppressed and unspoken 
because it is unspeakable within the patriarchal language.
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Finding a version of ‗feminine‘ that was different, oppressed, and unspeakable within 
patriarchal language is impossible for the very notion of masculine and feminine 
underlie patriarchy. Often their new femininity was defined by the very terms they were 
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rejecting whether it was a revaluing of the feminine negative or an embrace of women‘s 
ability to personify the masculine and ‗positive‘ side. 
Cixous is aware of these dangers. She writes that the solution to the ‗couples‘ 
that dictate gender relations ‗is not a question of appropriating their [patriarchy‘s] 
instruments, their concepts, their places for oneself or of wishing oneself in their 
position of mastery‘.101 Cixous struggles with how to use the tools of poststructuralism 
to rethink the position of women. Toril Moi argues that Cixous‘s project is to imagine 
what woman is if she does not fit into the feminine/negative side of the binary 
oppositions, most particularly the definition of woman as passive: 
‗Either woman is passive or she doesn‘t exist‘. Her whole theoretical project 
can in one sense be summed up as the effort to undo this logocentric ideology: 
to proclaim woman as the source of life, power and energy and to hail the 
advent of a new, feminine language that ceaselessly subverts these patriarchal 
binary schemes where logocentrism colludes with phallocentrism in an effort 
to oppress and silence women.
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However, the proclamation of woman as the source of life, power and energy, Cixous‘s 
l’écriture féminine, often reads as a revaluation of the body that appropriates 
patriarchy‘s instruments through a reclamation and elevation of the maternal function, 
the female body, and patriarchy‘s definition of femininity to claim a position of 
superiority if not mastery. Woman, because of her marginality and her life-giving 
function, is better suited to liberate the world. Along the way she is defined as chaotic 
and flowing, equated to the gush of her menstrual blood and mother‘s milk. This is an 
essentialism that reinforces the patriarchal definitions of women as ruled by her bodily 
functions, hysterical, and unreliable.  
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That is to say, Cixous‘s recourse to the body is problematically rooted in the 
traditional opposition of body and mind and a recognition that women need to be 
willing to occupy both; to straddle that binary of mind and body. A reconciliation of the 
mind and body, a recognition that women are both, is revolutionary. Her vision of a 
writing style that allows women to work in the in-between, to inhabit the middle ground 
between binary oppositions, identifies a way forward in which language can be used as 
a tool to undermine the oppression of absolute opposites: 
To admit that writing is precisely working (in) the in-between, inspecting the 
process of the same and of the other without which nothing can live, undoing 
the work of death – to admit this is first to want the two, as well as both, the 
ensemble of the one and the other, not fixed in sequences of struggle and 
expulsion or some other form of death but infinitely dynamized by an incessant 
process of exchange from one subject to another. A process of different 
subjects knowing one another and beginning one another anew only from the 
living boundaries of the other: a multiple and inexhaustible course with 
millions of encounters and transformations of the same into the other and into 
the in-between, from which woman takes her forms (and man, in his turn; but 
that‘s his other history).103 
This kind of writing does not regard one side of an opposition as superior to the other or 
seek to value a previously discounted characteristic, but rather find a place where 
‗both/and‘ can be inhabited rather than ‗either/or‘. It has a regard for the porous 
boundary where the binaries overlap.  
However, as Robbins explains, Cixous‘s ‗writing enacts a resistance to a closed 
system of duality, through a mode of writing which is rhetorical, excessive and poetic 
rather than logical, ordered and prosaic‘.104 She recognises the limits that binary 
thinking has placed on gendered beings, but her response to a ‗closed system of duality‘ 
is to introduce her own binaries – rhetorical/logical, excessive/ordered, poetic/prosaic – 
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and place the value on the feminine side. Furthermore, at times her discourse seems to 
be claiming a biological value to women‘s writing: 
Her rising: is not erection. But diffusion. Not the shaft. The vessel. Let her 
write! And her text knows in seeking itself that it is more than flesh and blood, 
dough kneading itself, rising, uprising openly with resounding, perfumed 
ingredients, a turbulent compound of flying colours, leafy spaces, and rivers 
flowing to the sea we feed‘.105 
She situates woman securely on one side of the bodily binary oppositions. She is not 
erection, male, but diffusion, female. She is not the shaft, male, she is the vessel, 
female. It is a valuation that comes at the expense of claiming women‘s ability to be 
both body and mind and by privileging the body serves to invert the hierarchy; what is 
feminine becomes the positive value and masculine becomes negative. Cixous 
envisioned the liberation of women through a writing style that was distinctly female, 
rooted in her body and in her experience as ‗Other‘. Cixous‘s underlying argument, that 
it is dividing the world into couples that maintains women‘s position in society, is 
convincing when she asserts: ‗Woman must write her body, must make up the 
unimpeded tongue that bursts partitions, classes, and rhetorics, orders and codes, must 
inundate, run through, go beyond the discourse with its last reserves‘.106 However, it is 
not in a rhetorical, excessive, poetic prose style that women (and men) can transcend 
gender boundaries; it is in a style that allows them to straddle these oppositions.  
I attempt to identify the characteristics of this ‗style‘ and to look at the language 
these authors use without having to label it ‗feminine‘ and by so doing establish, build, 
or reinforce a boundary with some undefined ‗masculine‘ language which stands in for 
all occurrences that are not ‗feminine‘. Additionally, I attempt to forge a transformed, 
adapted concept vocabulary for dealing with this group of writers. As Maggie Humm 
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argues ‗Feminist criticism has no party line but brings together many ways of looking 
which in turn draw on different disciplines and debates‘.107 To this end, I make use of 
various discourses to show how the different authors either negotiate with that discourse 
or prove its inadequacy to describe or explain these new femininities. Marilyn R. 
Farwell argues that lesbian criticism ‗must find a way to accommodate some of the 
revolutionary postmodern insights of feminist and lesbian thinking on textuality and at 
the same time validate both traditional and non-traditional stories as lesbian and as 
disruptive‘.108 I attempt to do something similar for New Femininities fiction in order to 
accommodate the revolutionary within the traditional validating domestic white middle-
class femininities as disruptive.  
In the first chapter I argue that New Femininities fiction utilises unreliable 
narration in order to not only upset the binaries of reliable/unreliable, truth/lie, but make 
them irrelevant and call into question the system of authentication by narration. Ali 
Smith‘s The Accidental unseats the reassurance of the domestic and disrupts the 
binaries of comfort and discomfort. Julie Myerson‘s The Story of You disturbs the 
boundaries between truth and untruth, reality and delusion. Alice Munro‘s short fiction 
renders a vision of self and autonomy that is dependent on relationships, that cannot 
happen in isolation, and her unreliable narration works to draw attention to the conflicts 
of subjectivity inherent in her characters‘ desires for both connection and disconnection. 
Unreliable narration and the subject of the next chapter, first person ironic narration, 
overlap and in fact may be performed by the same narrator, for example Barbara Covett 
in Zoë Heller‘s Notes on a Scandal is both unreliable and ironic. Unreliable and ironic 
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narration are ways that first person narrators call into question the certainties around 
which gender identities are fashioned.  
In the second chapter, I suggest that, rather than embracing Cixous‘s call to 
transgress the boundaries of binary oppositions through a discourse that is excessive, 
poetic, and feminine, the use of the ironic voice allows the New Femininities‘ fictions‘ 
characters to occupy both sides of binary oppositions. Anne Enright‘s The Gathering 
uses her ironic voice to disrupt the mind/body ‗couple‘ – her ironic hovering figures an 
embodied intellect. Zoë Heller‘s Notes on a Scandal reworks Thomas Hardy‘s Far 
From the Madding Crowd and negotiates the boundary between masculine spectator 
and feminine spectacle by casting a woman in the role of spectator. A.L. Kennedy‘s 
Paradise problematises the boundaries of masculine ‗alcoholic‘ and feminine 
‗accomplice‘.  
The third-person narrators of the New Femininities‘ fiction embed their irony in 
free indirect discourse. In the third chapter, I assert that free indirect discourse is used to 
call into question the truth of what is said and who says it and thus undermines the 
ideology of marriage and motherhood that serves to limit women‘s lives. In their ironic 
asides rendered in free indirect discourse the characters negotiate a particularised way 
to occupy these roles without the need to sacrifice their autonomy or reject 
relationships. Rachel Cusk‘s use of free indirect discourse in Arlington Park functions 
to expose the unnaturalness of ‗natural‘ feminine gender roles, voice her characters‘ 
inner rebellion, and suggest the potentiality of subversive performances of femininity. 
Charlotte Mendelson‘s When We Were Bad uses free indirect discourse to enact a self 
divided and to articulate a way for her character to contain her needs for autonomy 
within the confines of her relationships. Tessa Hadley‘s Accidents in the Home uses free 
indirect discourse to negotiate between the genres of anti-romance and the sentimental 
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domestic novel and rereads Gustave Flaubert‘s Madame Bovary utilising Henry James‘s 
embrace of the imagination of pleasure.  
The first three chapters share a concern with narration and the various ways that 
the New Femininities fiction has of dealing with the binaries that shape reality. They 
share an overarching concern with challenging the fundamental certainties that have 
been thought to organise gender and limit women‘s possibilities. I look at the way these 
authors negotiate narrative form to talk about and respond to feminist theory and ideas 
of femininity.  
The fourth chapter extends my interest from narration to how the structuring of 
a text serves to underline the unseating of certainties. In this chapter, I argue that 
interrogative endings offer a proliferation of questions rather than closure to the New 
Femininities fiction. They negotiate with traditional endings and refuse the certainty 
implied by the conventional happy ending suggesting that no ending is adequate for a 
tales of domestic femininities. Just as feminism could not square itself with 
heterosexual domesticity, fiction is unable to resolve the equation and allowing these 
contradictions to stand without recourse to a Utopian sensibility is what makes these 
fictions new. The concerns New Femininities fiction has with unseating uncertainties 
highlights the performativity of femininity and how negotiable gender really is. 
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Chapter One: The Unreliable Narrator and the ‘New 
Femininities’ Novel 
The female narrators of the ‗New Femininities‘ fiction are darkly funny, ironically self-
deprecating, clever and above all not to be trusted. When they are honest they are 
brutally so, but they are also unreliable. They reveal either too much, using details that 
they could not know; too little, leaving the reader grappling with what is missing; or 
continuously call into question the veracity of what they have said. These narrators are 
not mad, mentally deficient, wilfully deceptive, or alarmingly naïve, as common 
definitions of ‗unreliable narrator‘ imply. These narrators are unreliable because they do 
not necessarily know what really happened and I would argue that these novelists are 
simultaneously resisting the urge to make definitive sense of their stories and frustrating 
the reader‘s ability to do so. They are wilfully ‗incompetent‘ if ‗competence‘ is 
accepted as meaning ‗the capacity to deal adequately with a subject‘.1 Their subjects are 
such that there is no way to adequately deal with them. Ali Smith‘s The Accidental 
weaves a beguiling story (told from multiple viewpoints) about a mysterious young 
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woman who turns up at a family‘s holiday home and intervenes unpredictably in their 
lives bringing both comfort and discomfort, disrupting female (and male) bourgeois 
values: career, marriage, children, and a settled home. For Smith, ‗truth‘ is problematic. 
She uses multiperson narration and paralepsis to create dialogism and to undermine the 
veracity of her narrators and reinforce the elusiveness of ‗truth‘. Julie Myerson‘s The 
Story of You is told by a delusional narrator grieving the loss of her baby daughter. For 
much of her novel, she does not know, is unable to discern, or actively resists allowing 
herself to see the truth. Alice Munro‘s short stories are narrated by speakers who do not 
trust ‗the truth‘ or the need their audience has for it. Her narrators repeatedly thwart the 
meaning of their narratives by calling into question the authenticity of their tales; they 
are self-cancelling. They are unwilling to say definitively whether events happened the 
way that they have said. They withdraw from authorizing their stories. The New 
Femininities authors‘ use of an unreliable narrator does not simply upset the binaries of 
reliable and unreliable, truth and lie. Rather it makes these binaries immaterial; to use 
Cixous‘s terms, it goes beyond the ‗reserve-discourse‘; it ‗wrecks‘ the ‗regulations and 
codes‘ of storytelling.2 In choosing to present their lives through the eyes of narrators 
who question the whole system of authentication by narration, their authors sabotage 
the truth-value of their own stories. 
Wayne C. Booth first used the term ‗the unreliable narrator‘ in his 1961 study 
The Rhetoric of Fiction. According to Booth, the ‗fallible‘ or unreliable narrator is 
distanced from the ‗implied author‘, a construct that ‗carries the reader with him [sic] in 
judging the narrator‘.3 For Booth, a narrator is reliable ‗when he speaks for or acts in 
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accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author‘s norms), 
and unreliable when he does not‘.4 This theory requires that the reader be able to locate 
an implied author in the text, distinguish his norms, and ascertain if his narrator 
transgresses these norms. It also carries an implied sense that ‗normal‘ is a universal 
and concrete term. As Ansgar Nünning argues: ‗The trouble with seemingly self-
explanatory yardsticks like ―normal moral standards‖ and ―basic common sense‖ is that 
no generally accepted standard of normality exists which can serve as the basis for 
impartial judgments‘.5 Another question Booth leaves unanswered is whether the 
transgression of these norms entails immorality or a naïve worldview. What if a narrator 
is ‗normal‘ and ‗moral‘, but still unreliable?  
Even though Booth can be criticised for his confident assumptions about 
readerly competence, coherent authorial consciousness, and the transparency of a 
literary work‘s singular moral position, his main point still has considerable force, 
namely that the reader‘s retrospective discovery of the distance between implied author 
and narrator is crucial to our understanding of the literary work: ‗If [the narrator] is 
discovered to be untrustworthy, then the total effect of the work he relays to us is 
transformed‘.6 Elke D‘hoker argues that this transformation should not provoke a 
dismissal of the story as lies or delusions, but rather instigate a focussing of attention: 
The point of using an unreliable narrator is not to have the whole story 
dismissed as false, but rather to draw attention to the narrator and the way in 
which he or she tells, distorts, or conceals his or her tale. It is therefore 
important to consider unreliability in the novel as a fictional construct with a 
particular purpose.
7
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When faced with unreliability, then, the reader needs to think about why a novelist 
might choose to employ an unreliable narrator; what is she trying to call attention to by 
attributing the narration to someone who is not being completely honest? Unreliability 
in a narrator is not necessarily ‗a matter of lying‘, Booth observes. Rather, ‗[i]t is most 
often a matter of what [Henry] James calls inconscience; the narrator is mistaken, or he 
believes himself to have qualities which the author denies him … [Unreliable narrators] 
make stronger demands on the reader‘s powers of inference than do reliable narrators‘.8 
For Booth, these demands perplex the reader. As he argues about Henry James‘s The 
Turn of the Screw, ‗few of us feel happy with a situation in which we cannot decide 
whether the subject is two evil children as seen by a naïve but well-meaning governess 
or two innocent children as seen by a hysterical, destructive governess‘.9 Following 
D‘hoker, one must ask why James chooses to write a story that complicates the 
difference between the binaries of innocent and evil, well-meaning and destructive? Is it 
simply to make his readers ‗unhappy‘? Or has he complicated the ‗truth‘ of the 
governess/child relationship? Booth identifies the unreliability of the narrator of the 
short story, but he does not concern himself with why James utilizes unreliable 
narration. 
Booth attempts to identify two kinds of unreliable narrators. The first has 
shortcomings we can ignore: ‗even though the narrator may … have serious faults, we 
are scarcely aware of them.‘ But one feels altogether less sanguine about the second: 
although this narrator may have ‗some redeeming qualities‘, the reader cannot accept 
him as a trustworthy guide.
10
 The problem with Booth‘s taxonomy is these categories 
are slippery and could describe most narrators. Here I agree with Frank Kermode: ‗[a]ll 
                                                             
8 Booth 1961, p. 159. 
9 Booth 1961, p. 346. 
10 Booth 1961, p. 300. 
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narrators are unreliable.‘11 However, as Kermode observes, ‗[t]he trouble is not that 
there are unreliable narrators but that we have endorsed the fiction of the ―reliable‖ 
narrator.‘12 In other words, we still subscribe to the humanist thinking that supposes that 
reliable narration is possible. Kathleen Wall argues that, in the last century, novels 
began to reflect a changing attitude towards reliability in response to the changes in 
theories of subjectivity brought about by poststructuralism: ‗The standard definitions of 
an unreliable narrator presuppose a reliable counterpart who is the ―rational, self-
present subject of humanism‖, who occupies a world in which language is a transparent 
medium that is capable of reflecting a ―real‖ world.‘13 She contends that with the 
poststructuralist vision of subjectivity as fluid, in process, and unstable, the reliability of 
narrators too has become questionable: 
These questions are brought into play by our recognition that human 
subjectivity is not entirely coherent; that it is indeed a sight [sic] of conflict; 
that, like unreliable narrators, we frequently ‗lie‘ to ourselves, and – with just a 
shadow of awareness – avoid facts that might undermine the coherence or the 
purpose of narratives we construct about our lives. […] But if ‗subjectivity … 
is precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being reconstituted in 
discourse each time we think or speak‘, then we are forced to think about the 
issue of unreliable narration as a matter of degree rather than as the moral 
aberration of more traditional definitions.
14
 
All narrators are now in some way unreliable because subjectivity itself is unreliable. 
Interestingly, unreliability is most common, as Bruno Zerweck argues, in realist 
contemporary novels: ‗most texts from our century featuring unreliable narrators are not 
experimental, or at least not radically anti-illusionist. It is the realist or only partly anti-
illusionist literature of the twentieth century that is largely characterized by unreliable 
                                                             
11 Frank Kermode, ‗Secrets and Narrative Sequence‘, Critical Inquiry 7 (1980), pp. 89-90.  
12 Kermode 1980, p. 90, n 7. 
13 Kathleen Wall, ‗The Remains of the Day and Its Challenges to Theories of Unreliable Narration‘, 
Journal of Narrative Technique, 24 (1994), p. 21, quotation from Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and 
Poststructuralist Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 41. 
14 Wall 1994, p. 21-2, the quotation is from Weedon 1987, p. 33. 
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narrators‘.15 New Femininities fiction works within a sub-genre of realist writing where 
narration is unreliable because ‗reliability is regarded as an impossibility‘.16 
Unreliability is now the norm. A narrator ‗who exposes his cognitive or epistemological 
limitations is arguably much more in tune with our notions of ―normality‖ and of the 
possibilities of its fictional representation‘.17 Unreliability draws attention to the 
narrator, but also serves to render the work realistic. 
 This fiction, with its unreliable narrators, both aids and frustrates the reader‘s 
desire to decipher ‗what really happened‘. This simultaneous give and take, according 
to Wall, ‗not only refocuses the reader‘s attention on the narrator‘s mental processes, 
but deconstructs the notion of truth, and consequently questions both ―reliable‖ and 
―unreliable‖ narration and the distinctions we make between them‘.18 To what end? It 
changes the focus from ‗what really happened‘ and an attempt to determine the 
narrator‘s moral directive or the values of the implied author to a focus on the conflicts 
of subjectivity:  
Moving to the end of this century, however, writers may be far more 
concerned with the causes and consequences of split subjectivity than with 
values. The result may be a diminishing focus upon the conflict between the 
norms and values of the implied author and those held by the narrator […] and 
a greater focus on interior conflicts, conflicts of subjectivity, that assert or 
manifest themselves in unreliable narration.
19
 
These conflicts of subjectivity are exemplified in the unreliable New Femininities 
narrator as she simultaneously narrates and tries to make sense of her experience. Her 
attempt to articulate something which she herself cannot quite grasp lies at the root of 
the unreliability of her narration. This ‗something‘ that is difficult to translate into 
                                                             
15 Bruno Zerweck, ‗Historicizing Unreliable Narration: Unreliability and Cultural Discourse in Narrative 
Fiction‘, Style, 35 (2001), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_1_35/ai_97074176/print 
[accessed 11 December 2007], paragraph 46. 
16 Zerweck 2001, paragraph 47. 
17 Zerweck 2001, paragraph 47. 
18 Wall 1994, p. 23. 
19 Wall 1994, p. 38. 
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language could be described as the ‗truth‘ of the narrator‘s experience. This is not a 
truth that can be reliably proven; its veracity is contingent and immaterial. Rather its 
telling allows its authors to try to get beyond what Cixous calls ‗the ultimate reserve-
discourse‘ to speak in a ‗language that will wreck partitions, classes, and rhetorics, 
regulations and codes‘.20 Their narratives seek to tell the truth in a way that does not 
require the repudiation of its binary opposite, the untruth; sometimes truth is a lie and 
sometimes lies are true. 
Comforting Discomfort: Ali Smith’s The Accidental 
Ali Smith‘s The Accidental is deeply concerned with truth and authority. Its first person 
narrator‘s unreliability questions the veracity of narratorial authority by claiming the 
plots of movies as her life experience and in her actions in the third-person narratives 
focalised through the four members of the Smart family; the children, Astrid and 
Magnus, and the parents, Michael and Eve. The use of this multivoice narration allows 
an insight into the five characters and the contradictions revealed serve to complicate 
the ‗truth‘ of each character‘s experience. Alhambra, the first-person narrator, speaks 
for herself, but she chooses to relay information that does not reveal much about her. 
Her characterisation is achieved by the composite impressions offered by the differing 
accounts of her in the variously focalised third-person sections. She is, by and large, a 
truth-teller, but her truths are received as outrageous stories and her lies as truth. Ali 
Smith makes use of young female grifters and drifters in her plots in order to disrupt the 
domestic status quo. Alhambra appears at the Smarts‘ rented summer cottage at a 
pivotal time in their lives. Each member is expecting to return home to an upheaval: 
Astrid is starting secondary school, Magnus is implicated in a prank that resulted in the 
                                                             
20 Cixous 1997a, p. 355. 
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suicide of a classmate, Michael‘s sexual exploits with female students is about to come 
to light, and Eve is facing the deadline for a book which she is unable to write. 
Alhambra‘s presence brings the family together during their holiday, introduces 
comfort into the discomfort of the ‗substandard‘ summerhouse, but her theft of the 
entire contents of their permanent home, including the doorknobs, disrupts the comfort 
of the settled domestic home. The domestic is meant to reassure, but it is exactly that 
reassurance Alhambra unseats. She makes the uncomfortable comfortable and intrudes 
discomfort into the comfortable domestic environment. She wrecks the partition 
between the binary of comfort and discomfort and undermines the authenticity that 
narrating is supposed to offer.  
Alhambra‘s first-person narrative opens and closes the novel reinforcing a sense 
that it is in some way her narrative. The structure of the novel makes use of what Brian 
Richardson calls ‗multiperson narration‘ and which resembles Dickens‘s use of both an 
omniscient third-person narrator and the first person narration of Esther Summerson in 
Bleak House. Unlike Dickens, however, Smith avoids the omniscient and opinionated 
heterodiegetic narrator and uses a limited third person narration that is confined to the 
knowledge of its focalising character. Richardson argues that the presence of more than 
one narrator in a novel exceeds the parameters of narrative identified by Gerard 
Genette: 
The novelist‘s choice, unlike the narrator‘s, is not between two grammatical 
forms, but between two narrative postures (whose grammatical forms are 
simply an automatic consequence): to have the story told by one of its 
‗characters,‘ or to have it told by a narrator outside of the story.21  
Genette only recognises the ‗either/or‘ of narrative postures and not the possibility that 
a novelist could choose to utilise or resist both postures. This is exactly what Smith 
                                                             
21 Gerard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1980), p. 244. 
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does; she chooses to have both an outside narrator and a character within the story 
speak. What multiperson narration allows a novelist to achieve, Richardson argues, is to 
‗allow the free play of multiple voices and [… generate] a greater degree of dialogism 
than more conventional techniques typically allow‘.22 The many voices speaking in 
Smith‘s text allow the ‗truth‘ of what they relate to be called into question. The reader 
is aware that the woman they refer to as ‗Amber‘ is in fact called ‗Alhambra‘ and that 
they have, as a group, based their perception of her on a misunderstanding; they 
misname her in both actual name and in their perception of her motivations and 
truthfulness. Their perceptions of her are unreliable. 
The reliability of Alhambra‘s personal narrative is questionable as well. She 
knows details about her conception that she could not possibly know. This is a use of 
‗paralepsis‘ which Ruediger Heinze defines as ‗the phenomenon of a first-person 
narrator knowing and/or sensing something to which he/she should not have access by 
all that we as readers know about human cognition and perception‘.23 The impossibility 
of some of her narration renders her unreliable, but rather than invite a wholesale 
rejection of her narration this paralepsis invites the reader to make sense of it. Ruth 
Ronen argues that ‗impossibilities, in the logical sense, have become a central poetic 
device, which shows that contradictions in themselves do not collapse the coherence of 
a fictional world‘.24 Fiction is able to create multiple and contradictory worlds that, like 
Jorge Luis Borges‘s multiverses, feature ‗an infinite series of times, in a growing, 
dizzying net of divergent, convergent and parallel times. This network of times […] 
                                                             
22 Brian Richardson, Unnatural Voices: Extreme Narration in Modern and Contemporary Fiction 
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006), p. 68. 
23 Ruediger Heinze, ‗Violations of Mimetic Epistemology in First-Person Narrative Fiction‘, Narrative 
16 (2008), p. 282. 
24 Ruth Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 
55. 
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embraces all possibilities of time‘.25 Nor does the presence of impossible narration 
undermine a novel‘s status as a realist text. Jan Alber, et al argue that realist texts often 
make use of what they term ‗impossible narration‘. ‗Standard realist texts, for example, 
are full of unnatural elements such as narratorial omniscience, instances of paralepsis, 
streamlined plots, definitive closure, or what James Phelan calls ―redundant telling‖‘.26 
These instances of impossible narration do not necessarily undermine the realism of the 
text, but serve to draw attention to its concerns. As Tamar Yacobi asserts, often 
deviances and peculiarities can be explained by the novel‘s functional design. 
 Yacobi argues that ‗The work‘s aesthetic, thematic and persuasive goals 
invariably operate as a major guideline to making sense of its peculiarities as well as its 
more regular features‘. This is ‗because the opposite is also true; such peculiarities 
serve as a pointer, if not as a key, to the work‘s functional design‘.27 The novel‘s 
concern with what is the truth and who possesses it is echoed and reinforced in 
Alhambra‘s impossible knowledge. The question of ‗how does she know‘ raises the 
question of ‗how does anyone know‘ and renders truth elusive and situational. The 
function of the novel is echoed in its thematic content. Yacobi asserts that the functional 
mechanism can be used to tame the deviances and peculiarities it encompasses: 
The functional mechanism imposes order on the deviant terms of the ends 
requiring or justifying that deviance. Whatever looks odd – about the 
characters, the ideas, the structure – can be motivated by the work‘s purpose, 
local or overall, literary or otherwise.
28
 
                                                             
25 Jorge Luis Borges, ‗The Garden of Forking Paths‘, in The New Media Reader, ed. Noah Wardrip-Fruin 
and Nick Montfort ( Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 34. 
26 Jan Alber, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen, and Brian Richardson, ‗Unnatural Narratives, 
Unnatural Narratology: Beyond Mimetic Models‘, Narrative 18 (2010), p. 130. 
27 Tamar Yacobi, ‗Fictional Reliability as a Communicative Problem‘, Poetics Today 2 (1981), p. 117. 
28 Tamar Yacobi, ‗Authorial Rhetoric, Narratorial (Un)Reliability, Divergent Readings: Tolstoy‘s 
Kreutzer Sonata‘, in A Companion to Narrative Theory, ed. by James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 111. 
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Creating a narrator whose reliability is always in question and placing her in contrast to 
the usually reliable third-person narrator whose tale is all about the obscurity of truth 
upsets the reassurance of the realist text as reinforcing the way things are. In a 
discussion of Rick Moody‘s The Ice Storm, Heinze puts into practice Yacobi‘s 
functional design argument to assert that the structure of Moody‘s novel, a third-person 
narrative that is revealed at the last moment to have been the product of one of its 
characters, can be explained by its concern with how perspective affects the nature of 
what is told: 
As an authorial reporter of the events, the narrator is clearly heterodiegetic, 
narrating through a variety of focalizers, one of which he is himself. As Paul, 
he is homo- and autodiegetic. His double status as character and paraleptic 
narrator at the end of the novel undermines the ‗reporter‘ status of the narrator 
function throughout the majority of the narrative, as the reliability of 
everything that has been told to us has to be reevaluated. In fact, as readers we 
realize that our reevaluation cannot reach closure, that on the level of the 
narrative, reliability cannot be decided, that the violation of mimetic 
epistemology coming with a first-person narrator narrating about himself and 
others from an authorial position is indeterminate.
29
 
Much like Alhambra, Paul‘s status as both narrator and character undermines the 
reliability of the novel and leaves it undecidable. It is possible that Alhambra narrates 
the entire novel, that her paraleptic abilities include the reading of the other characters‘ 
minds, and it is this possibility, even if one chooses to reject it, that draws attention to 
the work‘s purpose, to its questioning of authority and truth. Heinze connects The Ice 
Storm‘s undecidability with the novel‘s concern with ‗a time which the characters 
experience as contradictory, making no sense and beyond the roster of received 
cognition‘.30 Smith‘s novel, too, concerns a time which her characters find 
contradictory; they found comfort in an alien place, but returned home to find that it had 
become alien.  
                                                             
29 Heinze 2008, p. 291. 
30 Heinze 2008, p. 291. 
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A noteworthy example of the contradictoriness of the narrative and its interest in 
the contingency of truth and authority can be illustrated by the novel‘s attempt to pin 
down who or what Alhambra is. The family call her ‗Amber‘ because when she 
introduces herself to Michael, he mishears her. ‗She had rung the doorbell this morning. 
He had opened the door and she‘d walked in. Sorry I‘m late, she‘d said. I‘m Amber. 
Car broke down‘.31 He assumes that she is there on legitimate business to meet his wife, 
Eve. Eve assumes that she is ‗something to do with Michael‘ (The Accidental, p. 80). 
Alhambra does not explain her presence, taking advantage of the family‘s willingness 
to make assumptions and not question her appearance in their house and lives. Their 
perceptions of her accent, their attempts to locate her origins geographically, reveal 
their own interests and needs rather than reflecting how she might actually sound. 
Astrid believes that she is interesting and different and hears her accent as Irish or 
American, accents that are both familiar and exotic (The Accidental, p. 31). Michael is 
attracted to her and interprets her accent through the veil of a pivotal sexual awakening 
at age ten with two Swedish women; he perceives her as ‗foreign […] Scandinavian‘ 
(The Accidental, p. 65). Eve is looking for comfort and reads comfort into Alhambra‘s 
voice: ‗You‘re Scottish, aren‘t you? I can hear it in your voice. I love Scotland. I 
haven‘t been for years. My mother was Scottish‘ (The Accidental, p. 91). The effect of 
these perceptions is contradictory and can in no way convey how Alhambra might 
really sound – her voice is co-opted by each member of the Smart family for their own 
purposes: to read Amber as a cool friend, a potential sexual partner, or a familiar and 
reassuring reminder of the past. 
Alhambra is allowed to speak for herself, to narrate her own story. However, her 
account is filled with paralepsis and histories that are not her own. She introduces 
                                                             
31 Ali Smith, The Accidental (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 61. Subsequent quotations will be taken from 
this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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herself by relating the story of how she was conceived in the café of a cinema, a story 
that does not reveal much detail about who she is, but which is deeply connected to her 
name: ‗I am Alhambra, named for the place of my conception‘ (The Accidental, p. 3). 
She describes details of the café where she was conceived on a table, but these are 
details which her mother could not notice laying on the table, and which Alhambra 
cannot know: ‗Behind the till the half-submerged oranges in the orange juice machine 
went round and round on their spikes; the dregs at the bottom of the tank rose and 
settled, rose and settled‘ (The Accidental, p. 1-2). She variously describes her life by 
tracing it through the historical events of 1968 and the plots of films from the sixties 
through the eighties: she is a child of The Sound of Music: ‗My mother was a nun who 
could no longer stand the convent. She married my father, the captain; he was very 
strict. She taught us all to sing and made new clothes out of curtains‘ (The Accidental, 
p. 103), and of Mary Poppins, National Velvet, My Fair Lady, and Rosemary’s Baby, 
among others. Each film‘s recognisable plot is claimed as the events of her life and 
accumulates into a web of contradictions. These are not the details of her life but rather 
the account of a childhood spent watching movies. She traces the history of cinema and 
of the particular Alhambra theatre in which she was conceived; she traces the history of 
the name ‗Alhambra‘ and its various incarnations as a palace, a theatre, and a minivan, 
rather than relate the details of her life or of the ‗truth‘ of who she is. The stories she 
tells are clearly not the truth, but their blatant untruthfulness calls attention to the fact 
that the system of authentication by narration is flawed. Even if she told a story of 
growing up and sexual awakening, it might be no more true than her claim to have lived 
the plot of Dirty Dancing. She finishes the novel by claiming to be ‗everything you ever 
dreamed‘ (The Accidental, p. 306). She leaves open the possibilities. She can be anyone 
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or anything she wants and likewise, by refraining from defining herself, she can be 
anyone or anything her perceivers want. 
 Alhambra‘s resistance to defining herself conclusively echoes the novel‘s 
concern with what is true and its resemblance to what is false or fake. Alhambra 
challenges the certainties that the other characters have about the world and their 
desires to tame it by placing these certainties into words. Eve and Astrid both tell stories 
about Adam, Astrid‘s father, but rather than being drawn into their reminiscences (Eve) 
or fantasies (Astrid), Alhambra resists the story. She tells Astrid she is ‗disgusting‘ and 
Eve that she is ‗boring‘. ‗―Is that the highpoint, the true-blue, the secret-can‘t-be-told 
everything-must-go ultimate all-singing all-dancing story-of-you?‖ she asks Eve. ―Jesus 
God you‘re going to have to tell me something a bit more interesting than that‖‘ (The 
Accidental, p. 196). Despite the ‗truth‘ of Eve‘s story, it is unable to fulfil the role of a 
narrative that encompasses Eve and it fails at the all-important requirement; it is not 
interesting. Alhambra questions Magnus‘s belief in the concrete truthfulness of maths. 
When he tells her that the equals sign was invented by Leibniz, she wants to know how 
he knows this and how he knows that it is true:  
But how do you know it‘s true? Amber said. 
Well, Magnus said. Assuming I read it in a book, because I can‘t 
remember exactly when or how I learned it as a fact, but assuming I read it in a 
book, well, then it will have been in a book, which makes it presumably true. 
Why would being in a book make it true? Amber said. 
Because if it was in a book it was presumably in a schoolbook, a 
textbook, Magnus said, and textbooks tend to have been written by people who 
have studied a subject for a long enough time, and well enough, to be able to 
teach it to people who know a lot less about it. And also. Books are edited by 
editors who check the facts before they publish them. And even assuming I 
didn‘t learn it from a textbook but from a teacher, then the same applies. 
What, Amber said, teachers are edited by editors who check the facts 
before they teach them? (The Accidental, p. 251). 
She undermines all of his assurances, all of his safe places of truth, books and teachers, 
the existence of people who possess fact and truth. His repetition of ‗presumably‘ 
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suggests that knowledge can be taken for granted. Magnus uses book knowledge and 
maths to both make sense of the world and to reassure himself that it is safe and logical. 
Alhambra questions not only the facticity of fact, but even that there is a way to 
definitively know something. She questions the whole system of authentication by 
narration: just because it is written in a book or related by a trusted authority does not 
mean it is the truth. She equally questions whether something that seems ludicrous 
might be reality. She draws a pair of pictures for Astrid: in the first a little girl has a 
drawing of her mother. It is ‗a stick figure with its arms stuck stupidly out, funny jaggy 
hair and one eye much bigger than the other and a scrawl for a mouth‘ (The Accidental, 
p. 120). In the second one, the mother is waiting at the school gates and looks exactly 
like her daughter‘s picture. Astrid finds these pictures hilarious because they call into 
question the assumption of what real people look like. She thinks about ‗how clever the 
idea of it is, the mother standing waiting at the school gates looking like she exists in 
the real world exactly the stupid childish way she has been drawn i.e. as if the way the 
child drew her was actually true and real after all‘ (The Accidental, p. 122). It is 
humorous because it is ludicrous. It goes against everything one knows about what 
mothers look like. The picture raises the possibility that the child‘s representation of her 
mother does not reflect her childishness but rather the reality of her mother or the 
mother reflects her child‘s perception of her, she is determined by that perception. Truth 
and falsehood can be indistinguishable and do not rely on surety or presumption. Rather 
Amber introduces discomfort into Magnus and Astrid‘s confidence in ‗truth‘. 
 New Femininities fictions work to call it into question and to elucidate the 
contingent nature of ‗truth‘, and Smith iterates the discomfiture aroused by disrupting 
the truth-value of narrative. ‗Amber‘, the Smarts‘ perception of Alhambra, brings 
comfort and ease to their uncomfortable summer rental described repeatedly by Astrid 
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as ‗substandard‘ and a ‗dump‘ (The Accidental, p. 7-27). The summer rental falls far 
below Astrid‘s expectations and the qualities of a nice home. The family is on the verge 
of collapse; are all about to face the consequences for their actions or inactions, and the 
time they spend with Amber serves as a reprieve from the worry and the separateness 
that characterises the family. Magnus imagines Amber as the sun in the Smart family‘s 
solar system: ‗Amber at the centre of it like an axis […] holding them all together right 
now in this room, keeping everything going round, stopping everything from 
fragmenting into an exploded nothing that shatters itself out into the furthest reaches of 
the known universe‘ (The Accidental, p. 152). Alhambra acts as the magnet that holds 
them all together and without her they would fragment and divide, the family would 
self-destruct. For the Smart parents, this comfort in the uncomfortable home is inverted 
by returning to their normally comfortable home after the holiday to discover that 
Alhambra has emptied it. The children, however, find that there is something strangely 
comforting in the discomfort of their formerly comfortable home: 
I mean, it was good when we were on holiday this year, he says.[…] It 
was really good, too, he says, when we got back here and there was like nearly 
nothing left.[…] 
It was brilliant, she says. It was so good. 
I think I liked it best when there was totally nothing, Magnus says. When 
you could just walk through a room and there was nothing at all in it. 
And we could hear ourselves all different when we walked or talked, 
even just breathing was different, Astrid says. […] And when we spoke it 
sounded like an echo, all round us, like we lived in a stately historic house, 
Astrid says, or like we were on stage or something because of the carpets gone, 
no carpets where you expected there to be carpets. So it was like we were 
walking out on to a wooden stage every time we went across a room. […] 
Except we weren‘t, she says, we hadn‘t, we were just at home, in our own 
house (The Accidental, p. 257). 
The emptiness transforms their house into something more. It is still home, but it 
exceeds ‗home‘ and becomes a grand estate or a theatre. These images echo Alhambra‘s 
definition of ‗Alhambra‘ as ‗Heaven on earth. Alhambra. […] It‘s a palace in the sun. 
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It‘s a derelict old cinema packed with inflammable filmstock‘ (The Accidental, p. 306). 
By emptying it, Alhambra has transformed their house into a reminder of her, a 
reminder of the comfort of discomfort. The children are the first to realise that there is 
something comforting about the discomfort of their empty house. They find comfort in 
the empty domestic home, in its defamiliarisation of the homely. Astrid says, ‗Getting 
home and walking in through the front door and it all being bare was like hearing 
yourself breathe for the first time. It was like as if someone had turned your breathing 
volume level inside you up to full‘ (The Accidental, p. 217). The empty house allows 
her to hear herself breathe, to recognise her own aliveness. Alhambra has wrecked the 
partitions between comfort and discomfort. Their meaning, much like Freud‘s heimlich 
and unheimlich, when stretched to their limits, comes to denote their binary opposite.  
The homely and unhomely are at the root of Freud‘s analysis in his essay, ‗The 
―Uncanny‖‘. He approaches the uncanny via dictionaries, exploring the meaning of the 
word unheimlich (the English ‗uncanny‘, but which literally translates as ‗unhomely). 
He discovers that ‗heimlich [‗homely‘] is a word the meaning of which develops in the 
direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich 
[unhomely/uncanny]‘.32 The meaning of heimlich eventually coincides with the 
meaning of unheimlich; linguistically the homely can be unhomely, the familiar, 
strange, the domestic, uncanny. The division that should exist between binary opposites 
is elided and it is this intrusion of the other that is uncanny. Cixous argues that this 
uncanny linguistic coupling, the homely and unhomely, is an ‗androgyne‘, the Platonic 
notion of primordial humans made up of both male and female who were separated but 
are now, in heimlich/unheimlich, made one again. She contends that Freud‘s realisation 
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that the pair has been reunited disturbs him and he attempts to alleviate his own 
discomfiture by halting the linguistic discussion and picking up a literary one: 
At the end of this strange crossing of languages, Unheimliche can consider 
itself a part of this myth [of the androgyne]: from Heimliche to Unheimliche. 
In this crossing, the meaning reproduces itself or it becomes extinguished or it 
is stirred up. Opposition has been blunted; the divergence opened just enough 
space for it to be reclosed. The phoenix reproduces itself. Elsewhere, Freud‘s 
commentary attempts to mitigate the disquieting character of the junction by 
contriving a sort of dislocation of contraries: a remarkable repugnance to 
acknowledge the absolute reclosing that takes place. 
33
 
The convergence of meaning of unheimlich and heimlich denotes a couple whose 
separation has been ended; no longer do the words, which she implies are gendered 
male and female, lie on opposite sides of a division: they occupy the same space where 
they might mean the same thing, negate each other‘s meaning, or multiply the 
possibilities. This ‗reclosing‘ of the separation is disquieting and repugnant to Freud, 
Cixous argues, and he attempts to render it less uncanny, to quickly move away from 
meaning into a discussion of the uncanny in action. Cixous raises the questions that this 
merging of meaning introduces for the possibility of subverting patriarchal binary 
schemes through the use of language. She argues: ‗This indirectly brings up the 
question of hierarchy in the dual relationship of two terms: is there any inversion of the 
Heimliche and the Unheimliche, or else, starting from Heimliche, is there any 
emergence, through the Unheimliche, of a new concept?‘34 If heimlich and unheimlich 
have reunited in an androgyne, how do they fit into the binary oppositions that Cixous 
argues structure gender relations? Which is on top, which is the valued term? If there is 
not a positive and negative word, if they are equivalent, then is this something new? 
These questions remain unanswered by Freud. The unheimlich/heimlich androgyne 
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could introduce the revolutionary bisexuality which Cixous seeks and perhaps it is that 
very bisexuality which Freud finds uncanny. 
Thus, the uncanny has the potential to be revolutionary, to model the power of 
terms that are androgynous, that encompass the ‗both/and‘. For The Accidental it is the 
androgyne of comfort and discomfort which, the children recognise, have come to mean 
the same thing bringing the domestic and the alien into close quarters as well. By 
closing the gap of meaning between comfort and discomfort, the assurance and 
certainty of the domestic becomes unsettled. Nicholas Royle, in his discussion of the 
effects of the uncanny, argues that its effects are similar to the Russian formalists‘ 
‗defamiliarization‘ which sought to ‗make strange, to defamiliarize, to make unfamiliar 
all sorts of familiar perceptions and beliefs‘ and gestures towards the ‗revolutionary 
possibilities of making the familiar strange‘.35 Returning home to find one‘s house has 
been completely emptied is the familiar being made strange:  
As soon as they went in Astrid registered the bleeping noise. Then she 
registered that something was different. Then she registered that the place 
where the coatstand usually was was strange. This was because the coatstand 
was gone. […] It is funny, Astrid thinks, that it actually took a moment to 
remember, and sometimes was actually quite difficult to re-imagine what it 
was that was in the space that something left after it got taken away (The 
Accidental, p. 219). 
The familiar has become strange and quickly the strange becomes familiar making it 
difficult to remember what used to be familiar. She traces her dawning awareness that 
something was wrong and recognition of what was different with the repetition of 
‗registered‘. The repeating of ‗actually‘ contributes to the characterisation of Astrid as a 
twelve-year old girl as well as her desire to relate her reaction accurately. Gina Wisker 
asserts that ‗Knowing what we fear, we know what we desire: safety, mother, friends. 
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59 
 
 
Our worst fears arise from dangerous domestic disillusionment‘.36 But, for Astrid and 
Magnus, the defamiliarisation of home, of the domestic, is a source of pleasure and a 
welcome change. Alhambra has familiarised them with the androgyne of 
comfort/discomfort and they feel the pleasure of crossing its wrecked borders. 
 Smith‘s novel unseats the comfort and safety of the domestic. Alhambra calls 
into question the reassurance of the domestic by illuminating comfort/discomfort‘s 
identity as an androgyne that goes beyond the ultimate reserve-discourse, the safety 
offered by a world neatly ordered through binary oppositions. If everything can be 
divided into either/or, right or wrong, good or evil, male or female, then answers are 
much easier and more concrete; the world is a safer more manageable place. However, 
the destruction of the partitions, as the Smart family discovers, opens up the 
possibilities of discovering a truth that can countenance falsehood and comfort in the 
uncomfortable. The unreliable narrator, the use of multiperson narration and paralepsis, 
serve as a layering of pointers that draw attention to the novel‘s purpose: to unseat the 
taken for granted comfort of the domestic, narratorial authority, and an identifiable truth 
guaranteed by its opposite. 
‘It’s what you’ve decided to let yourself feel’: Unreliable Second-
Person Narration in Julie Myerson’s The Story of You 
Julie Myerson‘s The Story of You is told by Rosy, a grief-stricken narrator, who finds 
truth in its opposite, untruth and delusion. She is unreliable because, for much of her 
novel, she does not know, or is unable to discern, and actively resists allowing herself to 
see, the truth. Her ‗narration‘ encompasses both senses of the word identified by 
Kathleen Wall: ‗To narrate comes not only from the Latin narrare, to relate or recount, 
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but is also related to gnarus, knowing, skilled, and thus ultimately allied to the verb 
know (OED). Narration can thus be both an attempt to tell and an effort to understand 
one‘s story‘.37 She tells the story of ‗you‘ in order to reconcile herself with her own 
story. The ‗you‘ whose story she tells, is an unnamed lover with whom she reunites 
after twenty years. As she relates the story of her affair it becomes clear that the story is 
about her grief after the loss of her infant daughter, ‗Baby‘, just before her second 
birthday. Rosy either does not know or keeps secret that her relationship with her lover 
is imaginary, but hints at his intangibility throughout and finally reveals that he had, 
unbeknownst to her, died in a car accident just before their first reunion. Rosy is 
haunted, in fact invites haunting, as neither of her narratees, lover or child, is still alive. 
Like Smith‘s novel, there is a misnaming: the protagonist‘s partner, Tom, calls her 
‗Nic‘ from her middle name, ‗Nicole‘, where before she met him she had been ‗Rosy‘, 
short for ‗Rosemary‘. This misnaming stands in for the loss of self required of her by 
settled domesticity and motherhood. The story is told in the second person, addressed 
throughout to a ‗you‘ whose subject is mostly the lover, but whose referent occasionally 
shifts to the ‗general‘, to stand in for the ‗I‘, or to address her daughter. It is told in the 
present tense, but slides into the past and into the future tenses, at times in the middle of 
a sentence. Myerson‘s shifting tenses and shifting narratees disturb narrative norms of 
realism and enact Nic/Rosy‘s shifting sense of her self as she struggles to discern the 
boundaries between truth and untruth until she realizes that the boundary is immaterial. 
Regardless of what is real or imagined, Rosy‘s ‗I‘ narrates the story of a ‗you‘ which 
allows her to begin to articulate the ‗truth‘ of her experience, its veracity contingent and 
irrelevant. 
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 Rosy addresses her narrative to a specific ‗you‘, much the way a person might in 
a letter or in speech. The use of second person narration is often a device used to 
defamiliarise the narrative certainties of novel reading and implicate the reader in the 
events of the novel. Brian Richardson defines three types of second person narrative 
that he views as ‗unnatural‘ and exceeding the traditional narrative theories of point of 
view: the ‗standard‘ form, in which the protagonist is designated ‗you‘ rather than ‗I‘ or 
‗he‘ or ‗she‘, the ‗hypothetical‘ form, ‗employs the style of the guidebook to recount a 
narrative‘, and the ‗autotelic‘ form, which ‗employs direct address to the reader or 
narratee‘.38 Myerson‘s text does not fit any of these categories: it is not in the ‗standard‘ 
form as she does not ‗oscillate between third and first person perspectives, it is not 
‗hypothetical‘ as it does not resemble a guidebook, nor is it autotelic because it lacks a 
necessary component, what Richardson calls ‗one of the most fascinating features of 
second person narrative: the way the narrative ‗you‘ is alternately opposed to and fused 
with the reader –both the constructed and the actual reader‘.39 The second person is 
used to address a homodiegetic audience and not to address the actual reader. The 
actual reader ‗overhears‘ the narrative and acts as narrative audience rather than 
narratee. However, Myerson does make use of some of the same devices as 
Richardson‘s defamiliarising and postmodern stories. The novel ‗is told primarily in the 
present tense, and some pronominal shifting is evident‘.40 The use of the second person 
does disturb the reading process because ‗you‘ is deictic. As Steve Cohan and Linda M. 
Shires explain: ‗Like other deictic terms – such as here and there, then and now, this 
and that – pronouns mean only by referring (literally pointing) to an antecedent located 
somewhere else in the discourse‘.41 ‗You‘ lacks a concrete identity, and requires 
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40 Richardson 2006, p. 31. 
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deductive thinking to determine whom the narrative is hailing. Emile Benveniste argues 
that ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ ‗do not refer to ―reality‖ or to ―objective‖ positions in space and time 
but to the utterance, unique each time, that contains them‘.42 The identity of ‗you‘ 
depends entirely upon the context in which it is situated, requires some decoding, and 
can often be unclear.  
Richardson asserts that ‗you‘ ‗can refer to the protagonist, the narrator, the 
narratee, or the reader; authors using this form regularly play on this ambiguity as well 
as on its multiple possible meanings‘.43 Myerson recognises the power of the deictic 
even if she only occasionally makes use of it as an address to someone other than the 
homodiegetic audience. Rosy‘s rumination on the signification of proper names, 
addressed to a ‗you‘ that could be replaced by ‗one‘, recognises that names too are 
deictic: 
Nicole, Rosemary, Nic, Rosy. Sometimes you can step outside of a name. Just 
for a moment or two you can step outside of it and there‘s the name and there 
are you, stranded and clueless on the outside, and for a few unnerving 
moments it‘s possible to see it clearly for what it is. A name, a word you call 
someone – a brief flavour on the tongue, stronger or sweeter depending on 
what you think or know of that person. But how does that leave you, the 
person? Nameless and stranded I think (p. 12).
44
 
One‘s name is just as arbitrary as the pronoun ‗you‘. It could refer to another person 
altogether and what it signifies depends ‗on what you think or know of that person‘. 
Whether someone calls her ‗Nic‘ or ‗Rosy‘ they still are not ‗naming‘ her, she is 
something else. Yet without a name, she is nowhere, she is no one. To ‗step outside‘ 
one‘s name is in effect to step outside one‘s self and raises the question: if I am not 
Nicole, Rosemary, Nic, or Rosy, who am I? Richardson asserts that ‗at a more 
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philosophical level, it [second person narration] is admirably suited to express the 
unstable nature and intersubjective constitution of the self‘.45 The use of ‗you‘ 
narration, then, can draw attention to what Yacobi calls a text‘s functional design, its 
‗aesthetic, thematic and persuasive goals‘.46 For Myerson‘s novel, the ambiguity of 
‗you‘ and its defamiliarising of the process of reading a story, calls attention to the 
novel‘s concerns with subjectivity and Rosie‘s attempt to comfort herself by 
externalising part of her self, she transforms ‗I‘ into ‗you‘ in order to articulate a new 
version of her self. 
The source of confusion in the novel arises not because the narrator appears to 
be addressing the actual reader as Richardson prefers, but from the suspicion that some 
of her narrative might be addressed to her lost child, that child and lover have become 
confused. A passage arguably addressed to her lover works equally well if read as 
addressed to her child, ‗Baby‘: ‗I like to imagine that I might get a chance one day to 
ask you, baby, why it had to be like this, why you had to come and find me and make 
me love you so very hard and then why you had to hurt us both, why you had to go?‘ 
(Story, p. 311). The appellation ‗baby‘ is, for Rosy, deictic as it can apply to any small 
child, her lover, or her lost infant. The confusion of the two narratees reinforces the 
sense that this narration is an attempt to tell and simultaneously to begin to understand 
her own story. It works to call into question whether this is an account of romantic love 
or whether the story of romantic love and loss, because of its ubiquity and formulaic 
treatment as a subject of fiction, might be easier to tell than the story of maternal love 
and loss. The nature of these concerns means that The Story of You is a story of 
relationship enacted in the interplay of ‗I‘ and ‗you‘. Monika Fludernik, in her 
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introduction to a special issue of Style on second person narration, unlike Richardson, 
recognises this type of narration as second person narration: 
second-person texts frequently also have an explicit communicative level on 
which a narrator (speaker) tells the story of the ‗you‘ to (sometimes) the ‗you‘ 
protagonist‘s present-day absent or dead, wiser, self. In such contexts the 
narratee acquires a fictional past through the narrative in progress. The 
narrative projects an addressee by means of the second-person pronoun, and 
that speech act of address evolves into a narration of the ‗you‘s‘ past 
experience […] (One might even call such narratives ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ 
narratives).
47
 
Myerson‘s ‗you‘ protagonist, it is revealed, is both absent and dead, and her narrator 
fabricates the past and present she articulates for him. Myerson uses ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ to 
allow Rosy to formulate who she is, who ‗I‘ is, by conjuring up a return to a 
relationship with a ‗you‘ which was cut short by chance and not by death. Her 
interaction with him, imaginary though it is, recalls a past version of herself she can 
recognise: ‗Rosy‘ rather than ‗Nic‘. Fludernik further explains that, ‗These texts also 
involve the narrator‘s past selves to such an extent that the addressee and the narrator 
are protagonists of equal weighting. The story, then, is one of shared experience, not 
solely that of the ‗you‘ protagonist‘.48 ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ narration is used to tell the story of 
a relationship, of two people of ‗equal weighting‘, which Myerson utilises to push the 
boundaries of realism, highlight the contingency and immateriality of ‗truth‘, and allow 
Rosy to ‗retell‘ herself. 
 Luce Irigaray argues that this desire to speak about relationships and give equal 
weighting to both the ‗I‘ and the ‗you‘ characterises feminine speech. After conducting 
studies in linguistic gender which analysed the speech patterns of men and women, 
Irigaray concluded: ‗With men, the I is asserted in different ways; it is significantly 
more important than the you and the world. With women, the I often makes way for 
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you, the world, for the objectivity of words and things‘.49 Men are self-obsessed 
objectifiers and women are selfless relaters. In her study, she asked her subjects to 
create sentences using the preposition ‗with‘ or the adverb ‗together‘: 
female adolescents and students, and many adult women, will respond with 
statements such as: ‗I‘ll go out with him tonight‘; or ‗We‘ll always live 
together‘. Male subjects instead respond: ‗I came with my motorcycle‘; ‗I 
wrote this sentence with my pencil‘; or ‗Me and my guitar are good 
together‘.50 
She concludes that men and women ‗occupy different subjective configurations and 
different worlds‘ in which men relate to objects while women have a ‗taste for 
intersubjectivity‘.51 She sees women‘s choice of subject-subject relations to be the more 
ethical of the two. Irigaray identifies linguistic gender as a basis upon which to theorize 
the necessity of a ‗style‘ of writing that would allow women to speak their own 
feminine subjectivity. Margaret Whitford explains that for Irigaray: ‗What is important 
is to shift the position of the subject in discourse, the subject of enunciation, and find 
ways and ―styles‖ to bring about changes in discourse‘.52 This is an evolution of 
Irigaray‘s version of parler femme: rather than women speaking in a contiguous way 
connected to the layout of their genitals, Irigaray is calling for women to speak and 
write in a style that recognises that their subjectivity is not a discount version of male 
subjectivity, but rather a separate and different subjectivity, and one that is capable of 
recognising the subjectivity of others.  
 By embracing our sexual difference, analysing ‗the formal structures of 
discourse‘, and creating a new ‗style‘, Irigaray asserts, women can establish ‗different 
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norms of life‘.53 However, she chooses not to describe this new style as she did in This 
Sex Which is Not One in order ‗not to reduplicate [the ethics of traditional morality] by 
explaining what is being invented‘.54 Rather, she suggests that the benefits of ‗a style‘ is 
that it is immune to reduction: 
A style resists coding, summarizing, encrypting, pigeon-holing in differently 
programmed machines. It cannot be reduced to oppositions like 
sensible/intelligent, poetic/conceptual … or the masculine/feminine, as 
presented to us by all these dichotomies. A style will not let itself be reduced to 
bipolar alternatives: positive/negative, better/not so good, etc. It may permit 
them, especially in the form of […] in one way or another contradictory 
commentaries, but it escapes them insofar as it creates and is neither resolved 
nor dissolved into dichotomies, however refined.
55
 
Irigaray‘s sense of style is immune to dichotomies, resists being split into binaries, 
because it allows contradictions without resolving or dissolving them. Without 
explaining what it looks like, this style is, up to a point, what I have been identifying in 
the narrative devices utilised by the New Femininities writers. Her argument about 
linguistic gender suggests that a feminine style would take into account women‘s 
preference for ‗subject-subject relations, the present and future tense […] being with, 
being two [l’être (à) deux]‘.56 Thus their style would be characterised by the ‗I‘ and 
‗you‘, present and future tense, and an interest in the objectivity of words and things. It 
could be argued that this ‗feminine‘ style is the style that Myerson employs in her 
narrative.  
However, I would want to qualify this definition on two levels. Firstly, I am 
unconvinced by Irigaray‘s ‗feminine language‘. It maintains the binary of masculine 
and feminine and simply inverts the hierarchy, revaluing the feminine negative while 
denigrating the masculine positive. She reinforces patriarchy‘s definition of women as 
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selfless and defined by their relationships: mother, daughter, wife: subjects who can 
only assert themselves by demurring to an other, a ‗you‘. Rather than recognising that 
women straddle the traditional boundaries of binaristic thinking as this fiction does, are 
both body and mind, active and passive, independent and interdependent, she embraces 
the ‗feminine‘ side and confines women, once again, to relationships. Secondly, 
Myerson‘s use of the ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ is one stripped of its ethics and intersubjectivity. 
Rosy‘s ‗you‘ is imaginary and invented out of, and in order to, allow her to overcome 
her grief. Her lover articulates this provenance: ‗And I think that grief – this grief and 
loss I‘m talking about – it can be a force for good as well as sadness. Stuff can be 
conjured out of grief, quite literally, out of the salt and sweat of the actual tears you cry‘ 
(Story, p. 243). She has conjured him out of her grief as a force against sadness. Rosy is 
not interested in her lover‘s desires. Her relationship with him is imagined in order to 
satisfy her own needs, so much so that his needs exactly mirror hers. The narrative 
often comments on this sameness of feeling and perception: He does not need to speak 
because ‗I know how you feel – I feel it too, I feel exactly the same‘ (Story, p. 9). The 
boundaries between the two of them are completely permeable because ‗you‘ is actually 
an expression of ‗I‘. She blurs the boundaries between real and imaginary and comes to 
the conclusion that this border is irrelevant; the imaginary can be real, or its unreality is 
immaterial: ‗None of this is real, I say, but mostly I say it to myself and I‘m surprised at 
how little it bothers me‘ (Story, p. 228). Unreality no longer ‗bothers‘ her. For her to tell 
her story and make sense of it, the boundaries do not exist. 
It is not the use of the relationship of ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ that allows the novel to enact 
the ‗truth‘ of Rosy‘s conflicts of subjectivity and desire to make sense of her experience 
despite its status as untruth, delusion, and fantasy; rather it is Myerson‘s recognition of 
the power of the deictic to unseat assurances of identity, the temporal unreliability in 
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her use of shifting present and future tenses, and the calling into question the ‗reality‘ of 
her narrative. The novel‘s sense of ‗reality‘ is undermined by Rosy‘s inability to keep 
track of time. When she is with her lover, it stops or moves slowly: ‗Minutes pass. Or I 
think they are minutes. They could be whole hours or days. Time has crinkled up on 
itself again and gone strange‘ (Story, p. 43). Time‘s failure to pass reinforces the sense 
that the lover is not really there, that she is imagining the encounter. The novel does 
have a clear sense of a present, a here-and-now, a settled perspective from which Rosy 
reflects on the relationship and the story of you. Her use of flashback and prolepsis 
make strange her narration – how can a memory in the past be recounted in the present 
tense; how can she know what he will say? She further complicates the difference 
between the three tenses because she feels that she is unable to occupy the time in 
which her lover exists: ‗I‘m locked somewhere between the past and the future and all I 
want is to stay in this present with you‘ (Story, p. 177). Grief has locked her out of the 
present, but the present of her lover is actually the past of the account. St Augustine 
argues that the past and future do not exist. Rather ‗there are three times, a present of 
things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come‘. Past and future 
occur in the present, exist only in our perceptions of them. Augustine asserts that: ‗The 
present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is 
immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation‘.57 Rosy‘s use of 
future tense is an expectation of a future that is impossible. Her lover and her baby will 
not be able to talk to her or to answer her. 
‗And I‘ll ask you this, not because I really need to know, but because I want to 
see, right now after all this time, how you‘ll answer‘. And you‘ll look at me 
and touch my face for a quick second but you‘ll say nothing and I‘ll think how 
after all you‘re just like the photo I still have of you somewhere – secretly 
stashed at the bottom of a box, smiling all the time beneath a pile of other 
photos, impossible to forget, flat and shiny and perfect, my old love. Telling 
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me nothing but acting all the time as if you had the answers, as if you knew, as 
if you know (Story, p. 6). 
Because the future is the present of things to come, expectation, she is able to say ‗I 
will‘ and speak of ‗right now‘. Her qualifications, ‗as if you knew‘, past tense, and ‗as if 
you know‘, present tense, reiterate the impossibility of the situation. Her lover really is 
like the picture: he can tell her nothing; he will tell her nothing. When Rosy makes use 
of the present tense for a past experience she speaks in memory; she truly flashes back 
and occupies the present of that past. Her account of a night twenty years before enacts 
the movement from the present looking back to the present of that past: ‗It wasn‘t cold 
at all, not like this, in fact I know it was a stifling summer‘s night, the kind of airless 
night where it‘s still hot in the city at midnight. It‘s been like that practically all the 
summer term – day after day, night after night‘ (Story, p. 79). The shifting of tense in 
the middle of the sentence means that Rosy‘s memory occurs in the present of things 
past and that she occupies that present; if only in her language. Temporal unreliability is 
naturalised in The Story of You; Rosy is able to simultaneously occupy past, present, 
and future. 
Time is not the only unreliable element of her narrative. Her identity is in flux. 
This is rendered in her language by an early shifting of person. She has been speaking 
as an ‗I‘ narrator, but shifts to ‗a woman‘ and ‗her‘ to detail the difficulty of confessing 
to her husband that she has been conducting an affair: ‗It begins with snow and with a 
woman who must tell her husband the truth before she dissolves to nothing. I don‘t do 
this lightly. She doesn‘t do this lightly‘ (Story, p. 11). She begins the passage as ‗a 
woman‘, she has externalised her own crisis; she narrates the experience as if it is 
happening to someone else. She asserts the ‗I‘ to establish the importance of the 
confession, but returns to ‗she‘ to reiterate its seriousness. Not confessing would mean 
the destruction of her self, she would disappear, dissolve. The next sentence returns to 
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the ‗I‘ never to return to third person. The rest of her narrative is told in ‗first person‘ 
because she takes ownership of her story. Her refusal to place the responsibility of the 
narrative onto a stand-in ‗she‘ is crucial to her project of not only telling but somehow 
making sense of an experience in which she must accept the unreal as representing a 
real experience: ‗In the end it‘s entirely in your own hands – it‘s what you decide to let 
yourself feel that matters. It‘s how much love you decide to give, not what you spend 
time imagining you ought to get back. I think I believe this, certainly I try to‘ (Story, p. 
309). She is using the ‗you‘ in its use as ‗one‘ and iterating that reality or unreality does 
not matter, in the end what is important about her story is the sense she makes of it; 
what she discovers about herself. But even now, she is unable to fully authorize this 
message, that it all comes down to ‗you‘, she must qualify her endorsement of it, she 
thinks she believes it, she wants to believe it. Belief too becomes an androgyne. She can 
neither believe nor disbelieve, she can only negotiate between the two by trying to 
believe. 
Negotiating contradictions is central to this novel. Rosy not only questions the 
‗reality‘ of her experience, she often contradicts her own recollections and her own 
experience. This novel is not only a story, but also an effort to make sense of that story. 
The act of composing and organising what happened and how it happened require 
precision or honesty about the provisional quality of what one relates. To that end, Rosy 
often uses ‗maybe‘ to signal the tenuousness of her own recollections : 
He was being so easy and kind and good – so much the Tom I find it easy to 
respond to – and I drank enough wine almost to forget how crazy and 
confusing the day had been, to forget about you. Maybe the earlier vodkas 
helped too. Or maybe not. Maybe I‘d never had them. Maybe it didn‘t matter. 
After all, vodka leaves no trace on the breath (Story, p. 103). 
She is unsure whether she actually met her lover in a bar and drank vodkas with him. 
She repeats ‗maybe‘ as she proposes why she could put her lover‘s disappearance out of 
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her mind. However, this series of ‗maybes‘ brings her back to the question of the reality 
of her experience and of her lover. She concludes that it does not matter because the 
evidence that would prove the veracity of her experience, the vodka, is undetectable. 
Peter J. Rabinowitz argues that in postmodern detective stories ‗the search is not for 
some empirically verifiable ―truth‖ but rather for some coherent story ―about‖ the 
world‘.58 I would argue that this is true for Myerson and for all of the New Femininities 
texts – these texts are not about a truth or a moral, but rather about telling a story that 
relates something about their experience. If the search is for story rather than truth then 
a narrator may question her own narration and conclude that ‗maybe it didn‘t matter‘. 
For Myerson, the point of her novel is not to find and articulate an undeniable, 
verifiable, universal truth; it is to tell a story that says something ‗true‘ about experience 
even if its truth is a lie. Her use of ‗I-you‘ narration, shifting tenses and narratees 
renders her unreliable and draws attention to conflicts of subjectivity and a desire to 
make sense, to tell the ‗truth‘ of her experience. What she relates is patently untrue, but 
its veracity is immaterial – it is the truth of her experience. This questions the system of 
authentication by narration – she tells lies that allow her to both tell and begin to 
understand her own story. Her narrative is unbelievable, even she can only ‗try‘ to 
believe in it, yet it works to upset the boundaries between reliable/unreliable, 
truth/untruth, and real/unreal to suggest that her experience goes beyond the ultimate 
reserve-discourse and aims for the impossible. 
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The Pleasure and Pain of Connection and Disconnection: Alice 
Munro’s Recent Short Fiction 
It is well established that Alice Munro‘s short stories deal with questions of truth, 
reliability, meaning, and identity, and that she rejects the system of authentication by 
narration. Like much of her mature work, her collections of stories from the 2000s, 
Hateship, Friendship, Courtship, Loveship, Marriage (2001), Runaway (2004), and Too 
Much Happiness (2009), are populated by narrators who do not trust ‗the truth‘ or the 
need their audience has for it. Her narrators repeatedly thwart the meaning of their 
narratives by calling into question the authenticity of their tales: they self-cancel and are 
therefore unreliable. They are unwilling to say definitively whether events happened in 
the way that they have said; in fact they explicitly call into question the very notion that 
any narrative can be ‗the whole truth‘. They withdraw from authorizing their stories 
instead they take ownership of the unreliability of memory without rejecting the story 
that they have told. Truth, meaning, and identity are shown to be complex, changeable, 
and partial – they all exist ‗in process‘. As Margaret Atwood argues, ‗For Munro, a 
thing can be true, but not true, but true nonetheless‘.59 Using established research on the 
puzzling and ambiguous qualities of Munro‘s fiction as a jumping off point, I will 
discuss how her short fiction renders a vision of self and autonomy that is dependent on 
relationships, that cannot happen in isolation, and argue that her unreliable narration 
works to draw attention to the conflicts of subjectivity inherent in her characters‘ 
desires for both connection and disconnection, freedom and enclosure, domesticity and 
autonomy.  
Adrian Hunter argues that Munro‘s short stories are ‗interrogative fictions‘ 
characterised by her ‗technique of multiple layering, […] she allows different strands in 
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her texts to qualify or even to cancel one another out and so produce[s] a sense of 
chronic misapprehension and irresolution‘.60 Munro unseats closure and readerly 
assurance of narratives relaying universal truths; her writing, in Hunter‘s words, ‗backs 
away from its own truth-value‘.61 Coral Ann Howells characterises it as Munro‘s ‗art of 
indeterminacy: her narratives evade any single meaning but allow room for the 
interplay of shifting multiple meanings and of multiple human interests‘.62 Like the 
other authors of New Femininities fiction, she is comfortable with the indeterminacy of 
language and allows her meanings to proliferate. She fashions prose that rewards 
rereading with new information and new interpretations. Howells asserts that Munro‘s 
stories are ‗revisitings [… that] oddly combine familiarity with strangeness‘.63 Munro 
has throughout her career ‗revisited‘ the same narratorial ground, the subjects of 
growing up in rural 1940s Ontario, marriages and migrations to the Canadian West 
Coast, divorce and adultery, and, as she has aged, bereavement and illness; but each 
revisiting introduces something new and, often, surprising to these familiar stories. 
Georgeann Murphy argues that: ‗If she [Munro] calls her identity as a writer into 
question with her series of ambivalent, self-conscious narrators, it is only because she 
would have us realize that none of us can be smug about labeling what we see ―the 
truth‖‘.64 Perceptions colour interpretations so one person‘s truth is not necessarily, or 
even likely, identical to another person‘s; nor can it be the truth. Even authors are 
subject to this ‗truth‘. Robert McGill asserts that Munro‘s unreliability arises from her 
acceptance that ‗narratives are always subjective and therefore partial, and that 
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audiences should not take any one account – whether fictional or non-fictional – as 
telling them the whole story and equipping them adequately for ethical judgments of the 
people involved.
65
 This partiality means that no one in her stories is in possession of the 
‗real‘ or ‗true‘ version of the events. Their narratives are only an interpretation that, in 
all likelihood, will change –their interpretations, like the interpretations of her audience, 
are not fixed. 
Munro‘s interest in the domestic and women‘s ambivalent relationship with 
gender roles – marriage, motherhood, and daughterhood – is equally well documented. 
Murphy identifies ‗connection‘ as ‗a subsuming theme of Munro‘s fiction. Her 
characters, particularly the writers among them, struggle to forge their identities in a 
crucible of connections: of one place to the next, of the past to the present, and of one 
sexual being to another‘.66 Murphy performs a thematic reading of Munro‘s pre-1992 
fiction and catalogues the various connections, familial, location, temporal, and sexual, 
that can be found in her short stories. She argues that Munro‘s fiction is about how 
these various connections ‗shape our lives‘.67 She further argues that Munro‘s style is a 
‗function‘ of connection as well and that Munro ‗follows the modernist tradition of 
juxtaposing seemingly unconnected incidents to evoke a new meaning. Contradictory 
narration, multiple storytellers, and leaps in time require the reader actively to connect 
and interpret divergent materials‘.68 Murphy‘s interest in ‗connection‘ in Munro‘s work 
is to chronicle how the theme functions in Munro‘s prose. My focus will be on how 
Munro‘s unreliable, contradictory, narration is concerned not only with connection, but 
equally concerned with ‗disconnection‘. Further, I will argue that her characters inhabit 
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a subjectivity that requires for them both autonomy and relationship so that they must 
attempt to maintain a delicate tension between connecting and disconnecting, most 
particularly with their spouses or partners.  
Unlike the sexual connection, which Murphy identifies, I will focus on 
‗relationship‘, what Arnold Weinstein calls ‗the bizarre spectacle of connection itself‘.69 
Weinstein holds that passion describes something separate from relationship: ‗Passion 
may easily be constructed as an individual feeling, and here too we reach the crux of 
relationship: it is insistently mutual, connective. The word itself suggests linkage‘.70 
Relationship requires two participants to cooperate, to coexist, and to commingle. It is 
not effortless and its greatest impediment is time: 
To maintain a relationship over time (formerly known as the concept of 
marriage) entails energies other than passion, and indeed poses problems that 
are unknown to passion. The energies in question have to do with fidelity, 
evolving feelings, and the like; the problems involved concern the peculiar 
assertiveness, the quasi-insolence of imposing a human form, of stopping the 
entropic work of time, of making something stick. Coming together is possible 
for anyone; staying together is a challenge to all parties involved […] for it is 
an act of volition, the foisting of a human-made pattern onto the heterogeneous 
randomness of the species.
71
 
Weinstein‘s interest is a literary one. He believes that much of the great fiction and the 
great innovations in narrative in the West have been in the service of articulating the 
pleasures and difficulties of attaining and maintaining relationship with a desired other. 
It is the conflicting desire to preserve the connection and the desire for freedom and fear 
of annihilation of the self at the hand of one‘s beloved, or, indeed, at one‘s own hands 
in the name of love, self-abnegation that lies at the root of the conflicts of prose. 
Weinstein asks: ‗Is anything more ambivalent than human connection? […] The 
physical outcome of pleasure or death is fully matched by the drama of connection as 
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―completion‖ or ―invasion‖ […] Is the self expanded, or diminished, when it encounters 
linkage?‘72 I would question the use of the word ‗completion‘ to describe the positive 
outcome of a romantic connection: does anyone really desire ‗completion‘ when it 
implies concluded, ended, finished? Is the desired end of romantic love the ending of 
self? 
 The attainment of the desired love object, for Munro, does not bring unbridled 
happiness, nor an ending in completion, but rather a sense of the self being diminished 
and of enclosure. Passion, desire, and love cannot prove the culmination of a woman‘s 
identity nor can they bring meaning to her life. Connection, in Munro, is much more 
complicated than sexual compatibility and the longing for it comes equipped with equal 
amounts of desire for disconnection and freedom. In the story ‗Nettles‘, a chance 
meeting with a man she had known and loved when they were children, means that the 
unnamed narrator finds herself falling, comfortably, into the roles that they inhabited as 
children: ‗I would aid and admire him, he would direct and stand ready to protect me‘.73 
Because her recent divorce means that she is living a life of increasing disconnection 
with others, the immediate ease and connection she feels with Mike proves seductive. 
However, this is too simplistic a reading, for even in the middle of the pleasure of 
connection, she is conscious of its naiveté as well. She experiences delight about 
occupying the ‗wife‘s seat‘ in Mike‘s truck, but perceives this pleasure as ‗light-headed 
as an adolescent girl‘s. The notion of being a wife beguiled me, just as if I had never 
been one. This had never happened with the man who was now my actual lover. Could I 
really have settled in, with a true love, and somehow just got rid of the parts of me that 
did not fit, and been happy?‘ (p. 178). While fantasies of companionship and bonhomie 
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‗beguile‘ her, she simultaneously is critical of a ‗true love‘ which requires the 
abandonment of the parts of her self that do not ‗fit‘, a disconnection with her self. She 
is well aware that she is no longer the eight-year-old who loved Mike or a light-headed 
adolescent. Her sense of self, her current identity as divorcee, would be unable to 
unquestioningly occupy the wife‘s seat, the role of directed and protected helpmate, or 
true love‘s amputee. Her conflicted emotions at her reunion with Mike means she 
fluctuates between desire to belong to him and knowledge that she is no longer capable 
of belonging, desire to connect and knowledge of the pleasures of disconnection.  
Michiko Kakutani notes that women in Munro‘s stories ‗oscillate between two 
poles: between domesticity and independence, between a yearning for roots and a 
vision of themselves as solitary outsiders‘.74 The fantasy of wifedom, connection, and 
domesticity is countered by the fantasy of self-control, independence, and freedom. 
These oscillations, with neither pole being a satisfactory location, characterise the 
narrator‘s life. In the aftermath of her divorce where she left ‗husband and house and all 
the things acquired during the marriage (except of course the children, who were to be 
parcelled about) in the hope of making a life that could be lived without hypocrisy or 
deprivation or shame‘ (p. 168), she is conflicted about her children. She can leave the 
domesticity of husband, house, and marital possessions, but her ironic aside exemplifies 
her ambivalence about ‗parcelling‘ her children about, separating and reuniting with 
them. The hope is that without domesticity her life will be authentic and satisfying, 
lacking hypocrisy, deprivation, and shame. However, she reveals in her narrative, 
perhaps without even realising it herself, that her new life very much involves 
hypocrisy, deprivation, and shame. Her daughters have stayed with their father in the 
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family home and visit her in Toronto over the summer holiday. Her new life is so alien 
and unwelcoming to her children that they insist upon returning to their father earlier 
than planned: 
When I came back, alone, I gathered up all reminders of them – a cartoon the 
younger one had drawn, a Glamour magazine that the older one had bought, 
various bits of jewelry and clothing they could wear in Toronto but not at 
home – and stuffed them in a garbage bag. And I did more or less the same 
thing every time I thought of them – I snapped my mind shut. There were 
miseries that I could bear – those connected with me. And other miseries – 
those connected with children – that I could not (p. 170).  
She stuffs all reminders, thoughts, and feelings about her daughters into a mental 
garbage bag. The miseries connected with her daughters are the miseries of their mother 
and that identity cannot live comfortably in her new flat. That identity reads the 
separation as a deprivation and the packing away as hypocrisy. The absence of the 
connections mother and wife to define her lead to a sense of being identity free, 
completely disconnected, of the possibility of no longer existing: ‗Outside the windows, 
as it got dark, the back-yard parties would begin, with music and shouting and 
provocations that later might develop into fights, and I would be frightened, not of any 
hostility but of a kind of non-existence‘ (p. 171). The vacillation between connection 
and disconnection arises from a sense that connection is often that to which identity is 
anchored. Without connections, husband, and most particularly, children, she feels in 
danger of ceasing to matter. Despite the fears that disconnection will erase her, Munro 
resists reconnecting her with a different man, she does not wring a ‗truth‘ about 
domesticity or independence out of her narrative, or foreclose the narrator‘s identity 
conflicts. Her story brings into question the desire for ‗completion‘ through romantic 
love; the desire to write ‗the end‘ to self and individuality. Concluded, ended, finished 
are exactly the states that Munro‘s short fiction resists. She has complicated the binary 
outcomes of relationship that Weinstein established. Instead of completion/invasion and 
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expanded/diminished, Munro eradicates the boundaries: completion and invasion are 
not opposites but near synonyms and each might just as easily lead to diminishment as 
expansion. For the unnamed narrator of ‗Nettles‘ the ‗completion‘ that relationship 
offers her is a trimming of the extraneous aspects of self that do not fit; the self is 
diminished rather than expanded. Nor is an expansion of self necessarily a desirable 
result of relationship. 
 The feminine selves that populate the New Femininities fiction have to 
incorporate many divergent and conflicting identities into their sense of self. Any new 
relationship will bring an expansion of some sort as a woman assimilates the new 
identity of friend or lover to that particular person. Whether these expansions, and the 
inherent juggling of identities and roles, are always welcome is questionable. Diana 
Tietjens Meyers argues that the dominant contemporary Anglo-American moral and 
political philosophy based on homo economicus, ‗the free and rational chooser and 
actor whose desires are ranked in a coherent order and whose aim is to maximize desire 
satisfaction‘, is inadequate to encompass the subjectivity experienced by women (and 
arguably by men as well).
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 This model underestimates the importance of ‗unchosen 
circumstances and relationships. It eclipses interpersonal commitments, including 
friendship, love, and caregiving relationships [… and] downplays the difficulty of 
resolving conflicts that arise between these commitments and personal aims‘.76 It 
cannot account for the importance of familial relationships in identity formation or the 
impact of affinitive affiliations on a subject‘s sense of self. Additionally, it is blind to 
gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and other particularising forces, as constituents 
of identity because it only recognises the happy, and middle class, consumer who lives 
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in isolation. For homo economicus, autonomy and freedom are of the utmost 
importance. Marilyn Friedman argues that definitions of subjectivity must take into 
account social relationships. She suggests that Evelyn Fox Keller‘s conception of 
‗dynamic autonomy‘ offers a squaring of autonomy and relationship because it 
‗acknowledges the human interrelatedness that produces autonomy, recognizes that the 
self is influenced by and needs others, and allows for a recognition of other selves as 
subjects in their own right‘.77 Keller also recognizes that there will always be a tension 
between ‗autonomy and intimacy, separation and connection, aggression and love‘.78 I 
would argue that this is the subjectivity that Munro‘s characters, as well as many 
characters in postmodern fiction, inhabit and that these tensions are what enact the 
indeterminacy of her fiction. She makes the binaries immaterial. For her narratives, 
autonomy and intimacy, separation and connection, aggression and love exist 
simultaneously – they are inseparable and the conflicts her characters face involve 
attempting to maintain the balance between autonomy and intimacy so as to maintain a 
healthy sense of self. 
 One of the stories that Munro revisits frequently is the story of the wife who 
runs away from her husband only to return quickly, often before her spouse has noticed 
her absence. This wife finds the idea of disconnection seductive, but its realisation 
terrifying and self-abnegating – who is she if she is not being defined by her husband? 
Naomi Scheman asserts that people are not simply who they remember themselves as 
being, but ‗are equally, for better or worse, the persons others remember us as being 
[…] and we can be grateful or resentful or both for being held in their memories, for 
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being continuous with the persons they remember us as being‘.79 What such a wife 
faces is the conundrum of locating who she is when she is outside the orbit of the 
person around whom she has centred her life, when she can no longer rely upon being 
reminded of her continuity with his definition of her. In ‗Runaway‘, Carla feels that 
‗she would be lost‘ when she contemplates living without the identity ‗Clark‘s wife‘.80 
Clark is unpleasant and moody, particularly over the summer when it rains every day 
and their horseback riding school loses business. Her life begins to feel unliveable when 
Clark insists she help him to blackmail their neighbour, Sylvia, about the inappropriate 
sexual advances of her now deceased husband. With Sylvia‘s assistance, Carla leaves 
Clark to embark on an independent life in Toronto, but as soon as she gets distance 
between herself and her husband her desire for connection, to be connected to someone, 
reasserts itself:  
And what was strange about it was that she was doing all this, she was riding 
on this bus in the hope of recovering herself. As Mrs. Jamieson might say – 
and as she herself might with satisfaction have said – taking charge of her own 
life. With nobody glowering over her, nobody‘s mood infecting her with 
misery.  
But what would she care about? How would she know that she was 
alive? (‗Runaway‘, p. 34). 
Her identity is precarious outside of the relationship she shares with Clark, she is unsure 
of her self when it is not reinforced by Clark‘s glower and infectious bad moods. The 
conflict between autonomy and dependence, the need to maintain them in a constant 
tension, call her home; she gets off the bus and phones Clark to come and get her. She 
cannot, or is unwilling, to sever the connection with Clark. It is interesting that their 
names are almost identical; they share every letter save one. She cannot fabricate an 
                                                             
79 Naomi Scheman, ‗Queering the Center by Centering the Queer: Reflections on Transsexuals and 
Secular Jews‘, in Feminists Rethink the Self, ed. by Diana Tietjens Meyers, Feminist Theory and Politics 
Series (Boulder, CO and Oxford, UK: Westview, 1997), p. 125-6. 
80 Alice Munro, ‗Runaway‘, in Runaway (London: Chatto and Windus, 2004), p. 34. Subsequent 
quotations will be taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
82 
 
 
identity without him. Carla‘s near brush with freedom and independence is hampered 
by her inability to deal with the conflicts between connection and disconnection. She 
will continue to vacillate, because this is Munro, between connection and 
disconnection, relationship and isolation. Carol Shields posits that for Munro: ‗hanging 
on to your own life may mean the excommunication of all others‘.81 Carla is unwilling 
to excommunicate all others; she is unwilling to fully embrace disconnection, to cement 
her identity as separate from Clark and the riding school. Instead, she will maintain the 
tension between intimacy and autonomy, connection and disconnection. 
Sylvia, Carla‘s neighbour, in the wake of her husband‘s illness and death, feels a 
connection. Carla had cleaned her house when he was ill and comes to help Sylvia clear 
out his possessions after he dies. Sylvia disposes of everything her husband had owned, 
his clothing, his pills and creams, the supplies that kept him alive: ‗all of that was 
dumped into plastic bags to be hauled away as garbage, and Carla didn‘t question a 
thing […] When Sylvia said, ―I wish I hadn‘t taken the clothes to town. I wish I‘d 
burned them all up in the incinerator,‖ Carla had shown no surprise‘ (‗Runaway‘, p. 16-
17). Instead, Carla offers her the comfort of laughter and companionship, the comfort of 
connection. However, when Carla breaks down and cries because of her unhappiness at 
home, Sylvia begins to disconnect: ‗And Sylvia could not help feeling how, with every 
moment of this show of misery, the girl made herself more ordinary‘ (‗Runaway‘, p. 
22). The sense of connection that Sylvia felt for Carla made her ‗sense‘ Carla‘s 
superiority to other women and the evidence that Carla was vulnerable and miserable 
just like every other woman causes Sylvia to withdraw. The language of the passage 
echoes this withdrawal. Sylvia is the focaliser at this point in the narrative. Her speech 
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is rendered in direct speech using quotation marks: ‗―Has he hurt you, Carla?‖‘ 
(‗Runaway‘, p. 23). However, Carla‘s speech is rendered in indirect discourse: ‗He was 
mad at her all the time. He acted as if he hated her. There was nothing she could do 
right, there was nothing she could say. Living with him was driving her crazy. 
Sometimes she thought she already was crazy. Sometimes she thought he was‘ 
(‗Runaway‘, p. 23). Carla is paraphrased as if Sylvia is only partly listening, as if Sylvia 
has disconnected from this tale of woe. Carla and Sylvia‘s relationship is one of only 
temporary connection because it lacked real intimacy; their intimacy was only a 
perceived connection. Rather than autonomy being overwhelmed by dependency, Carla 
and Sylvia were unable to establish a relationship of intimacy, they were unable to grow 
dependent on each other, and thus the balance was never achieved and the relationship 
dissipated into separate autonomies. 
Not all relationships are conducive to realizing autonomy, of course, nor does 
Munro‘s fiction reject disconnection entirely. Her stories often feature divorcees, 
widows, and the mothers of adult children who have disappeared and lost touch. ‗Deep-
Holes‘ is a story from the latter revisiting. Sally‘s son has left his family behind in 
search of a more authentic life. The story is told in two times: the first when Sally‘s 
eldest son, Kent, is nine and severely breaks his leg by falling into one of the deep holes 
of the title. The second is in Sally‘s widowhood when her son resurfaces living in the 
same part of Canada. Her bereavement is recent and she has spent the final years of her 
geologist husband‘s life being used by him ‗for scale, in the photographs. So she 
became the small figure in black or bright clothing, contrasting with the ribbons of 
Silurian or Devonian rock‘.82 She acts as scale in her husband‘s retirement, the small 
figure that contrasts with him. His death leaves her ‗at loose ends a little‘ (‗Deep-
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Holes‘, p. 106). The reunion with her son is fraught. He is a distant and self-satisfied 
man and Sally wants to flee his company. ‗When he was gone she thought of running 
away. If she could locate a back door, a route that didn‘t go through the kitchen. But she 
could not do it, because it would mean she would never see him again‘ (‗Deep-Holes, p. 
113). She stays because she fears the permanent disconnection that a minor one would 
predict – she wants connection with her son despite feeling ‗steered‘ and that he 
emphasizes ‗the cost‘ speaking to her is for him, the ‗labour‘ it requires (‗Deep-Holes, 
p. 109). For his part, Kent desires a relationship with her, but one predicated on his 
terms: 
I am after you. Don‘t you want a different life? I‘m not saying I love you, I 
don‘t use stupid language. Or, I want to save you. You know you can only save 
yourself. So what is the point? I don‘t usually try to get anywhere talking to 
people. I usually try to avoid personal relationships. I mean I do. I do avoid 
them. 
 Relationships (‗Deep-Holes, p. 114). 
He retracts the usual rewards of connection: love, deliverance from loneliness, 
conversation, and personal relationship, personal ties. His articulation of his 
motivations reveals much about his character. His search for an authentic life has 
culminated in his embracing of disconnection – he no longer speaks of love, he no 
longer talks to people, and he avoids personal relationships. He refuses to maintain the 
necessary tension between connection and disconnection, autonomy and dependence, 
and thus reveals himself as a deficient subject. Her repetition of the final word 
‗relationships‘ in free indirect discourse underscores her recognition of everything that 
reconnection with her son will deny her, of the real sense of connection that will be 
impossible and that will remain lost.  
 Sally is faced with a decision about reconnecting with her son: is connection, 
any connection, worth the sacrifice of all the benefits of relationship? Friedman argues 
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that although some relationships ‗of certain sorts are necessary for the realization of 
autonomy‘, other types of relationship can be ‗irrelevant or positively detrimental to it‘. 
83
 Although relationship allows one to realize autonomy, not all relationships are 
conducive to it. Some people in relationships, rather than maintaining the tension 
between dependence and independence, choose one side or the other, dependence or 
independence, and thus force their partner onto the other side, to embrace the 
opposition. Not all relationships benefit both parties equally; only one person may find 
self-fulfilment while the other party encounters only self-abnegation. ‗One relationship 
might, furthermore, foster the personal autonomy of only some of its participants while 
at the same time hindering the personal autonomy of other participants‘.84 Sally‘s 
response to her son is often a visceral one. At the possibility that she might be reunited 
with him, she finds herself shaking: ‗Sally was overcome by a trembling, a longing, a 
weariness‘ (‗Deep-Holes, p. 105). The experience of both longing and weariness create 
a complex and possibly contradictory set of emotions. She wants him back, but the 
thought of him makes her tired or perhaps she is tired of the longing for him having not 
seen him in a decade. Her response to his offer of a relationship without love, dialogue, 
or real connection is a physical one as well: 
She is shaking with anger. What is she supposed to do, go back to the 
condemned house and scrub the rotten linoleum and cook up the chicken parts 
that were thrown out because they‘re past the best-before date? And be 
reminded every day how she falls short of Marnie or any other afflicted 
creature? All for the privilege of being useful in the life somebody else – Kent 
– has chosen (‗Deep-Holes, p. 115). 
She rejects the life of self-abnegation, the life of sacrifice in which she can never 
redeem herself, where she will always fall short because she is not properly afflicted. 
Sally refuses, in her widowhood, finally, to act as the figure that gives scale to the male 
                                                             
83 Friedman 1997, p. 56. 
84 Friedman 1997, p. 56, original emphasis. 
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enterprise that is her son‘s life. If relationship requires a fine balance between intimacy 
and autonomy, connection and disconnection, love and aggression, she refuses to settle 
for one that is unbalanced, that can only offer her dependence, disconnection, and the 
withholding of love. Sally‘s choice of disconnection from her son does not mean a neat 
and tidy conclusion to her story; rather Munro resists such an ending. Sally leaves open 
the possibility of future reconnection with her son and takes consolation in the thought 
that she might become senile, ‗marooned on [an] island of [her] own choosing, clear 
sighted, content‘ and thus no longer feel bereft at the loss of the relationship with Kent 
(‗Deep-Holes‘, p. 115). 
 Munro resists resolving the conflicts that her protagonists face because such 
resolution would be an evasive falsification. She renders a vision of a subjectivity 
predicated on both connection and disconnection; one that recognises autonomy is 
made possible by relationships with others. Her protagonists oscillate between the poles 
of domestic connection and independent excommunication, with neither being a 
comfortable resting place because life is lived in the fluctuating between. Her 
protagonists will continue to revisit the familiar places and struggle with the discomfort 
of connection and their desire for the pleasure of disconnection. It is these tensions, 
between autonomy and intimacy, separation and connection, love and hate that enact 
the indeterminacy of Munro‘s fiction. 
The New Femininities authors‘ use of an unreliable narrator does not simply 
upset the binaries of reliable and unreliable, truth and lie, connection and disconnection, 
it makes these binaries immaterial; it goes beyond the ‗reserve-discourse‘; it ‗wrecks‘ 
the ‗regulations and codes‘ of storytelling. In choosing to present their lives through the 
eyes of narrators who question the whole system of authentication by narration, these 
authors sabotage the truth-value of their own stories. These writers are simultaneously 
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resisting the urge to make definitive sense of their stories and frustrating the reader‘s 
ability to do so. They are wilfully ‗incompetent‘ ‗because their subjects are such that 
there is no way to adequately deal with them.  
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Chapter Two: Flirting with the Boundary: The Ironic Voices 
of Enright, Heller, and Kennedy 
Just as the unreliable narrator works to call into question the boundaries between 
binaries, the unreliable narrators of the New Femininities fictions employ an ironic 
voice to allow them to straddle the gendered binary oppositions which are at the root of 
patriarchy and which organize attributes along an access of positive/negative, 
active/passive, and masculine/feminine. An ironic voice does not necessarily say what it 
means, rather it works by echoing a cultural norm or previous statement in such a way 
as to dissociate the speaker from it. Kierkegaard describes a person who uses irony as 
‗svaevende (hovering)‘.1 Lydia Rainford describes the ironist as a flirt who teases the 
boundaries without ever consummating or rejecting her suitor.
2
 By hovering and 
flirting, irony allows its speakers to straddle the binaries and occupy a position of 
bothness. Rather than embracing Cixous‘s call to transgress the boundaries of binary 
oppositions through a discourse that is excessive and poetic, the use of the ironic voice, 
to use Cixous‘s examples, allows its characters to be both active and passive, head and 
                                                             
1 Birgit Baldwin, ‗Irony, that ―Little, Invisible Personage‖: A Reading of Kierkegaard‘s Ghosts‘, MLN, 
104 (1989), p. 1131. 
2 Lydia Rainford, She Changes by Intrigue Irony, Femininity and Feminism (Amsterdam and New York: 
Rodopi, 2005), p. 67-8. 
89 
 
 
heart, intelligible and palpable. They can fulfil Cixous‘s call to occupy both the body 
and the mind but without having to speak in a feminine language that is somehow more 
‗natural‘ to women. Anne Enright‘s The Gathering uses her ironic voice to disrupt the 
mind/body ‗couple‘ – her ironic hovering figures an embodied intellect. Zoë Heller‘s 
Notes on a Scandal reworks Thomas Hardy‘s Far From the Madding Crowd and 
negotiates the boundary between masculine spectator and feminine spectacle by casting 
a woman in the role of spectator. A.L. Kennedy‘s Paradise problematises the 
boundaries of masculine ‗alcoholic‘ and feminine ‗accomplice‘. 
 Virginia Woolf, in A Room of One’s Own, suggested that in order to create one 
needs to balance the masculine and feminine sides of one‘s mind, a balance she calls, 
after Coleridge, ‗androgyny‘.3 This androgynous state does not engage in bodily 
metaphors but rather chooses to ignore binary oppositions to envision a self that bridges 
the division between masculine and feminine. An androgynous mind finds binary 
oppositions permeable, it is capable of hovering over and flirting with difference. 
Creativity is rooted in a mind that straddles the boundaries between the two. This is not 
to say that Woolf ignores gender difference or believes that it is completely escapable. 
Toril Moi argues that 
Far from fleeing such gender identities because she fears them, Woolf rejects 
them because she has seen them for what they are. She has understood that the 
goal of the feminist struggle must precisely be to deconstruct the death-dealing 
binary oppositions of masculinity and femininity.
4
 
Rather than attempt to revalue the feminine or denigrate the masculine, deconstructing 
the binary oppositions means recognising that they are constructed through language 
and can be subverted through language. By way of the use of the ironic voice, I will 
argue that these texts disrupt the partitions and go beyond the discourse of gender. The 
                                                             
3 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, Great Ideas Series, (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 114. 
4 Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics, New Accents Series (London and New York: Methuen, 1985), p. 13. 
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‗hovering‘ that the ironic voice accomplishes straddles the binary oppositions without 
coming down decisively on either side of the boundary, without embracing the 
feminine/negative or the masculine/positive and without rejecting them either. Their 
authors realise for their characters Cixous‘s ‗bisexuality‘ but not in the ways that 
Cixous imagined. This bisexuality/androgyny allows a person to occupy a position of 
bothness – she hovers or straddles binary oppositions in a place that allows her to be 
both: active and passive, culture and nature, head and heart, intelligible and palpable. 
Hovering, straddling, ‗being both‘ describes the ‗autonomous self‘ which I have been 
arguing the New Femininities‘ characters are seeking. 
The OED defines irony as ‗a figure of speech in which the intended meaning is 
the opposite of that expressed by the words used‘.5 Irony is much more sophisticated 
than the OED‘s definition implies. This definition implies that meaning falls neatly into 
binary oppositions and that to decode an ironic utterance all that is required is to locate 
this oppositionality. However, meanings are not stationary nor do they necessarily carry 
binary opposites. In the words of Ruth Robbins: 
[M]eaning comes not from the closed relationship of two, but from an endless 
stream of differentiations: not one, not two, but many […] In French, 
différance puns on two meanings; difference and deferral. Derrida argues that 
all meaning takes place within the realm of différance; words mean in terms of 
their differences to other words, rather than having meanings fixed within 
them, and therefore meaning is always deferred, put off, never present.
6
 
An ironic statement requires interpretation which obliges a listener to discern what the 
ironist intended to imply. Irony does not lie in an opposite meaning, but rather can be 
found in what Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber call an ‗echoic interpretive use‘ which 
echoes a previous statement or cultural value in such a way as to communicate the 
                                                             
5 ‗Irony‘, in Oxford English Dictionary Online 2008 [1989], 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50121251?query_type=word&queryword=irony&first=1&max_to_s
how=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=LqAU-AFhi8V-550&hilite=50121251> [accessed 
10 May 2008] 
6 Ruth Robbins, Literary Feminisms, Transitions series (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 171. 
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speaker‘s dissociation with that statement.7 The reader of irony unravels the implication 
of that dissociation. Linda Hutcheon asserts that rather than the presence of two 
meanings, irony occurs in the in-between: 
[Irony] happens in the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid; it 
needs both to happen. What I want to call the ‗ironic‘ meaning is inclusive and 
relational: the said and the unsaid coexist for the interpreter, and each has 
meaning in relation to the other because they literally ‗interact‘ to create the 
real ‗ironic‘ meaning. The ‗ironic‘ meaning is not, then, simply the unsaid 
meaning, and the unsaid meaning is not always a simple inversion or opposite 
of the said: it is always different – other than and more than the said.8 
Irony allows a betweenness of meaning, of what Hutcheon calls the said and unsaid, 
that allows their meanings to coexist, to be ‗both/and‘, and further to function as more 
than a simple statement, to in effect become a statement that goes beyond binary 
oppositions, a statement that straddles the boundaries. This straddling of boundaries, 
Rainford posits, allows irony to call into question the structures which it undermines. 
She argues that ‗irony operates from within the structure it interrogates, repeating the 
beliefs of the structure in such a way as to negate their value; thus implying that the real 
truth is another thing altogether‘.9 Irony works to achieve Cixous‘s project of disrupting 
the ‗couples‘ that structure gender difference and discourse.  
                                                             
7 Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, ‗On Verbal Irony‘, in The Stylistics Reader: From Roman Jakobson 
to the Present, ed. by Jean Jacques Weber (London: Arnold, 1996), p. 278. 
8 Linda Hutcheon, Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony (London and New York: Routledge, 
1995), p. 12-3, original emphasis. 
9 Rainford 2005, p. 3. 
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Anne Enright’s Ironic Voice: Hovering on the Border Between Body 
and Mind 
The gendered duality of mind and body which designates man as transcendent 
consciousness and woman as located in and bound to her body, man as human and 
woman as animal, has characterised Western thought since the time of Plato. Judith 
Butler asserts that ‗[t]he cultural associations of mind with masculinity and body with 
femininity are well documented within the field of philosophy and feminism‘.  10 Simone 
de Beauvoir‘s The Second Sex has been interpreted by many to be a woman‘s argument 
against the ideologies that confined her to the bodily and a desire to be equivalent to 
men and able to become existential subjects capable of embracing the Cartesian 
location of existence in thinking. She argued that women were hampered from 
embracing their full existential subjectivity by the ideology of marriage and 
motherhood that required them to care for small children at the expense of their 
working lives and intellectual lives. According to Weil, Beauvoir argued ‗that it was 
primarily because of their identification with the maternal function that women were 
confined to a domestic role and prohibited from transcending their bodies and nature to 
become fully human‘.11 Beauvoir‘s critique of the ideology of motherhood makes her 
one of the theorists to whom Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva are responding and whom 
they ultimately resist. In ‗Women‘s Time‘, Kristeva accuses ‗existential feminists‘, like 
Beauvoir, of a ‗rejection, when necessary, of the attributes traditionally considered 
feminine or maternal insofar as they are deemed incompatible with insertion in that 
history‘, and of desiring a universalist politics of identification with the male 
                                                             
10 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), p. 17. 
11 Kari Weil, ‗French Feminism‘s écriture féminine‘, in The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Literary 
Theory, ed. by Ellen Rooney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 155. 
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position.
12Beauvoir‘s politics, Kristeva intimates, require the denial of maternity and 
sexual difference. 
However, Beauvoir‘s argument is much more nuanced than a simple rejection of 
motherhood and call for women to become transcendent existential subjects. Her 
discussion of the body recognises that ‗nature is no more an immutable given than is 
historical reality‘.13 Bodies are marked and interpreted by the cultures in which they 
live and there is nothing intrinsic to the body that explains the values assigned to sexual 
difference: 
It is not as a body but as a body subjected to taboos and laws that the subject 
gains consciousness of and accomplishes himself. He valorises himself in the 
name of certain values. And once again, physiology cannot ground values: 
rather, biological data take on those values the existent confers upon them.
14
 
Her understanding of consciousness, this passage seems to imply, is of an intellect 
rooted in a body and that the value of particular bodies over other bodies is dictated by 
ideology. Butler argues that Beauvoir is calling for an embodiment of consciousness, a 
realisation that women, and men, do not simply want to be able to claim an 
existentialist subjectivity but that they want to be able to inhabit that subjectivity: 
Although Beauvoir is often understood to be calling for the right of women, in 
effect, to become existential subjects and, hence, for inclusion within the terms 
of an abstract universality, her position also implies a fundamental critique of 
the very disembodiment of the abstract masculine epistemological subject. 
That subject is abstract to the extent that it disavows its socially marked 
embodiment, and, further, projects that disavowed and disparaged embodiment 
on to the feminine sphere, effectively renaming the body as female. This 
association of the body with the female works along magical relations of 
reciprocity whereby the female sex becomes restricted to its body, and the 
male body, fully disavowed, becomes, paradoxically, the incorporeal 
instrument of an ostensibly radical freedom […] Beauvoir proposes that the 
                                                             
12 Julia Kristeva, ‗Women‘s Time‘, Signs, 7 (1981), p. 18-19. 
13 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 2009), p. 8. 
14 de Beauvoir 2009, p. 48. 
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female body ought to be the situation and instrumentality of women‘s freedom, 
not a defining and limiting essence.
15
 
Butler is interpreting Beauvoir as proposing that women should be recognised as 
inhabiting a middle ground in which they are situated in the body, but not confined in it; 
in which they are able to be great thinking minds while still being embodied women. 
Butler argues that for Beauvoir the ‗socially marked embodiment‘ is inescapable and 
that freedom is located in and made possible by that body. Women need to be able to be 
both intellect and body, to bridge the mind/body duality, and situate themselves on that 
bridge, that in-between. The theorists of écriture féminine seem to be attempting to find 
such a place, but have difficulty with negotiating the mind and body connection; too 
much emphasis on either side suggests a return to identification or a foray into 
essentialist politics that takes as its own the traditional reading of the social marks on 
the female body. 
 Luce Irigaray takes as her starting point the biological marks of the female body 
and defines women‘s thinking as contiguous rather than linear anchoring her 
description in the physical layout of women‘s genitals. Women have two lips that rub 
together continuously and therefore ‗[w]hat she says is never identical with anything, 
moreover; rather, it is contiguous. It touches (upon)‘.16 Irigaray further argues that 
‗woman has sex organs more or less everywhere‘ and, in contrast to men who have one 
pleasure centre and thus think linearly, tend to speak from several different directions, 
from several different pleasure centres. This explains, for Irigaray, why women are 
perceived to be irrational and illogical.
17
 She is using revolutionary thinking about the 
female body to explain the patriarchal definitions of women‘s nature, ‗whimsical, 
                                                             
15 Butler 2006, p. 16. 
16 Luce Irigaray, ‗This Sex Which is Not One‘, in Feminisms: An Anthology of Literary Theory and 
Criticism, ed. by Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl, revised edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 
p. 366, her emphasis. 
17 Irigaray 1997, p. 366. 
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incomprehensible, agitated, capricious‘, incoherent, and ‗contradictory‘.18 In Ann 
Rosalind Jones‘s words, this kind of theory ‗[r]ather than questioning the terms of such 
a definition (woman is man‘s opposite) féminité as a celebration of women‘s difference 
from men maintains them‘.19  Furthermore, as Beauvoir argued, ‗nature is no more an 
immutable given than is historical reality‘; women‘s biology is not her destiny but her 
ideologically interpreted situation. Jones asserts that: 
All in all, at this point in history, most of us perceive our bodies through a 
jumpy, contradictory mesh of hoary sexual symbolization and political 
counter-response. It is possible to argue that the French feminists make of the 
female body too unproblematic pleasurable and totalized an entity.
20
 
The female body is too uncomplicated in Irigaray‘s formulation and her conclusions 
serve to reinforce the patriarchal definition of women‘s nature, a definition that is far 
too rigid. Women are not a totalizable entity, they do not all think the same or behave 
the same. This universalist definition ignores race, class, education, sexuality, and all 
the other factors that contribute to the individuality of each distinct woman, that 
contribute to women who do not think contiguously or who are not afraid to speak or 
who speak from a part of their bodies not connected to pleasure or sexuality. 
 Anne Enright‘s use of the ironic voice serves to straddle the distance between 
the body and the mind. Her style is not about the pleasures of the female body, but 
rather hovers between an academic discourse and a deep interest in the experiences of 
the body. In her collection of essays on motherhood, Making Babies: Stumbling into 
Motherhood (2005), her focus is upon an experience that is definitely bodily, but for 
Enright, the intellectual component is fundamental and undeniable: 
                                                             
18 Irigaray 1997, p. 366. 
19 Ann Rosalind Jones, ‗Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding of l’écriture féminine‘, in 
Feminisms: An Anthology of Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. by Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price 
Herndl, revised edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 376. 
20 Jones 1997, p. 376. 
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Speech is a selfish act, and mothers should probably remain silent […] I‘d like 
to apologise to all those people who find the whole idea of talking about things 
as opposed to just getting on with them mildly indecent, or provoking […] 
Also to those readers who would prefer me not to think so much (because 
mothers just shouldn‘t), and to those thinkers who will realise that in the last 
few years I have not had time to research, or check a reference – the only 
books I have finished, since I had children, being the ones I wrote myself (not 
quite true, but it‘s a nice thing to say) […] Also, sorry about my insides: I was 
reared with the idea that, for a woman, anatomy is destiny, so I have always 
paid close attention to what the body is and what it actually does. Call it a 
hobby.
21
 
In this passage, Enright identifies the cultural valuation of mothers as being selfless 
occupants of the body – they should not speak or think, they do not have time to 
research, they should simply do. Despite their embodied nature, the workings of that 
body should remain mysterious and should not be discussed. The ironic voice that 
characterises this passage (she echoes her critics and the ideology of motherhood in 
such a way as to clearly dissociate herself with it) makes clear that these opinions are 
not her own as she will spend one hundred ninety-six pages writing and thinking about 
motherhood and ‗her insides‘. In this passage, Enright begins with a rhetorically strong 
opening, ‗speech is a selfish act‘, but immediately deflates her seriousness by shifting 
registers from intellectual thinker to conversational mother, ‗talking about things‘. She 
plays off ‗wrong‘ thinking, mothers should not speak or do not think, with ‗right‘ 
thinking, mothers do think and should speak; they do have interesting ‗things‘ to say. 
She is not happy to settle on either side. She leaves the door open to interpretation to 
avoid foreclosing or preaching a version of ‗rightness‘ to her readers. Enright takes 
Freud‘s maxim that ‗the anatomy is destiny‘ and turns it on her critics. If anatomy is 
destiny, then a woman should think and talk about it. The final ‗call it a hobby‘ is a 
bathetic return from the performed intellectualism of quoting Freud to the embodied 
                                                             
21 Anne Enright, Making Babies: Stumbling into Motherhood (London: Vintage, 2005), p. 1-2. 
Subsequent quotations will be taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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mother for whom intellectual pursuits are a hobby. For Enright, mothers are both of the 
body and of the mind. 
Enright uses her ironic voice, in her essays, short stories, and novels, to disrupt 
the mind/body ‗couple‘. In her work, both body and mind are central. Her ironic voice 
interjects whenever the discourse becomes too entrenched in the body or the 
consciousness. A passage that pays close attention to the physical will finish with an 
ironic aside that introduces the intellect either through an echoic interpretive use of 
cultural norms or through dissociation from the physical perspective. A passage that 
theorises will be interrupted by an ironic aside that restores attention to the body. These 
ironic asides, physical or intellectual, tend to be bathetic, to serve as an anticlimactic 
return to the in-between. The existence of a narrative voice that hovers around the 
middle ground between the body and the mind is compelling because the division 
between the mind and body has traditionally been gendered masculine mind and 
feminine body, and it is this well-known division and a mainstay of feminism, that has 
been used to justify patriarchy. I will argue that Enright makes use of an ironic voice to 
upset the gendered binary of mind and body and suggest a middle ground where women 
can be both, an intellect and a body. 
 Enright finds herself puzzled by how much the physical experience of 
motherhood is intertwined with the intellectual. Her nursing reflex responds not only to 
crying babies, but also to thoughts, to images, and to stories. She finds that her nursing 
body‘s desire to feed strangers and memories raises questions about the origins of 
stories, whether they are physical or intellectual constructs. Motherhood‘s very 
embodiment requires critical thinking:  
Stories, no matter how fake, produce a real biological response in us, and we 
are used to this. But the questions my nursing body raises are more testing to 
me. Do we need stories in order to produce emotion, or is an emotion already a 
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story? What is the connection, in other words, between narrative and my 
alveolar cells? I suspect, as I search the room for the hunger by the fireplace, 
or the hunger in her cry, that I have found a place before stories start. Or the 
precise place where stories start. How else can I explain the shift from 
language that has happened in my brain? This is why mothers do not write, 
because motherhood happens in the body, as much as the mind (Making 
Babies, p. 46-7). 
Interestingly, Enright implies that her previous assumption had been that motherhood 
happens in the mind; motherhood is an intellectual activity. That she finds thoughts are 
translated into a biological response, the let down of milk, surprises her. For her nursing 
self, thoughts straddle the boundary; they are both bodily and in her mind. She shifts 
register with her question ‗what is the connection […] between narrative and my 
alveolar cells‘ to a more intellectual tone; she uses the scientific terminology for her 
breast tissue and changes from ‗story‘ to ‗narrative‘; her questions of the body 
translated into academic speak. This reading of breastfeeding runs counter to 
Beauvoir‘s assertion that the physical reality of mothering is a passive submission to 
biology. Beauvoir found mothering a purely physical and non-intellectual undertaking: 
But in any case, to give birth and to breastfeed are not activities, they are 
natural functions; they do not involve a project, which is why the woman finds 
no motive there to claim a higher meaning for her existence; she passively 
submits to her biological destiny.
22
 
Birthing and nursing are purely biological functions and require no higher thinking 
from the participants, mother and child. This is a common view of mothering and is 
echoed in narratives in which the mother resents spending her days dealing with eating, 
sleeping, and defecating: activities lacking intellectual stimulation. Enright finds that 
her very physical response, releasing milk to feed unnamed and often imaginary hunger 
which is inconvenient and often embarrassing, is connected to an intellectual one and 
actually inspires her intellectually. She ponders the meaning behind the biological 
functions of her body. Her body not only responds to stories, she theorises that it is the 
                                                             
22 de Beauvoir 2009, p. 75. 
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source of stories. For Enright, motherhood takes place in the body as well as the brain; 
it straddles the division and occurs in the in-between.  
 In her short story collection, Taking Pictures, her narrative focus shifts from the 
connection of mind and body to the related distinction between public and private. Her 
characters confuse the distinction between physical and private attributes and financial 
and public markers in her short story entitled ‗Caravan‘. Continuing the confusion of 
the intellectual and the emotional which she makes explicit in her essay on 
breastfeeding, Enright‘s narrative continues to place value on body and mind in such a 
way as to establish a tension between the two that is a ‗Both/And‘ situation. In a tale of 
the difficulties of a middle class Irish family holiday to a caravan park in France, 
boundaries are confused between the physical body which is traditionally associated 
with the feminine and the private, but which is public evidence of financial success or 
lack thereof:  
Most people on the campsite had two. Most people, like them, were doing ‗all 
right‘. They probably weren‘t doing ‗well‘ – the women hadn‘t lost the baby 
weight, and the men‘s legs looked a bit self-conscious in shorts – but even ‗all 
right‘ cost a fucking fortune.23 
The financial security usually connected with the notions of people doing ‗all right‘ and 
doing ‗well‘ is conflated with baby weight and physical appearance, with popular 
culture markers of success that locates it in a slim body. Body parts, ‗legs‘, are imbued 
with self-awareness and the ability to feel ‗self-conscious‘. Men‘s legs are now able to 
feel insecure in their exposure to public gaze and to reveal the financial insecurity of 
their owners‘ lives. Mind and body, public and private, coexist and infer that these 
middle class people on vacation inhabit an in-between where their private is made 
public and vice versa. 
                                                             
23 Anne Enright, Taking Pictures (London: Jonathan Cape, 2008), p. 177. Subsequent quotations will be 
taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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 The anorectic inhabits a body that is both public and private, not only as 
performances of a class identity; her self-restriction marks her body out as different and 
open to the perception of onlookers. The narrator of the story, ‗Little Sister‘, confronts 
the in-betweenness of public and private in the glimpsed body of an anorectic. Anorexia 
is a disease in which the body is subjugated by the mind which chooses not to feed it. 
Susan Bordo argues that this struggle is a gendered struggle of the masculine mind over 
the feminine body:  
Hilda Bruch reports that many anorectics talk of having a ‗ghost‘ inside them 
or surrounding them, ‗a dictator who dominates me,‘ as one describes it; ‗a 
little man who objects when I eat‘ is the description given by another. The 
little ghost, the dictator, the ‗other self‘ (as he is often described) is always 
male, reports Bruch. The anorectic‘s other self – the self of uncontrollable 
appetites, the impurities and taints, the flabby will and tendency to mental 
torpor – is the body, as we have seen. But it is also (and here the anorectic‘s 
associations are surely in the mainstream of Western culture) the female self.
24
 
The anorectic embodies the struggle between the notion of intellect as masculine and 
the body as appetitive, weak-willed, passive feminine. She has turned this struggle 
inward, rather than finding a way to inhabit both sides of the binary mind and body, the 
anorectic sets them at war within herself. The narrator of Enright‘s story describes the 
physicality of the anorectic body in detail before ending with a register shift: 
I opened the bathroom door one day and saw one of them in there, checking 
herself in the mirror. She was standing on a toilet seat with the cubicle door 
open and her nightdress pulled up to her face. You could see all her bones. 
There was a mile of space between her legs, and her pubis stuck out, a bulging 
hammock of flesh, terribly split. She pulled the nightdress down when she 
heard the door open, so by the time I looked from her reflection to the cubicle, 
she was decent again. It was just a flash, like flicking the remote to find a 
sitcom and getting a shot of famine in the middle, or of porn (Taking Pictures, 
p. 59). 
The girl is characterised as one of ‗them‘, a distancing that defines the girl entirely by 
her body and her illness. The physical description conveys horror; her pubis is ‗a 
                                                             
24 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
and London: University of California Press, 1993), p. 155. 
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bulging hammock of flesh, terribly split‘. The concluding ironic remark further builds 
the sense of voyeurism by equating her glimpse with changing the channels on a 
television – she is a passive watcher. However, the confusion and equation of news 
footage of famine with porn reintroduces a strongly critical mind asserting itself as 
more than a passive eye absorbing a scene. It is an intellect that recognises that the 
female body can hover between famine and porn: between the denial of one‘s appetite 
and the use and exploitation of another. The same female body can denote both famine 
and porn, both spectacles that might inspire horror or pleasure in their viewers. 
Enright‘s spectator experiences both emotions and acts as both the passive consuming 
viewer, body, and the critical reader of culture, mind, with neither role given preference 
or a higher value. 
 Enright creates this same balance between body and mind in her novel The 
Gathering. The homodiegetic narrator, Veronica, finds her sense of self collapsing in 
the wake of her brother‘s death. Once again, the ironic voice interrupts whenever the 
narrative is in danger of becoming too engrossed ‗in‘ the body or too entrenched in the 
mind. If she finds herself feeling socially awkward and out of place, her response is to 
try to find a bodily solution to her mental unease: 
I should be wearing my light green tweed skirt, tight across the thighs – that 
would show them. I should be sitting here in one of those posh wrap dresses. 
This is what I think about, on the brink of my marriage (or is it my sanity) in 
the Shelbourne bar – I think clothes would make a difference.25 
The passage attempts to shift registers; to imagine that her emotional distress would be 
eliminated if she was wearing a different outfit; if she was performing ‗sexy‘ or ‗posh‘. 
She repeats ‗I should‘ as she considers different outfits in which she would feel more 
confident. Its repetition calls attention to her compulsion to find a way to feel more 
                                                             
25 Anne Enright, The Gathering (New York: Black Cat, 2007), p. 178. Subsequent quotations will be 
taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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comfortable and how unsatisfying her solutions are because she is transferring her 
discomfort with her situation on to the outer surface of her body; her sense of alienation 
onto the performance of fashion. The parenthetical ironic aside of ‗or is it my sanity‘ 
reinforces this blurring of boundaries between the physical, marriage, and the mind, her 
sanity. She cannot distinguish which she is in danger of losing or if there is a difference 
between the two. The final bathetic ironic statement, ‗I think clothes would make a 
difference‘, emphasises the conflict. Perhaps if she were more comfortable with her 
physical performance of her self she would feel less self-conscious and out of place, but 
when the mental difficulty is the end of marriage or sanity, a physical performance is 
not enough. She does not really think that clothes would make a difference. 
 Veronica does not confine herself to physical performances of class or 
sophistication to remedy an uncomfortable emotional situation, but also finds that 
beauty treatments and body hair management help to calm her mind. In order to return 
to her house, her husband, and her family after impulsively flying to Gatwick Airport 
she feels that she must compose her body with a leg wax and facial, in order to clear her 
mind to reconstruct her life:  
I should go and get a half-wax in the spa. I have the rest of my life to organise. 
I can‘t organise the rest of my life with hairy legs. I wonder is there any way to 
get into the Clarins shop in the departure lounge where a woman in a white 
coat does a serious facial in a little back room, though facials always make me 
looked plucked. Still, I have a terrible yearning for a woman in a rasping white 
coat whose pressing and patting fingers will stick my face back on, where it is 
in danger of falling away (The Gathering, p. 255-6). 
The ironic tone of this passage makes clear that she finds ludicrous her contention that 
she cannot rebuild her life while her legs are hairy. However, it is this irony that 
suggests the middle ground, that, although absurd, the mind and body are connected and 
depilation may help her feel more in control of her life. She equates her face with her 
life and her sanity. Her sense that it is falling away externalises an interior sense of 
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disarray. The adjective ‗plucked‘ brings to mind poultry ready for cooking as well as 
tweezing eyebrows. The choice of the adjective ‗rasping‘ to describe the technician‘s 
white coat could mean that she finds it irritating but also evokes the image of a rasp that 
is used ‗to scrape off, away, out – file or sand down‘.26 Her desire for a spa treatment is 
a desire to be sanded down, remodelled, and rejuvenated physically and mentally. For 
Veronica, the physical reflects the emotional and the intellectual; controlling the 
physical enables her to feel more in control of her mind. 
 Veronica‘s insistence that mind and body are connected, and that the physical 
can be employed to remedy what ails the mind, functions in the opposite direction as 
well: intellect can be used to assuage physical discomfort. As the novel progresses, 
Veronica finds herself unmoored from her life, most particularly from her husband. She 
finds that the binary of desire and hatred is confused in her marriage; they are the same 
thing. Making love for Tom and Veronica is the same thing as making hate: 
I say I have slept with ‗men‘ but you know that is a sort of affectation, because 
what I mean is that when I sleep with Tom, that this is sometimes what he is 
like, yearning on the pull-back and hatred on the forward slam, and, ‗What are 
you looking at?‘ he says, or a weird sarcasm at dinner with friends about 
coming, or me not coming, though you know I do come – at least I think I do – 
realising then, later, that what he wants, what my husband has always wanted, 
and the thing I will not give him, is my annihilation. This is the way his desire 
runs. It runs close to hatred. It is sometimes the same thing (The Gathering, p. 
144-5). 
The binary of love and hatred is upset here; Veronica speculates that her husband 
equates them. The physical act of ‗making love‘ conveys both love and hatred. The 
parallelism of ‗yearning on the pull-back‘ and ‗hatred on the forward slam‘ sets up three 
sets of binaries: yearning/hatred, back/forward, and pull/slam whose difference 
                                                             
26 ‗Rasp‘, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, ed. by John Simpson, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50197606?query_type=word&queryword=rasp&first=1&max_to_sho
w=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=DgO6-2rfucD-3716&hilite=50197606, [accessed 19 
October 2010] 
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becomes elided in Veronica and Tom‘s relationship. The run-on stream of 
consciousness nature of this passage renders an urgency to her analysis of her 
husband‘s desire, as if she is only able to make sense of him as she speaks. She is in the 
body with ‗pull-back‘ and ‗forward slam‘, noun phrases that enact the violence that they 
describe, and then shifts register to a cerebral discourse by choosing the word 
‗annihilation‘ which echoes masculine discourse of the active man and the passive 
female. Veronica must utilise her intellectual skills to articulate to herself what has 
foundered in her relationship, but it is physical cues which fuel her conclusion. Love 
and hatred exist in the middle ground between the mind and the body; in both mind and 
body. 
 Enright‘s use of the ironic voice serves to straddle the binary division between 
body and mind without privileging or denigrating either. Veronica does not recognise a 
divide between what belongs to the body and what belongs to the mind perhaps because 
the division is an arbitrary one. Thinking is a physical undertaking that occurs in the 
body and the body carries out the instructions of the mind. This connection is made 
clear in Veronica‘s theory of belief. In the church, at her brother‘s funeral, Veronica 
realises that belief, too, is both bodily and of the mind: 
I check my heart now, and I find that there is still a feeling there, of something 
hot and struggling. I roll my eyes back under my closed lids, and there is the 
sense of opening in the middle of my forehead. The chest thing is like fighting 
for words and the forehead thing is pure and empty, like after all the words 
have been said. 
There now. 
Belief. I have the biology of it. All I need is the stuff to put in there. All I 
need are the words (The Gathering, p. 229). 
She locates the ability to believe in both the mind and the body. She can find it in her 
heart and in her head, but the feelings are related to language, to intellectual activity. 
The ironic assertion that she has ‗the biology‘ of belief, that she is naturally capable of 
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it, that it is rooted in her body is rendered bathetic because this biology is empty; she 
lacks the words, the culture, to fill up her biology. The location in her heart is 
characterised by both physical warmth and sense of movement and with the intellectual 
fighting for words. In her head there is a physical opening and a feeling of intellectual 
completion after having said everything you want to say. She finds that she has the 
physical feelings of belief and only needs the language to realise it. Her experience of 
belief is both of the body and of the mind and she is unable to separate these parts out. 
The intellectual fills the body, the body makes possible the intellectual. 
 If belief is a biological capability that simply requires something to believe in 
and the words with which to do it, then Veronica comes to realise that her previous 
religion was her husband. She has anchored herself in him, but soon becomes conscious 
that this faith has foundered because of the concessions she has to make to his job and 
his philandering. However, rather than ceasing to believe in her husband‘s fidelity or 
his love, Veronica ceases to believe in his body: 
There he is now, in our bed, still alive. The air goes into him and the air comes 
out. His toenails grow. His hair turns silently grey. 
The last time I touched him was the night of Liam‘s wake. And I don‘t 
know what is wrong with me since, but I do not believe in my husband‘s body 
any more (The Gathering, p. 73). 
The passage begins in the body with her husband‘s physical presence. Although she 
asserts that he is alive the attention to his growing toenails and greying hair could 
characterise a corpse, which anecdotally continues to grow hair and toenails after death. 
The passage changes focus from the physical, with a description of his breathing body 
in bed, to the intellect, she is contemplating what has changed, thinking hard about what 
is ‗wrong‘ with her, and then returns to the body and her lack of belief in his. Since for 
Veronica belief is rooted in both body and mind, her loss of belief is much more total. 
Perhaps the root of the problem is that her belief was in just one side of a binary that for 
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her is indivisible, body and mind; her belief was in his body alone and cannot sustain 
her.  
Enright‘s assertion that for women body and mind cannot be separated, that life 
is lived in both, disrupts the binary division between mind and body, and its traditional 
gendering. She is not excessive or poetic. She does not root herself in the pleasures of 
the female body, rather her style hovers between a sharply critical intellectualism and a 
deep interest in the body. Whenever one side of the binary threatens to take over and 
upset the balance, her ironic voice calls attention to the other side with an anticlimactic 
return to the in-between. Through the use of this ironic voice she refuses to commit to 
either side of the binary opposition of mind and body and thus enables her female 
characters to intellectually inhabit their physical bodies; they are able to be an intellect 
rooted and situated in a body.  
Zoë Heller and the Impossible Female Gaze 
The mind/body duality can be seen in the binary of spectator and spectacle founded on 
Freudian psychoanalysis and the equation of the spectator with the masculine-active 
and the spectacle with the feminine-passive. Zoë Heller negotiates this binary in her 
novel Notes on a Scandal, but chooses to make both her gazer and the object of that 
gaze women, thus, complicating from the start their gendered roles. Heller‘s novel 
raises the question: if a woman looks at another woman with desire, is her gaze 
necessarily masculinised? I will examine how Heller negotiates the observer and 
observed binary to offer a different story of the female spectator and the female 
spectacle and how the use of an ironic voice does not allow the narrative or reader to 
foreclose on Barbara‘s motivations in her role as female spectator of another woman‘s 
performance of femininity. Her gaze is definitely an acquisitive one, she wants Sheba to 
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be hers, but it is also identificatory; she wants to be like Sheba. She seeks both conquest 
and collaboration. Feminist theorists, most particularly in film theory, have been 
struggling to envision a female spectator who does not have to take on the masculine 
subject position in what Laura Mulvey characterises as transvestism nor place herself in 
the position of feminine body to be scrutinised. Heller‘s choice to name her heroine 
Bathsheba places her novel in a history of literary representations of women as objects 
of the acquisitive male gaze dating back to the Biblical story of David and Bathsheba 
and Thomas Hardy‘s 1874 novel Far from the Madding Crowd. However, Heller offers 
an active female gazer whose gaze embodies both desire and identification, treading the 
middle ground between masculine and feminine observer, and calling into question the 
gendering of spectator and spectacle. 
Much of the discussion of women and gaze occurs among feminist film theorists 
and was sparked in 1975 by Laura Mulvey‘s article, ‗Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema‘. In this article, Mulvey took Freud‘s binary of scopophilia and exhibitionism 
and articulated how they were supported in cinema. In Freud‘s theory, scopophilia, the 
perversion of looking, is gendered masculine, while its opposite, exhibitionism, is 
gendered feminine. Freud sets up an equivalence between the active and passive nature 
of scopophilia and exhibitionism and that of sadism and masochism which elucidates 
the objectification inherent in gazing at another as well as locating them in the binary of 
gender:  
In the perversions which are directed towards looking and being looked at, we 
come across a very remarkable characteristic with which we shall be still more 
intensely concerned in the aberration that we shall consider next: in these 
perversions the sexual aim occurs in two forms, an active and a passive one 
[…] Sadism and masochism occupy a special position among the perversions, 
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since the contrast between activity and passivity which lies behind them is 
among the universal characteristics of sexual life.
27
 
Hence scopophilia becomes associated with the active, the masculine, and the sadistic – 
he dominates; exhibitionism with the passive, the feminine, and the masochistic – she is 
dominated and enjoys it. Daryl Ogden argues: ‗The distancing effect that scopophilia 
makes possible between subject and object corresponds precisely to the objectification 
of the desired other that sadism requires‘.28 However, he points out that Freud‘s own 
gendering of binary difference is flawed and confused. Freud writes, ‗The compulsion 
to exhibit, for instance, is also closely dependent on the castration complex: it is a 
means of constantly insisting upon the integrity of the subject‘s own (male) genitals and 
it reiterates his infantile satisfaction at the absence of a penis in those of women‘; 
clearly gendering exhibitionism masculine and active.
29
 The gendering of this binary is 
problematic, as is the gendering of all binaries, because it is arbitrary and based on 
ideology regarding how people of certain genders behave. Although the exhibitionist is 
not necessarily female or passive, Freud must force it onto the feminine passive in order 
to preserve, in Stephen Heath‘s words, his previous ‗emphasis elsewhere […] on 
libidinal investment in the eye as phallus‘.30 Oedipus‘s blinding is a form of castration 
in punishment for sleeping with his mother. If the eye and vision are phallic, then they 
belong to the masculine. This binary preserves the gendered mind/body duality as the 
feminine is once again reduced to a passive body. 
Feminist theorists have attempted to envision an active feminine spectator while 
shackled to psychoanalytic binaries that seem to concretely gender sight as masculine. 
                                                             
27 Sigmund Freud, On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works, trans. by 
James Strachey, ed. by Angela Richards, The Pelican Freud Library (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 70-2, 
original emphasis. 
28 Daryl Ogden, The Language of the Eyes: Science, Sexuality, and Female Vision in English Literature 
and Culture, 1690-1927 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 184. 
29 Freud 1977, p. 70, note 2. 
30 Stephen Heath, ‗Difference‘ in The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality, ed. by Screen 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 77. 
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As E. Ann Kaplan asserts: ‗men do not simply look; their gaze carries with it the power 
of action and of possession which is lacking in the female gaze. Women receive and 
return a gaze, but cannot act upon it‘.31 An embrace of this assertion means women are 
confined to passively looking back; their agency is taken away. In Mulvey‘s pivotal 
article, she demonstrates the validity of psychoanalysis‘s gendering of observer and 
observed and unquestioningly casts the spectator of cinema as male: 
In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split 
between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects 
its phantasy on to the female figure which is styled accordingly. In their 
traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and 
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so 
that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness.
32
 
The women she discusses are the ones projected onto the screen, not the women in the 
audience watching and deciphering, or not, the code for visual and erotic impact. She 
does not question these binary roles nor does she discuss the female spectator. Rather 
she takes the gaze to be exclusively masculine. Her notion of ‗to-be-looked-at-ness‘ 
echoes Lacan‘s argument that the pleasure of the gaze for women is in being its object. 
He says that there is satisfaction for ‗a woman who knows that she is being looked at, 
on condition that one does not show her that one knows that she knows‘.33 Mulvey 
stimulated much debate in film theory studies, with feminists calling for an articulation 
of the experience of cinema from the female spectator‘s vantage point. Six years later, 
Mulvey wrote a follow-up in which she argued that the feminine gaze becomes 
masculinised, that she identifies with the hero. This identification can be pleasurable, or 
it can be uncomfortable. Mulvey argues that ‗trans-sex identification is a habit that very 
                                                             
31 E. Ann Kaplan, Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988), p. 31. 
32 Laura Mulvey, ‗Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema‘, in The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in 
Sexuality, ed. by Screen (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 27, original emphasis. 
33 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
by Alan Sheridan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XI (New York and London: Norton, 1981), p. 75. 
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easily becomes second nature. However, this Nature does not sit easily and shifts 
restlessly in its borrowed transvestite clothes‘.34 For Mulvey, the female spectator must 
slip on a masculine identity that does not fit in order to harness the power of action and 
of possession that her own gaze lacks. Jackie Byars finds fault with this assertion and 
points out: ‗Basic to these arguments are the assumptions that […] the gazes/looks of 
both characters and spectators are ―male‖ or, at best, ―masculine‖ (this assumption 
basically gives up looking – or voyeurism – to the male)‘.35 This is a surrender that 
hampers feminist theorising and serves to reinforce patriarchy. 
 These discussions of gaze led Teresa de Lauretis to posit that there was a female 
gaze that was outside of the patriarchal definitions of feminized and masculinised; a 
gaze that was not about looking as a man would look, with a sexualized, acquisitive 
gaze, nor with a narcissistic feminine gaze enjoying seeing oneself being looked at as 
Lacan would have it. This gaze would, in Ogden‘s words, seek neither ‗the feminized 
valorization of the male gaze nor the masculinized visual conquest of the opposite 
sex‘.36 The difficulty that de Lauretis found in articulating such a gaze was the position 
she argues the female subject takes in language: 
Though now the place of the female subject in language, in discourse, and in 
the social may be understood another way, it is an equally impossible position. 
She now finds herself in the empty space between the signs, in a void of 
meaning, where no demand is possible and no code available; or, going back to 
the cinema, she finds herself in the place of the female spectator, between the 
look of the camera (the masculine representation) and the image on the screen 
(the specular fixity of the feminine representation), not one or the other but 
both and neither.
37
 
                                                             
34 Laura Mulvey, ‗Afterthoughts on ―Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema‖ inspired by King Vidor‘s 
Duel in the Sun (1946)‘, in Visual and Other Pleasures (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 32-2, original 
emphasis. 
35 Jackie Byars, ‗Gazes/Voices/Power: Expanding Psychoanalysis for Feminist Film and Television 
Theory‘, in Female Spectators: Looking at Film and Television, ed. by E. Deidre Pribram (London and 
New York: Verso, 1988), p. 121, original emphasis. 
36 Daryl Ogden, ‗Bathsheba‘s Visual Estate: Female Spectatorship in Far From the Madding Crowd‘, 
Journal of Narrative Technique, 23.1 (1993), p. 2. 
37 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 35. 
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De Lauretis identifies the female spectator‘s position as an ‗impossible‘ place where she 
is both taking up the gaze of the man and in the position of the objectified gazed at 
woman while being neither; she is trapped in a place where the terms do not include 
her. This realisation does not paralyse de Lauretis or convince her to surrender sight to 
men and embrace the feminine sense of touch as Irigaray does: ‗Woman takes pleasure 
more from touching than from looking,‘ she asserts, ‗and her entry into a dominant 
scopic economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful 
object of contemplation‘‘.38 Rather, de Lauretis begins to interrogate how to think from 
this position: ‗The question then is how to reconstruct or organize vision from the 
―impossible‖ place of female desire […] and how to represent the terms of her double 
identification in the process of looking at her looking‘.39 As a means to answer this 
question, she calls attention to Freud‘s acknowledgement that a woman may continue to 
exhibit masculine traits even after she has made her oedipal journey to become 
feminine. Some women may even alternate between the two subject positions 
throughout their lives. Thus, de Lauretis concludes: ‗The two terms, femininity and 
masculinity, do not refer so much to qualities or states of being inherent in a person, as 
to positions which she occupies in relation to desire. They are terms of identification‘.40 
This assertion, while it does not abolish or evacuate the terms nor bring attention to 
their arbitrariness, suggests that when a woman assumes a masculine gaze, she is not 
practicing a form of transvestism, the putting on of a gender that is not her own, but 
rather she is taking up of a subject position that could well belong to her. However, for 
de Lauretis, the female gaze that is not dictated by patriarchy, that is not gendered 
feminine or masculine, continues to be an ‗impossible‘ one. De Lauretis seems unable 
to unseat the binary, although she has found evidence that gender is more fluid than its 
                                                             
38 Irigaray 1997, p. 364. 
39 de Lauretis 1984, p. 69. 
40 de Lauretis 1984, p. 142. 
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division into two solid categories and that women occupy their gender in such a way as 
to choose from both sides of the binary couples that serve as the scaffold of patriarchal 
society, she is unable to locate examples of women looking with a non-patriarchal gaze. 
 Ogden undertakes a search for the ‗impossible‘ place of female visual desire by 
exploring the Bathsheba mythos. In II Samuel, David sees Bathsheba from afar bathing 
on the roof and covets her. He sends her husband off to his death so that he might have 
her. In the Biblical tale, David is the phallic scopophiliac and Bathsheba the passive 
object of his gaze, unaware that he is looking. Ogden argues that Thomas Hardy 
rethinks this scopic tale in Far from the Madding Crowd by christening his female 
protagonist Bathsheba Everdene, but by making her passivity questionable: 
Hardy invokes a correspondence with the biblical Bathsheba, and then 
proceeds to parallel his own Bathsheba with her biblical namesake by 
depicting her as a passive target of male scopic desire in the novel‘s opening 
chapters. Yet Hardy‘s subsequent characterization of Bathsheba Everdene 
departs from the biblical Bathsheba‘s in its portrayal not merely as a 
‗feminized‘ spectator who peripherally perceives the visual attentions of male 
characters, but also as a socially empowered, near ‗masculinized‘ spectator of 
those same male characters.
41
 
Ogden argues that Bathsheba begins the book as an unwitting object of Gabriel Oak‘s 
gaze. An orphaned milkmaid sent to live with her Aunt, she is vulnerable and appears 
passive and unaware, indeed unwilling to acknowledge, the curious male gaze. The first 
time Gabriel sees her it is from afar and she is sitting in a wagon atop all of her worldly 
goods gazing at herself in a mirror. He is surprised at ‗the change from the customary 
spot and necessary occasion for such an act – from the dressing hour in a bedroom to a 
time of travelling out of doors‘ and assumes ‗Woman‘s prescriptive infirmity had 
stalked into the sunlight‘; he assumes that she is flawed by ‗Vanity‘.42 However, 
                                                             
41 Ogden 1993, p. 2. 
42 Thomas Hardy, Far from the Madding Crowd (London: Macmillan and Co., 1924), p. 5 and 7. 
Subsequent quotations will be taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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Bathsheba at the beginning of the novel is not as passive as she appears and she resists 
being the object of Gabriel‘s gaze once she realises that he has been watching her. She 
understands that acquiescence to a man will mean the end of her freedom: ‗I hate to be 
thought men‘s property in that way, though possibly I shall be had some day‘ (FFMC, 
p. 32, original emphasis). Although, because of her socially disadvantaged position, her 
resistance of his gaze is arguably passive – she simply does not go where he can see her 
– her resistance of his marriage proposal is direct – she says ‗no‘. 
The change in Bathsheba‘s social position when she inherits her uncle‘s farm 
and assumes its management duties, Ogden argues, changes her way of negotiating the 
gaze. She continues to be the recipient of numerous male gazes; however, she is no 
longer the passive spectacle nor is she the passive exhibitionist. Rather, she knows how 
to control her observers gaze and influence what it sees; she is an active recipient of 
their gazes. Ogden states:  
Bathsheba‘s acute self-awareness of her physical desirability, coupled with the 
inheritance of her uncle‘s farm, prompts her transformation into an 
exhibitionist, a version of Berger‘s ‗feminized‘ spectator who watches herself 
being watched […] Exhibitionism thus becomes a strategy of resistance against 
the objectifying gaze of the spectator for the exhibitionist shows the spectator 
only what ‗she‘ chooses ‗him‘ to see.43 
Her recognition and ability to wield the power of a woman who knows that she is 
beautiful and that men are looking at her almost allows her to transcend the patriarchal 
division of the genders; it almost allows her to enter into the scopic economy as neither 
a masculinised nor feminised gazer. If she could maintain her control of her observers 
and of her own performance, she would be able to embody a gaze that is not about 
acquisition, but about a woman on equal footing with the men around her.  
                                                             
43 Ogden 1993, p. 5. 
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 However, the dual position which feminine spectators traditionally take, as 
identifying with both the masculine gazer and the feminine spectacle, proves upsetting 
to her equilibrium. When she meets Sergeant Troy in the dark, he literally entangles 
her, catching his stirrup in her dress. In the sudden light of a lamp lit so that they can 
see to extricate her skirts, she is dazzled by his scarlet suit and brass accoutrement and 
cowed by his overpowering gaze. His gaze drives her to avert her eyes. 
He looked hard into her eyes when she raised them for a moment; Bathsheba 
looked down again, for his gaze was too strong to be received pointblank with 
her own. But she had obliquely noticed that he was young and slim, and that he 
wore three chevrons upon his sleeve (FFMC, p. 187). 
Troy‘s mastery of the role of both spectator and spectacle defeats her reserve and she is 
overwhelmed by a desire that renders her passive to his will. She surrenders all to his 
scopic dexterity and makes a hasty marriage that ends in desertion and his death. 
Bathsheba, at the novel‘s end, has been diminished by her experiences of visual 
seduction and marries her original voyeur, the novel‘s hero, Gabriel. Their marriage 
returns the novel to the status quo of gender division; she takes up her position as 
passive female to Gabriel‘s active male. On her wedding day ‗having at Gabriel‘s 
request, arranged her hair this morning as she had worn it years ago on Norcombe Hill‘, 
she has figuratively returned to the woman she was at the beginning of the novel, but 
now the willing passive object of another‘s gaze (FFMC, p. 474). Gabriel, by 
requesting she change her appearance, compels Bathsheba to turn back the clock to the 
time when she refused him and assume her proper place as his wife. His acquisition of 
both Bathsheba and her property, Ogden argues, ‗doubl[es] the scope of male property 
ownership and reassert[s] male scopic and social hegemony. Bathsheba‘s marriage to 
Gabriel functions as an ideological recontainment of the female gaze and the 
foreclosure of female property ownership‘.44 Although Hardy‘s novel attempts to unseat 
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the traditional scopic binary, as Ogden asserts, ‗to conceive and manifest a non-
patriarchal female spectator will require a reformulation of gender roles and relations on 
numerous cultural registers, a task that Hardy, in spite of his profound criticism of his 
age‘s gender conventionality, was not prepared to undertake‘.45 Bathsheba Everdene 
could not maintain her position as a woman outside of traditional gender roles because 
such a space did not exist. Her gaze must be returned to the passive enjoyment of a 
man‘s pleasure in her appearance stripped of the power which her exhibitionism 
previously exercised.  
 Heller‘s novel enters into the Bathsheba mythos and its scopophilic concerns 
through both the presence of a character named Bathsheba and with her role as object of 
desire of an undetected observer. However, her retelling of Bathsheba as the object of 
desire changes the equation by casting a woman, fittingly named Barbara Covett, as 
Bathsheba‘s unobserved spectator. By employing a female spectator and a female 
spectacle, Heller dispenses with the (traditional) division of couples into masculine and 
feminine, and begins to explore relationships and desires between women. Barbara and 
Sheba are teachers at a secondary school. The novel is Barbara‘s account of Sheba‘s 
scandalous relationship with a fifteen-year-old boy and the fallout when it is discovered 
by the world, but more importantly it is Barbara‘s chronicle of the development of their 
friendship. Barbara is a harsh judge of everyone around her, but her voice is ironic and 
allows the narrative to hover between what can be seen, what is obvious, and what must 
be discerned, between the visual and the intuitive. Because of this hovering, the 
narrative leaves open the question of what motivates Barbara – is her desire for Sheba a 
sexually acquisitive one, and thus masculine, or is it feminine, identificatory and about 
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mutuality and friendship, or is it both/and, desire and identification, the ‗impossible‘ 
gaze not constrained by patriarchal limitations? 
Heller‘s awareness of the connection of the myth to scopic desire and a history 
of women as passive spectacles is suggested by the parallels she draws between her 
novel, the Biblical account, and Hardy‘s Bathsheba. Barbara‘s first view of Sheba is 
from afar, in common with both the Bible and Hardy, but she judges Sheba harshly 
which makes the parallel unarguably with Hardy: 
The first time I ever saw Sheba was on a Monday morning, early in the winter 
term of 1996. I was standing in the St George‘s car park, getting books out of 
the back of my car when she came through the gates on a bicycle – an old-
fashioned butcher-boy model with a basket in the front. Her hair was arranged 
in one of those artfully dishevelled up-dos: a lot of stray tendrils framing the 
jaw, and something like a chopstick piercing a rough bun at the back. It was 
the sort of hairstyle that film actresses wear when they‘re playing sexy lady 
doctors. I can‘t recall exactly what she had on. Sheba‘s outfits tend to be very 
complicated – lots of floaty layers. I know she was wearing purple shoes. And 
there was definitely a long skirt involved, because I remember thinking that it 
was in imminent danger of becoming entangled in her spokes. When she 
dismounted – with a lithe, rather irritating, little skip – I saw that the skirt was 
made of some diaphanous material. Fey was the word that swam into my mind. 
Fey person, I thought. Then I locked my car and walked away.
46
 
Barbara notices a great deal of detail, but interprets it quickly in order to develop an 
opinion about the value of the object of her gaze. She notices tangible details, the old-
fashioned bicycle, the dishevelled hair, the long skirt and purple shoes, but interprets 
these details to expose in Sheba an element of performance – ‗the sort of hairstyle that 
film actresses wear when they‘re playing sexy doctors‘. Sheba, Barbara construes has 
chosen her grooming so as to affect both intelligence and sex appeal. These details 
seem to annoy Barbara: a ‗lithe, rather irritating, little skip‘ and ‗complicated‘ and 
‗diaphanous‘ outfits. The ironic voice asserts a judgement that translates the visible, 
tangible items of Sheba‘s appearance into her intuitive perception of some intrinsic 
                                                             
46 Zoë Heller, Notes on a Scandal (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 11, original emphasis. Subsequent 
quotations will be taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
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quality; Sheba is a fey person. The OED defines ‗fey‘ as ‗frequently used ironically, in 
sense ―affected, whimsy‖‘.47 Sheba is affected and whimsical and thus not deserving of 
Barbara‘s attention; Barbara chooses to walk away. The judgement and subsequent 
dismissal are echoed in Hardy‘s novel. Gabriel sums his Bathsheba up in one word: 
‗Vanity‘ (FFMC, p. 7). They both determine that their Bathsheba is not worthy of their 
regard and return to work.  
It is a second look, once again unnoticed, which convince both Barbara and 
Gabriel that Bathsheba is deserving of their regard and desire. For Gabriel, listening to 
Bathsheba‘s assurance of her competence at riding a horse convinces him she is a 
beautiful and interesting woman. Hooded so she is unrecognisable as the vain maiden 
he had previously observed, Bathsheba engages her observer by her activity, by her 
confidence; not by her feminine passivity or diffident demeanour. Barbara‘s interest in 
Sheba is aroused when she officially meets her and she perceives that other people, 
men, find Sheba beautiful: 
Women observing other women tend to be engrossed by the details – the 
bodily minutiae, the clothing particulars. We get so caught up in the lone 
dimple, the excessive ears, the missing button, that we often lag behind men in 
organizing the individual features into an overall impression. I mention this by 
way of explaining why it was only now, watching Bill, that the fact of Sheba‘s 
beauty occurred to me. Of course, I thought. She’s very good-looking. Sheba, 
who had been smiling fixedly […] made another nervous adjustment to her 
hair. As she raised her long, thin arms to fuss with the chopstick hair ornament, 
her torso lengthened and her chest was thrust forward slightly. She had a 
dancer‘s bosom. Two firm little patties riding the raft of her ribs […] The 
change that took place in the teachers‘ faces as they set eyes on Sheba 
confirmed my appraisal of Bill‘s appraisal. The men beamed and ogled. The 
women shrank slightly and turned sullen (Notes, p. 13-4, original emphasis). 
Barbara comments here on the psychology of men and women. She identifies with both 
the women and the men in this passage, feminine and masculine views, for she refers to 
                                                             
47 ‗Fey‘, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, ed. by John Simpson, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
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women as ‗we‘, but does not report shrinking or feeling sullen at the realisation that 
Sheba is beautiful. She continues to judge everyone around her, casting the men as 
‗ogling‘ Sheba, and placing herself above women who might feel intimidated by a 
beautiful woman. ‗Women‘, in Barbara‘s estimation, looking at a beautiful woman, find 
themselves in that double position de Lauretis identified, seeing her through men‘s eyes 
and finding her beautiful, and then identifying with her and finding their own ‗to-be-
looked-at-ness‘ wanting. Barbara begins to desire Sheba whether for her overall beauty 
or the dancer‘s bosom is unclear. Perhaps Barbara experiences a moment of sexual 
frisson at the sight and thought of Sheba‘s small breasts riding on her ribcage. However 
the question of whether her motivation is of a sexual nature is left open by her ironic 
distancing from the people around her. She reports how everyone else responds, but not 
her own response. 
Yet, because of her newfound desire Barbara intuits that Sheba and herself are 
compatible and similar and credits Sheba with sympathetic understanding. Barbara 
believes that Sheba recognises the condescending tone of a work colleague who claims 
the school would fall apart if Barbara left: ‗It was difficult to distinguish her tone, but it 
seemed to me that it contained a note of genuine sympathy – as if she understood how 
maddening it might be to be patronized by Mawson‘ (Notes, p. 15). She confuses the 
boundaries between the tangibles that can be seen, the bodily minutiae, to an intuited 
sense of Sheba‘s similarity and affinity with herself. Barbara begins to paint her 
beautiful colleague as a potential ‗soul mate‘ (Notes, p. 36), as a friend with whom she 
can have a bond of ‗uncommon intimacy and trust – a relationship de chaleur as the 
French say‘ (Notes, p. 18). Her pretentious use of French exposes both her own 
performance of intelligence and her exaggerated sense of rapport. It is clear that 
Barbara desires Sheba, but is it in the same way as the acquisitive masculine gaze of 
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sexual conquest? Does her gaze identify with Sheba or is her gaze about imagining a 
relationship in which they share a mutual gaze, in which they are both subjects gazing 
at other subjects? 
Jackie Stacey argues that psychoanalytic film theory is unable to account for the 
desires experienced by a female spectator admiring another woman. She takes as her 
evidence two films about a woman idealizing another woman, All About Eve and 
Desperately Seeking Susan. These films ‗construct not only a feminine object of desire 
in the narrative, but also a feminine subject of that desire‘.48 In both films, a woman 
adulates another woman and tries to emulate her, by wearing her clothes, endeavouring 
to seduce her lovers, and attempting to live her life. What motivates the female gazer to 
choose her object of desire is not easily broken down into the binary of masculinity and 
femininity. She is neither taking a masculine position of conquest toward her object nor 
is her desire a passive desire to be admired. Stacey contends: 
The binary opposition between masculinity and femininity offers a limited 
framework for the discussion of Eve‘s fascination with Margot, which is 
articulated actively through an interplay of desire and identification during the 
film. In many ways, Margot is Eve‘s idealized object of desire.49 
What Stacey finds in these films is an interaction between desire and affinity. The gazer 
does not desire to possess her object, rather she wants to be near her, be like her, to 
experience her power. ‗However,‘ Stacey asserts, ‗the pleasures of this feminine desire 
cannot be collapsed into simple identification, since difference and otherness are 
continuously played upon‘. Further, ‗[t]he rigid distinction between either desire or 
identification, so characteristic of psychoanalytic film theory, fails to address the 
construction of desires which involve a specific interplay of both processes‘.50 The 
                                                             
48 Jackie Stacey, ‗Desperately Seeking Difference‘, in The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality, 
ed. by Screen (London and New York: Routledge, 1992),  p. 250. 
49 Stacey 1992, p. 251. 
50 Stacey 1992, p. 256, original emphasis. 
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longing for resemblance does not denote a desire for sameness; part of the pleasure of 
observing the idealized other is that she is different. Nor is the female ideal a mere 
object, but rather the ‗active bearer of the look‘.51 Kaplan suggests that women desire 
the gaze shared by mother and child which is a ‗mutual gazing, rather than the subject-
object kind that reduces one of the parties to the place of submission‘.52 Thus, the 
female spectator‘s gaze might be about desire, identification, and mutuality – I see you 
and you see me. Ogden suggests that such a gaze can be found in Woolf‘s To the 
Lighthouse in which Mrs Ramsay and Lily Briscoe ‗merg[e] their eyes with their 
objects of desire into a dynamic, fluid relationship predicated on mutuality and 
reciprocity rather than on a separation based on domination and subordination‘.53 
According to Ogden, Woolf has envisioned female spectators whose gazes are not 
confined by patriarchal notions of subject and object. 
 Barbara yearns for a relationship built upon reciprocity and affinity. She longs 
for acknowledgement and mutuality, identification, and the presence of an active bearer 
of the look to look back at her. She is desperate enough for such a female ideal that she 
is willing to read the subtlest visual clues as indicating the presence of a spiritual 
affinity. However, Sheba does not seem to share her need for female connection nor is 
she aware of Barbara‘s regard: 
Owing to my seniority at St George‘s and the fact that I am more formal in 
manner than most of my colleagues, I am used to being treated with a certain 
deference. But Sheba seemed to be oblivious of my status. There was little 
indication, for a long time, that she really saw me at all. Yet, in spite of this, I 
found myself possessed by a strange certainty that we would one day be 
friends. […]The bond that I sensed, even at that stage, went far beyond 
anything that might have been expressed in quotidian chit-chat. It was an 
intuited kinship. An unspoken understanding. Does it sound too dramatic to 
call it spiritual recognition? Owing to our mutual reserve, I understood that it 
                                                             
51 Barbara Creed, ‗Introduction‘, in The Sexual Subject: A Screen Reader in Sexuality, ed. by Screen 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 225. 
52 Kaplan 1988, p. 205, original emphasis. 
53 Ogden 2005, p. 189. 
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would take time for us to form a friendship. But when we did, I had no doubt 
that it would prove to be one of uncommon intimacy and trust – a relationship 
de chaleur as the French say. In the meantime, I watched from afar (Notes, p. 
18, original emphasis). 
This passage is intimately concerned with gaze. It begins with Barbara‘s distress that 
Sheba never ‗really saw‘ her and ends with her assertion that while she awaits Sheba‘s 
recognition of their shared affinity, she watches from afar; she will continue gazing at 
Sheba until she looks back. She uses terms of perception and a strong assertion of ‗I‘ 
exposing the self-interest behind her reliance on senses other than sight: ‗I found myself 
possessed‘, ‗I sensed‘, ‗I understood‘, and ‗I had no doubt‘. She can see that Sheba does 
not notice, but she feels that they are destined to be together. The paralleling of the noun 
phrases, ‗an intuited kinship‘, ‗an unspoken understanding‘, and ‗spiritual recognition‘ 
amplify both the closeness of the bond and its provenance in the realm of feelings – it is 
not tangible, it cannot be observed or spoken, it is not physical. She intuits a similarity 
between them, an identification, a mutuality; their ‗mutual reserve‘. There is something 
ironic in Barbara‘s voice as she claims this affinity, as if she realises that she is 
overstating the connection. Sheba does not act as the exhibitionist deriving pleasure at 
looking at her observer looking at her. She refuses to recognise Barbara as an active 
gazer, as a person whose gaze ‗carries with it the power of action and of possession‘. 
Sheba perceives Barbara‘s gaze as the passive feminine one that only works to identify 
with and to admire her.  
 Sheba does not return Barbara‘s gaze because her gaze has been drawn by 
someone else. Rather than the passive feminine object of the gaze who is satisfied to 
simply be Irigaray‘s ‗beautiful object of contemplation‘, Bathsheba‘s gaze is drawn by 
a child. Her experience as a pottery teacher in an underprivileged school is unpleasant 
and difficult, as are her students. She is overwhelmed by their language and their 
resistance to learning and spends many of her classes hiding in the back while the 
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students throw clay around the room. It is not until she is supervising an afterschool 
detention, that she encounters a young man who seems different and who captures her 
own acquisitive gaze: 
They returned Sheba‘s gaze with reflexive surliness. Only one boy, at the very 
back of the room, sat working quietly. Sheba remembers being touched by his 
child-like posture of concentration – the way his tongue was peeping out from 
his mouth and his left arm was curled protectively around his labours. This was 
Steven Connolly (Notes, p. 25). 
Sheba is looking for a mutuality of gazes with her students, but instead receives only 
automatic hostility. The term ‗reflexive‘ could denote that the students are capable of 
reflection or serious thought, but the noun it modifies, ‗surliness‘, locates its meaning as 
the opposite – ‗automatic, unthinking, instinctive‘.54 Sheba is attracted by the child not 
included in the mass of automaton-like students, the one doing what he is supposed to 
do. She is drawn to his ‗child-like‘ pose of absorption in his task; child-like is important 
here as it shows she chooses not to see him as a child. The tongue which adds to the 
endearing image of a concentrating child is characterised by another metaphor of 
vision; it is ‗peeping‘ out, suggesting both the looking of a ‗peeping tom‘ and its near 
homophone, ‗peeking‘. Steven Connolly is drawing which allows Sheba to approach 
him and start a conversation by commenting on his picture. This overture sets in motion 
the events that lead to Sheba‘s ruin and Barbara‘s triumph as she interposes herself into 
Sheba‘s life to become her sole companion.  
 Barbara‘s role as active female spectator of another woman‘s performance of 
femininity finds its culmination in a dinner invitation, after this dinner she ceases to cast 
herself as spectator of Sheba; she begins to feel a part of her performance. Sheba invites 
Barbara to come to her house for dinner and to meet her family. Barbara is 
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overwhelmed by the hope that the invitation arouses in her: ‗I‘m a child in that respect: 
able to live, psychically speaking, on a crumb of anticipation for weeks at a time, but 
always in danger of crushing the waited-for even with the freight of my excessive hope‘ 
(Notes, p. 95). The change Barbara makes from feeling like an isolated spectator to 
identifying herself as the potential object of another‘s gaze occurs in the following 
passage:  
I stood watching her as she walked away. Her long green cardigan was 
flapping around her in the breeze and her skirt was clinging to her woollen 
tights, getting caught up between her legs. She was fiddling, as usual, with her 
unruly hair […] I kept my head down as I walked, partly so that I could 
concentrate on replaying the conversation that had just taken place and partly 
to avoid advertising the foolish smile on my face (Notes, p. 94). 
She describes Sheba‘s visible appearance, the bodily minutiae and clothing particulars, 
but instead of shifting to an intuitive reading of Sheba, she shifts her attention to 
herself. She watches Sheba walk away and then focuses on herself, casts herself as a 
potential object of vision whose expression might be readable to passersby; advertising 
her pleasure at finally connecting with Sheba, finally getting a hint of her longed for 
intimacy in a dinner invitation that is only for her. She can cast herself as a potential 
object of someone else‘s gaze because she reads Sheba‘s invitation as representing her 
mutual regard, representing Sheba looking back at her.  
 Barbara, our active female spectator, desires conquest, collaboration, and mutual 
regard. She longs to be engaged in a relationship in which each member gazes and is 
gazed at by the other. Her ironic voice allows her to hover over the binary of visible and 
perceptible and masculine gaze and feminine spectacle. She is no transvestite, pulling 
on a gender that is not her own, nor does she place herself in the position of 
exhibitionist, for Barbara believes that no one is looking at her with desire. Her desire is 
both masculine, for she may well harbour erotic intentions towards Sheba, and 
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feminine, she does long to experience the power of the beautiful object, and neither, she 
longs for a mutuality and reciprocity that resists the patriarchal notions of subject and 
object.  
A.L. Kennedy’s Paradise: Femininity, Alcoholism, and the Ironic Voice 
The ironic voice of Hannah, Paradise‘s homo- and autodiegetic narrator, works to flirt 
with the boundaries of masculine ‗alcoholic‘ and feminine ‗accomplice‘, between 
addict and enabler, monster and victim. ‗The alcoholic woman is a subversive figure in 
modern fiction and culture‘, asserts Ellen Lansky, because she subverts gender 
expectations by taking up the masculine position of ‗alcoholic‘ rather than the feminine 
one of ‗accomplice‘.55 Hannah is an alcoholic who drinks like a man in order to escape 
the pressures of prescriptive femininity to which she feels inadequate. Alcoholism, it 
has been argued by some feminists,
56
 not only allows a woman to evade normative 
femininity, but it also offers a reprieve from the slowness of time by allowing her to 
misplace large blocks of her life through blackouts, and it allows her to separate out 
different parts of her self as authentic while isolating others as false or dangerous. 
Hannah‘s identity is truly a self in division, a fragmented self. To this end, I will argue, 
Kennedy makes use of her characteristic narrative devices, an implementation of the 
future tense to speak of things that are past, a disruptive voice represented in italics 
which often proffers ironic asides, and an overall pattern of shifting narration, from ‗I‘ 
to ‗you‘, that attempts to distance and universalise experience, in order to explore the 
conflicts in subjectivity in a woman whose alcoholism means her experience is one of 
disruption, instability, and continuous alienation. Kennedy‘s narrative is not one of 
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56 See Karen Kopelson‘s ‗Radical Indulgence: Excess, Addiction, and Female Desire‘, Melissa Pearl 
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liberation through alcohol or through the destruction of binaries, but Hannah‘s 
subversive performance of alcoholic femininity relates the cost of avoiding the 
negotiation of binary oppositions that is contemporary femininity; not all ‗new 
femininities‘ are liberating. 
Instead of being the passive partner who concerns herself with smoothing the 
way for her husband‘s excessive alcoholic needs to the exclusion of her own happiness, 
the alcoholic woman pursues her own excessive path. Karen Kopelson asserts that ‗the 
primary manifestation of this pathology [addiction] is considered to be a focus on 
oneself bordering on egomania: a self-serving pursuit of what one wants […], without 
regard for others and at all costs – usually considered ―masculine‖ traits‘.57 The 
selfishness of alcoholism allows the female alcoholic to lay claim to her own version of 
masculinity. Her behaviour, however, Kopelson avers, refuses the ‗definitive male traits 
of self-control that have long served to confer masculine (and upper-middle-class) 
power and privilege‘ and by so doing ‗refuses to be the servile, docile counterpart to the 
ruling, virtuous male‘.58 In effect, the female alcoholic transcends the gender divide – 
she becomes someone who is neither virtuous masculine subject nor passive feminine 
object. In order to view this as liberatory, one must ignore the physical, mental, and 
emotional repercussions of addiction. The addict may transcend gender, but the 
consequences for this transcendence are severe –physical vulnerability, poverty, 
malnutrition, and isolation. The female alcoholic‘s transcendence of gender is not a 
performance that one could recommend to others. What is lacking from the model of 
the addict as emancipated from gender is a negotiation with the binary oppositions that 
allow one to generate a liveable self, rather than a compulsion which will ultimately 
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destroy that self. However, rather than seeking a model of liberation, the alcoholic 
Hannah, and Kopelson‘s addicts, are models of subversive performances of femininity.  
Kopelson asserts that intoxication and drug addiction are ‗another form of 
women‘s lived, embodied protest against patriarchal structures of containment‘.59 
Addiction is a response to the difficulties of conforming to normative femininity and 
heteronormativity. It could be argued that Hannah‘s alcoholism is rooted in her 
difficulties with ‗normal‘ and her perceived inadequacy to perform femininity properly. 
Jane Nardin, in a discussion of Jean Rhys‘s pre-war novels, posits that alcoholism is a 
choice for her protagonists because it is preferable to the oppressive situations in which 
they find themselves. Alcohol often ‗functions as a means of escape from intolerable 
humiliation‘, exploitation by men, rejection, and exclusion from family and friends.60 
This escape is only into oblivion and does not change or end the humiliation. Thus, as 
an escape and a protest, and it can be both, addiction and alcoholism are indicators of 
the intolerable humiliation of the constrictions of femininity.  
Simone de Beauvoir asserts that the process of ‗feminising‘ a young girl 
requires her ‗to realise herself as passivity, to accept dependence‘61 and identifies 
adolescence as the pivotal moment when a young, confident autonomous girl has to 
renounce her self and accept femininity in order to become an adult. This process, she 
argues, is traumatic and difficult. ‗The girl buries her childhood slowly – this 
autonomous and imperious individual she has been; and she enters adult existence 
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submissively‘.62 Little girls enjoy a freedom that is curtailed when they begin to show 
signs of physical maturity. Beauvoir argues that becoming a woman involves the 
surrender of autonomy: 
For the girl […] there is a divorce between her properly human condition and 
her feminine vocation. This is why adolescence is such a difficult and decisive 
moment for woman. Until then she was an autonomous individual: she now 
has to renounce her sovereignty.
63
 
More recently, in the 1990s, Mary Pipher, a clinical psychologist, argued that 
adolescence continues to be a time of traumatic passage for young western women. 
Preadolescent girls ‗have a brief respite from the female role and can be tomboys, a 
word that conveys courage, competency, and irreverence‘.64 However, the demands of 
peers and the media that young girls start becoming women, become concerned with 
their weight, make-up, and sexual relationships, means that there are pressures to be 
quieter, less active, and more decorative. They find these changes devastating:  
Something dramatic happens to girls in early adolescence. Just as planes and 
ships disappear mysteriously into the Bermuda Triangle, so do the selves of 
girls go down in droves. They crash and burn in a social and developmental 
Bermuda Triangle. In early adolescence, studies show that [… t]hey lose their 
resiliency and optimism and become less curious and inclined to take risks.
65
 
Their loss of resilence, curiosity, optimism, and courage shows the frightening nature of 
normative femininity; its potential to demoralise. Pipher argues that the choice appears 
to be between autonomy and femininity, between freedom and acceptance. This conflict 
requires the internment of a girl‘s child self and the fabrication of a new feminine self. 
Alcoholism and drug addiction can begin in adolescence, Pipher argues, as a response 
to the stressors of growing up and to the difficulty of creating this feminine self: ‗Often 
heavy chemical use is a red flag that points to other issues, such as despair, social 
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anxiety, […] or difficulty finding a positive identity‘.66 Further, Pipher maintains, 
‗adolescent girls experience […] pressure to split into true and false selves‘.67 Their 
new feminine self is experienced as false, as a performance that is not ‗true‘ to who the 
girl believes she is.  
 Hannah identifies her issues with alcohol as having started around the beginning 
of her adolescence. By the ‗last years at school‘, she is ‗wandering the park after lunch 
hour in the company of charming and dumpy bottlettes of cider‘.68 She is already 
habitually drinking and, ironically, personifying her alcohol, attributing friendly 
characteristics to it while simultaneously being aware of calling into question the truth 
of the charm of her teenage drinking. She is, in Rainford‘s formulation, ‗repeating the 
belief of the structure [alcoholism] in such a way as to negate [its] value; thus implying 
that the real truth is something altogether‘.69 That her alcoholism is tied to adolescence 
and to the changes required of a young girl approaching adulthood, is supported by the 
adult Hannah‘s nostalgia for childhood, for the ‗clean and early times‘ (Paradise, p. 
217). Her nostalgia for childhood and connection with her parents and younger brother 
act as her anchor to her self, to the self she was before she started drinking, to the self 
that she finds authentic and valuable. At moments of illness brought about by the 
alcohol, she retreats to these memories of her life as a child with her little brother: 
And I cry because by now I am very scared and because I want to be with him 
this evening, the two of us together, eating toasted cheese and wearing our 
pyjamas and being glad that we‘re indoors – outside it‘s raining – and maybe 
our father will come in, […] and he‘ll stand in the doorway quietly and watch 
us, as if we might have slipped away while he was out, or changed – but here 
we are, ourselves and not lost, turning in time to see his face and know that he 
loves us to the point of pain (Paradise, p. 135). 
                                                             
66 Pipher 1995, p. 191. 
67 Pipher 1995, p. 22. 
68 A.L. Kennedy, Paradise (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004), p. 87. Subsequent quotations will be taken 
from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
69 Rainford 2005, p. 3. 
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Her idea of safety is childhood, pyjamas, and nursery food, and being snug inside 
knowing that your father loves you and that you have done nothing wrong. She sees not 
only love, but also pain on her father‘s face; she links adult love with pain. It is this pain 
that she attempts to numb with her drinking, but it is also the disconnections inherent in 
adulthood, being separate from her family. She longs to return to the time when she was 
inseparable from her parents, when her father‘s smell was ‗invisible, in the way I was to 
me, something so near it could never be separate‘ (Paradise, p. 89). She longs to be the 
same as her parents again. These nostalgic moments are particularly painful because her 
return to the present reminds her of the emptiness of her existence: 
Sitting in the barley with Simon, my head was always orderly and bright – full 
of the birds we couldn‘t name that carved out notes and spaces, that tickled and 
soared, and poppies more red than a colour, like the marks of somewhere else, 
some unnatural place, shimmering, and the height of the stalks there to hide us, 
because we were small. Then I was clean. 
Now I am no one, which is not the same thing […] And I should be 
Hannah Luckraft and that should be joy (Paradise, p. 339). 
Being no one is not the same as being clean nor is it the same as being free as Kopelson 
posited for addiction. The birdsong and the poppies inscribe their presence, carve out 
notes, they are the marks of somewhere else. They are marks of her childhood and 
Hannah‘s nostalgia is evident here. Her language to describe her childhood memory is 
extravagant, everything exceeds her present reality. The poppies are more red, her head 
is full of the birdsong. Her present reality is empty. She does not feel like herself, like 
Hannah Luckraft. Her refusal of the feminine identity by taking up the masculine 
position of selfish alcoholic means that she has failed to take up a subject position of 
her own. She has not negotiated a ‗Hannah Luckraft‘, a self, whom she can comfortably 
inhabit. Her alcoholism has simply postponed the difficult identity formation she 
avoided in her youth. For her, neither masculine nor feminine occupy the positive side 
of the binary opposition. Both subject positions are uninhabitable. Her choice, rather 
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than ‗both/and‘, is neither. Unfortunately, as Beauvoir argues, ‗The adolescent girl 
often thinks she can simply scorn convention; but by doing so she is making a 
statement; she is creating a new situation involving consequences she will have to 
assume‘.70 The consequences of Hannah‘s ducking of adulthood and the selection of her 
own way of occupying a feminine subject position in the world is that she feels she is 
no one and being Hannah Luckraft is not joy, it is torment. 
 Hannah does drink as a response to femininity and her own perception that she 
is inadequate and unable to perform it ‗right‘ (Paradise, p. 21). Even the word 
‗feminine‘ is difficult for Hannah. She uses it seven times throughout her novel and 
each time it carries a negative connotation: it is an impractical burden. An ugly food 
cart in a seedy airport motel ‗is burdened with a feminine canopy and fat, little flounces 
of chintz (Paradise, p. 5). She uses it derisively to describe her sister-in-law, Gillian 
‗who renders any guilt ridiculous. It is impossible to think of her badly enough‘ 
(Paradise, p. 139) and who, Hannah feels, gloats over her superior performance of 
femininity through the ‗domestic proficiency‘ of a dust free floor (Paradise, p. 159). 
She uses ‗feminine‘ to describe the eyelashes of a young man who was maimed, indeed 
arguably emasculated, by an accident with a knife that severed much of his tongue 
(Paradise, p. 174). And she uses it to describe her fear of a spider as ‗So much like a 
pathetic come-on, or some kind of feminine panic attack‘ (Paradise, p. 323). In this 
context, ‗feminine‘ is a performance of weakness and hysteria. In fact, when the term 
applies to her or to her clothing, it is very much about performance and carries a note of 
irony as if she is aware that it is a performance. When she prepares to return to her local 
pub after leaving rehab, she washes thoroughly, puts on makeup and new underwear, 
and wears a ‗feminine sweater‘ to perform the role of ‗the prodigal returned‘. Thus, 
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‗feminine‘ is a derogatory term that denotes a false performance, much like the false 
performance of self that Pipher identifies the adolescent girl as having to embrace. The 
‗feminine‘ is problematic for Hannah.  
The only person for whom ‗feminine‘ is not a derisive label is Hannah‘s mother. 
However, she has set up her mother‘s performance of femininity as perfect and ideal. 
Her mother can wear clothes in a way that is unfashionable because ‗she has the poise 
to look lovely like that, and even her bending is feminine, delicate‘ (Paradise, p. 217). 
Every gesture her mother makes moves her through the world fragrantly, delicately, and 
tastefully. Hannah so admires her mother that she has always felt that she is unable to 
equal her mother‘s performance of femininity: ‗I‘ve developed degrees of assurance, 
naturally. I am a woman and not unwomanly, I suppose; but I realised years ago, before 
I was seven, that I won‘t be a woman the way that my mother is, I‘ll never do it right. 
She is a heartbreaker, really‘ (Paradise, p. 20-21). Hannah continues to rely on an 
assessment of herself that she made when she was seven and it is a rigid ideal that does 
not countenance individual difference or interpretation; it is non-negotiable. She 
recognises that she is a woman, although she qualifies it with an ironic ‗I suppose‘. She 
performs femininity well enough to communicate her gender, she is not ‗unwomanly‘, 
but her fears of femininity are grounded in the conviction that she will never do it 
‗right‘. The final sentence, ‗she‘s a heartbreaker, really‘, implies that it is Hannah‘s 
heart that is broken. Hannah is heartbroken by the impossible ideal of femininity.  
 In a world ordered by binaristic thinking, Hannah‘s inability to properly perform 
femininity would leave her only the option to embrace masculinity. She does ponder her 
gendered position in the world. She is aware of the masculine subject position which, 
not only her alcoholism, but her performance of this alcoholism, means that she takes. 
Her choice to be a social drinker, to spend her time drinking with groups of men in bars, 
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to in fact take her drinking into the public realm, means that she drinks like a man and 
not like a woman: 
And I do see this is how a man drinks and, therefore, inappropriate for me. I 
should have been at home behind my curtains with the methylated gin, the Tia 
Maria and Blue Nun. I should have been an early-morning shame at the off-
licence: make-up uneven, hands trembling into my bag for the greasy purse 
and then flitting over the counter to snatch up a genteel quarter-bottle, 
requested with a quiet excuse, even slight surprise, and back to sneak it down 
mixed with my tea – in the cup, not the pot – nobody there to see me, but 
female drinking is a sin and should be made invisible. Further downhill, I 
could have been a regular call to the local minicabs, asking them to fetch my 
bottles for me, so I could avoid the challenge of a walk, pay the premium to 
keep in hiding. 
That’s how you really do go insane. That’s how you die alone. 
So I stay with the men, because then I‘m not alone and because they do 
their best to be happy (Paradise, p. 184). 
The feminine alcoholic, though, is a depressing alternative: ashamed, hidden, secretive, 
diffident, and sinful. She argues that female drinking believes itself invisible, but it is 
clear that the female alcoholic‘s performance of respectability is not a convincing one – 
her makeup is uneven, her hands tremble – the idle observer in the off-licence is not 
fooled by the ‗genteel quarter-bottle‘ or her ‗slight surprise‘. Her dependence on the 
alcohol is noticeable. It is so sinful that she must keep up appearances even when alone, 
behind her curtains in her house, she must not let herself see her greed for it. The whole 
passage is characterised by an ironic tone. This is the way things are for alcoholic 
women, but Hannah implies that it should be different, that this truth is unsatisfactory. 
The ironic italicised aside supports her in her rejection of the feminine performance of 
alcoholism, of the shame and secrecy it requires. Hannah the manly drunk may still go 
insane, but her male companions will assure that others observe her death. The 
womanly drunk would ‗really‘ go insane and die alone. It is this dying alone which 
Hannah most fears.  
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 It is with the use of that italicised voice that, Julie Scanlon argues, Kennedy 
‗destabilizes the notion of a unifying voice‘.71 Its italicisation marks it out as different, 
if only slightly, from Hannah‘s narrative voice. It tends to interject agreement with 
Hannah‘s rationalisations that allow her to continue to drink or to continue to resist 
change. Glenda Norquay argues that Kennedy is known for undermining conventions of 
voice and form and this ‗undermining […] can offer an equally convincing challenge to 
the discourses of authority‘.72 Whose authority does its use undermine in this context? 
Its assertion that the pattern of drinking allotted to women is much more dangerous and 
devastating than the jovial social drinking allowed men calls into question the societal 
norm that women‘s drinking should be invisible. As well as calling discourses of 
authority into question, Scanlon argues that this use of different voices works to suggest 
Hannah‘s fragmented identity, her split subjectivity: 
The narrator displays a split, polyvocal subjectivity. This is demonstrated by 
occasional sentences and passages presented in italics, which sometimes seem 
to suggest a dialogue between one part of Hannah‘s self and another, 
sometimes her internal thoughts reflecting on the dominant narrative voice, 
represented in non-italicized typeface. There are, inevitably, points of 
confusion between the voices; they are by no means clear-cut and the function 
of the textual asides is not always apparent, if they may be called asides. In one 
respect they act as novelistic soliloquy, yet this does not quite capture them in 
their entirety, for the dominant narrative is in itself a soliloquy as there is no 
direct addressee beyond an implied reader. What emerges is a dislocated 
means of expressing Hannah‘s difficult sense of self. The voices literally 
appear not to come from one place, to be dialogic rather than monologic and 
express an attempt to regain control.
73
 
Scanlon cannot pin down the source of this voice. However, Hannah names it her 
‗drinking voice‘ and identifies it as ‗the one that‘s seen my soul. It understands me‘ 
(Paradise, p. 136). The asides vary in tone: usually they are ironic and sometimes 
                                                             
71 Julie Scanlon, ‗Unruly Novels, Unruly Selves‘, in Generic Instability and Identity in the Contemporary 
Novel, ed. Madelena Gonzalez and Marie-Odile Pittin-Hédon (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2010), p. 143-144. 
72 Glenda Norquay, ‗―Partial Intensity: The Novels of A.L. Kennedy‘, in The Contemporary British 
Novel, ed. James Acheson and Sarah C.E. Ross (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 144. 
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reassuring, sometimes reinforcing, and sometimes cruel and manipulative. Her 
‗drinking voice‘ makes use of its interior knowledge to insure that Hannah will continue 
drinking. When Hannah finds herself incapacitated by an infection in her face and jaw, 
she calls her brother, a doctor, to come help her. As soon as he agrees to drive the three 
hours, her drinking voice begins to belittle and accuse her: ‗Fooled him. Anything to get 
him here – that’s it, isn’t it? Any emotion you can fake. Well, isn’t it? You fooled him 
and you weren’t found out. Your own brother. Anything to get your way. Why couldn’t 
you have saved him all this trouble? Why couldn’t you have died?‘ (Paradise, p. 136). 
While it is untrue that Hannah was being manipulative, deceptive, or artificial, the result 
of this tirade is Hannah‘s decision to drink every last bottle of alcohol in her flat before 
her brother can arrive. Clearly her drinking voice is a self that she has developed in 
order to protect her alcoholism and prolong her contact with the alcoholic beverages she 
views as the only things she can count on in her adult life; a self that has become so 
powerful she interjects in order to maintain the status quo of alcoholism.  
 Norquay identifies Kennedy‘s concerns as ‗being insistently with the question of 
being in the world. Rather than taking her only into abstractions, her interest in the 
structures and contradictions of the self produces subtle and detailed explorations of its 
manifestations‘. 74 This can be seen not only in Hannah‘s split subjectivity, her dialogic 
relationship to herself and her own life, but in her use of what Sarah M. Dunnigan calls 
an ‗expendable temporal framework […] which renders the past and present lives of 
characters in intimate proximity‘.75 In Paradise, this framework renders the past into 
the future and by so doing rewrites a drinking binge, triggered by her boyfriend 
Robert‘s ending of their relationship, as an act of volition: 
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And in a while I will drink: drag it in so hard and obviously that it will steal 
away my job and I will go home and keep on drinking until I destroy whole 
days of myself, a week, and I will go to his flat at a point I don‘t remember and 
find there is a new lock, no curtains, bare floor behind the letter box, 
everything stripped and no one there and I will drink until the spider comes 
into my mouth, I will drink until there‘s no one there, I will drink until I leave 
me, until I leave myself alone (Paradise, p. 269). 
The use of the future tense lends her reckless actions an air of decisive intention and an 
ironic detachment from her descent into oblivion, she willed these things to happen. She 
is the instigator of the destruction of whole days and of the abandonment of herself; she 
will wake up in a psychiatric ward. Yet, she places the blame for the loss of her job onto 
the drinking; it steals away her job. The poignancy of her leaving herself alone might 
mean that she drinks enough to silence even her drinking voice, her other self. She 
locates these actions in a future, St Augustine‘s ‗present of things to come‘, and by 
implying that they will occur later, she is able to remain in the present of Robert‘s 
leaving, the time before she drinks herself away.  
 Kennedy makes use of ‗you‘ narration to articulate how someone who has been 
abandoned by everyone including her self might speak. Even the ‗I‘ has deserted her; 
she has evicted it, drowned it, and blacked it out. What is left is a consciousness which 
seems to dwell outside of the body and outside of the social configuration of people, her 
family, attempting to put her back together, to bring her back to her self. Kopelson 
identifies an intervention as serving the purpose of reuniting the addict with her 
‗authentic‘ self. During an intervention: ‗the drug user is corralled by friends and family 
members, reasoned with, told in no uncertain terms that she is in ―denial‖, and then 
shipped off to treatment which will return her to reality and ―recover‖ her authentic 
self‘.76 Hannah experiences her intervention with equal distaste: 
[T]he five of them sending you off to win their bet and recover yourself, grow 
respectable and better until everyone can pretend that‘s the way you were 
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made […] and all the while you‘re plunging downwards to the point where 
your family‘s wishes are going to make you disappear […] here is your ticket 
and boarding pass and here is your passport in order, although it contains the 
picture of someone who is not truly you and, judging yourself against your 
papers, it‘s terribly easy to spot the forgery. The cheap, dull fake. 
But Robert knows me – he knows that I’m real and like this and correct 
(Paradise, p. 160-161). 
She experiences sobriety as a falling and its permanence would mean that she would 
cease to exist, her ‗true‘ self would disappear. She finds the photograph on her passport 
to contain a counterfeit; it is faked; it depicts the self her family wants her to be. The 
drinking voice interjects to reinforce Hannah‘s resistance to recovery and support the 
notion that she is Hannah‘s real self. Hannah feels that alcoholism is what allows her to 
be, without it she is nothing, or perhaps without it she has to confront the false self she 
constructed to cope with the pressures of femininity. The use of ‗you‘ narration, enacts 
Hannah‘s distancing of herself from the experience of being sent away and attempts to 
bring her listener in with her, implicate her narratee, and transform her situation into 
one that could happen to anyone, the universal ‗you‘. Her use of ‗you‘ tries to render an 
alcoholic‘s intervention and forced admittance to a recovery centre into a common life 
event. 
 Choosing to centre her novel on an alcoholic allows Kennedy to continue her 
experiments with time, voice, and her characters‘ negotiations of identity. Paradise 
belongs to New Femininities fiction because Hannah‘s conflicted and afflicted 
performance of femininity calls into question gender norms and the trauma of 
normative femininity. Although she fails to find a liveable feminine subject position 
where she can negotiate the space between masculine and feminine without the limited 
choices of monstrous drinker or empty woman, Hannah‘s narrative identifies the 
conflicts and elucidates the problems inherent in locating emancipation in a practice 
that leads only to self-harm and self-destruction. Negotiating the boundaries of binary 
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oppositions does not guarantee liberation or even self-actualization, but subversive 
performances of femininity do call into question the ideologies that require a young girl 
to put away tomboyish things and embrace a subdued feminine self that she finds false. 
 A resistance to confinement by the gendered binaries of body and mind, 
spectacle and spectator, feminine and masculine and a desire to eke out a position that 
hovers somewhere in the middle refusing to place oneself down on either side is a 
common goal of New Femininities fiction. With their ironic voices they speak of the 
‗both/and‘ to repeat the beliefs of the structure of patriarchy in such a way as to negate 
its value, call it into question, and imply that the real truth is another thing altogether, a 
negotiation of the terms, a flirting that refuses to commit to either suitor. This fiction 
problematises the confinement of gender identities while suggesting that there are ways 
to negotiate the boundaries and find a position of tension in the in-between.  
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Chapter Three: Free Indirect Discourse and the Search for 
Self 
For the protagonists of New Femininities fictions, answers always lie somewhere in the 
middle, in the constant tension of self and mother, self and wife, self and worker. They 
struggle with maintaining the necessary tension between autonomy and intimacy, 
independence and responsibility for others. However, this tension is a precarious 
balance because, often, the position they need to occupy is not a simple one of duality, 
self and mother, but one of multiplicity: self, mother, wife, daughter, friend, where the 
demands of each relationship threaten to tip the scales into an overwhelming 
dependence, responsibility, or self-abnegation. The protagonists of this section struggle 
with the inadequacy of the moral philosophical model of homo economicus, chooser 
and consumer of autonomy and independence, to describe the subjectivity that they 
inhabit. As I have argued earlier, that model ignores the importance and contradictions 
of interpersonal relationships. Each protagonist must negotiate the conflicts between 
their plural identities in order to assert a subjectivity in which relationship and 
autonomy can coexist. Through their use of free indirect discourse, the overlap of the 
voices of character and third person narrator which occludes who is speaking, and its 
ability to upset dichotomies, the novels are able to blur the binaries that serve to limit 
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their characters‘ lives and allow them to negotiate a particularised way to occupy their 
roles without sacrificing their sense of self or rejecting relationship.  
 Anna Snaith argues that free indirect discourse ‗is not a synthesis or a replacing 
of one voice by another, but a combination of two separate, distinctive voices […] 
Neither voice ―takes over‖ in free indirect discourse. The narrator is still present, 
rendering the discourse a bivocal construction‘.1 David Lodge asserts that free indirect 
discourse allows novelists to ‗combine their own voice with the voices of their 
characters in order to render thought and emotion‘.2 He argues that this fulfils Bakhtin‘s 
assertion that ‗For the prose artist the world is full of other people‘s words, among 
which he must orient himself and whose speech characteristics he must be able to 
perceive with a very keen ear. He must introduce them into the plane of his own 
discourse, but in such a way that this plane is not destroyed.‘3 Michal Peled Ginsburg 
calls what is achieved ‗a double-voiced utterance, an utterance in which both the voice 
of the narrator and the voice of the character are heard, it reveals the doubling of the 
speaking subject‘ and ‗a break between a subject and his language. Because we cannot 
determine one speaking subject, we cannot see the language as belonging to a certain 
subject, as expressing a self‘.4 Snaith argues that through the indeterminacy of free 
indirect discourse ‗dichotomies such as speech/thought, character/narrator, 
mimesis/diegesis and style/content become blurred‘.5 Free indirect discourse, like 
unreliable narration and the ironic voice, works to undermine the certainty of binary 
oppositions. However, I will argue that the use of free indirect discourse introduces into 
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the narrative of the New Femininities fiction multiple voices which, as Snaith puts it, 
‗acknowledge the variety, fragmentation and situatedness of subjectivity‘, a subjectivity 
which cannot be totalised or contained.
6
  
As I have argued in the previous chapters, one of the difficulties of subjectivity 
is its predominant model is based upon the binary opposition of autonomy and 
dependence which fails to take into account interpersonal relationships and 
underestimates the difficulty of resolving tensions that exist between finding self-
fulfilment and caring for others. It cannot account for the importance of familial 
relationships in identity formation nor the impact of affiliation on a subject‘s sense of 
self. For homo economicus, autonomy and freedom are of the utmost importance. 
Marilyn Friedman argues that ‗conceptions of the self [need to] make sense of 
experiences of interpersonal dependency and interdependency that are central to many 
women‘s lives and that these conceptions yield an ethical view that is tenable in these 
intimate relationships‘.7 I suggested that Evelyn Fox Keller‘s conception of ‗dynamic 
autonomy‘ offers a squaring of autonomy and relationship because it acknowledges that 
relationship is necessary for the formation of autonomy.
8
 These novels, rather than 
recognising the delicate balance of connection and disconnection that Munro‘s fiction 
negotiates, use free indirect discourse to blur the dichotomies of self and mother, self 
and wife, self and daughter, self and friend. These are not identities that are necessarily 
to be considered dichotomous, but I would argue that the protagonists experience them 
in this way because they necessitate a focus on the self and autonomy and the 
dependence of others and on others; which are considered binaries. Thus their efforts to 
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find ways to inhabit motherhood or marriage without sacrificing their own sense of self 
seeks to have both autonomy and relationship, autonomy in relationship; an identity 
that allows them to occupy their roles without sacrificing their sense of self. 
The characters in these novels are struggling to stake out a ‗new‘ female 
subjectivity predicated on antagonism between autonomy and dependence. The 
instability of free indirect discourse and its often ironic asides are used as narrative 
modes because they enable the articulation and enactment of this subjectivity of 
dynamic autonomy. I will focus on three novels: Rachel Cusk‘s Arlington Park (2006), 
Charlotte Mendelson‘s When We Were Bad (2007), and Tessa Hadley‘s Accidents in the 
Home (2002). In my reading of these novels I will concentrate on how their use of free 
indirect discourse ironises the apparently bleak presentation of marriage and 
motherhood, suggesting a subversive questioning of the expectations that contemporary 
culture still places on women and the inadequacy of homo economicus to describe a 
liveable subjectivity for them, thus articulating different concerns about how women 
inhabit their ‗selves‘ in the twenty-first century. Moreover, in choosing to confuse the 
source of opinions with free indirect discourse, the authors foreclose on the possibility 
of allowing the reader to resolve the identity conflicts. This element of form – free 
indirect discourse – with its undermining of narrative/narrational reliability, echoes and 
reinforces the unreliability of identity and calls into question the efficacy of societal 
roles – wife, daughter, mother, and even worker – to describe actual (or fictional) 
women.  
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Rachel Cusk’s Arlington Park and the ‘Truth’ of Motherhood  
The identities ‗wife‘, ‗mother‘, and ‗neighbour‘ of Rachel Cusk‘s Arlington Park‘s 
suburban subjects fall short of adequately defining how these women see themselves. 
Cusk is perhaps best known as the author of A Life’s Work: On Becoming a Mother 
(2001), a frank documentary account of early motherhood that provoked extreme 
reactions from some readers because of the vehemence of its critique of motherhood. 
Arlington Park approaches both contemporary marriage and motherhood as sites of 
cultural contestation and sources of deep dissatisfaction for women. Marriage is 
‗murder‘ and motherhood is a form of prison where children ‗manacled themselves […] 
to one‘s breathless form‘.9 The novel accords no sympathy to the children bound to 
their mothers‘ dead bodies and barely sympathises with their asphyxiated mothers. 
Cusk‘s use of free indirect discourse in the novel functions to expose the unnaturalness 
of ‗natural‘ feminine gender roles, voice her characters‘ inner rebellion, and suggest the 
potentiality of subversive performances of femininity which negotiate subjectivities that 
can countenance both autonomy and dependence. 
Arlington Park‘s overt heterodiegetic narrator incorporates both a panoramic 
view of the action told in her own voice staying remote from the characters in a scene, 
and variable focalization where she gives an extreme close-up of a series of characters‘ 
consciousnesses told in a mixture of indirect speech and free indirect discourse.
10
 As 
James Wood asserts, free indirect discourse allows readers to ‗inhabit omniscience and 
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partiality at once‘. In that space between omniscience and partiality, ‗[a] gap opens 
between author and character, and the bridge – which is free indirect style itself – 
between them simultaneously closes the gap and draws attention to its distance‘.11 Such 
a gap opens up between self and performance of feminine gender roles as well – the 
characters simultaneously align themselves with the gender role and draw attention to 
their distance from it – they negotiate their performance. Much of this negotiation takes 
place in free indirect discourse. Michael Toolan argues that the difficulty of pinning 
down who is speaking often arouses uncertainty about the ‗truth‘ of the narrative. He 
asserts that free indirect discourse raises questions about reliability and veracity: ‗is 
what has been narrated ‗the truth‘, or fabrication, or something other or in between?‘ 
Additionally, it raises questions: ‗who says this?‘ and ‗how true/reliable is this?‘12 As 
Snaith, in a discussion of Virginia Woolf, argues:  
The narrator, omniscient because he or she can enter the characters‘ minds as 
well as describe their thoughts, relinquishes his or her authority, often 
[…]making pure narration secondary to the free indirect discourse [… This] 
displays the artificiality of the omniscient narrator, and his or her 
unproblematic conveying of subjectivity. [… The] use of multiple voices 
through free indirect discourse acknowledges the variety, fragmentation and 
situatedness of subjectivity: it cannot be totalized or contained.
13
 
Free indirect discourse, then, echoes the self that is fragmented and situated. The 
narrator‘s omniscience becomes suspect for she is often submerged within the 
character‘s consciousness and loses the boundary that separates them. These moments 
of ambiguity allow the narrative voice, as Susan Sniader Lanser has argued about 
Virginia Woolf‘s novelistic voice, to surreptitiously ‗ponder, preach, and prophesy‘, in 
                                                             
11 James Wood, How Fiction Works (London: Vintage, 2009), p. 11. 
12 Michael Toolan, ‗The ―Irresponsibility‖ of FID‘, ‗Professor Michael Toolan‘ on ‗University of 
Birmingham, Department of English‘ website, http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/MToolan/ [accessed 7 
September 2009], p. 1. Article is available online but was published elsewhere in 2006. 
13 Snaith 2003, p. 82. 
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this case about modern suburban women and their relationships to their multiple 
identities of mother, wife, and self.
14
 
 What Cusk‘s narrator is pondering and prophesying, if not preaching, in 
Arlington Park is the dark story of suburban womanhood. The women are like 
dragonflies fossilised in amber, frozen in time, and unable to break free; this is a novel 
of stasis rather than change. The events of the novel take place during a single day 
where little ostensibly happens: children are taken to school, children are picked up 
from school, a mall is visited, and a dinner party attended. The narrator begins the story 
with a tour of Arlington Park and London, commenting on the people going about their 
lives, and implies that the appearance of this setting might be deceptive: ‗The story of 
life required its stops and its pauses, its days and its nights. It didn‘t make sense 
otherwise. But to look at that view [of the city] you‘d think that a human life was 
meaningless. You‘d think that a day meant nothing at all‘ (AP, p. 7). The use of ‗you‘ 
narration stands in for the general ‗one‘ and hails the narratee, implicates her by 
creating a relationship of ‗I‘, the speaker, and ‗you‘, the listener, a ‗we‘ that takes the 
audience‘s agreement for granted. Through ironic negation, this statement implies that 
the opposite may be true: a day might mean something significant; human life may not 
be meaningless while simultaneously implying that the story that will be relayed 
concerns lives that ‗we‘ might consider insignificant – suburban middle class women. 
What could be interesting about the school run? Why would anyone care about 
shopping malls or dinner parties?  
Performances of motherhood and marriage are complicated by the fact that 
motherhood and marriage are social institutions and are mired in norms and ideologies 
                                                             
14 Susan Sniader Lanser, Fictions of Authority: Women Writers and Narrative Voice (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1992), p. 116. 
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that make their performance complicated and conflicting. Judith Butler, in an early 
essay on Simone de Beauvoir‘s The Second Sex, identifies motherhood as ‗a 
compulsory social institution‘ whose ‗optional character is being denied‘: an example 
of how culturally determined practices are naturalized and universalized.
 15
 Jon Simons 
calls this naturalization the ‗maternal matrix‘, a term he appropriates from Butler‘s own 
formulation of the heterosexual matrix, which is a ‗model of gender intelligibility that 
assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed 
through a stable gender‘16. Simons argues that in the maternal matrix, ‗the subject 
position and identity of mothering depends on a series of coherences‘ – female 
anatomy, desire to bear children, preference for reproduction in a secure heterosexual 
setting, propensity and ability to rear children, caring orientation to others, predilection 
for domestic issues, and prioritization of children. These coherences greatly resemble 
the coherences that underlie femininity, thus a performance of motherhood is a 
performance of a rigid version of femininity predicated on the definition of women as 
‗naturally‘ nurturing selfless relaters. Simons calls for these coherences to be disrupted 
by subversive performances of motherhood.
17
 The characters in the novel find their 
roles incoherent and their performances are subversive almost by default because of the 
self-abnegation required in order to be fully coherent mothers. Free indirect discourse is 
well suited for these concerns. Through its use, as Jane Lilienfeld argues, a text 
‗questions the meaning of knowledge, its origins, and its circulation‘.18 Free indirect 
discourse with its confusion of narrator and character, and the ‗truth‘ of its assertions 
                                                             
15 Judith Butler, ‗Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir‘s Second Sex‘, Yale French Studies, 72 (1986), 
p. 42. 
16 Jon Simons, ‗Foucault‘s Mother‘, in Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault, ed. by Susan J. 
Hekman (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 183; Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2006), p. 208, note 6. 
17 Simons, p. 199 
18 Jane Lilienfeld, ‗―To have the reader work with the author‖: The Circulation of Knowledge in Virginia 
Woolf‘s To the Lighthouse and Toni Morrison‘s Jazz‘, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 52 (2006), p. 44. 
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works to disrupt the sense of universality and absolutism of the maternal matrix. As 
Barbara Johnson and Henry Louis Gates argue, ‗free indirect discourse […] is a 
dramatic way of expressing a divided self‘.19 The conflicts aroused by their attempts to 
inhabit the maternal matrix, or perhaps more precisely to resist the maternal matrix, are 
dramatically expressed through free indirect discourse. 
The narrator of Arlington Park offers no versions of motherhood that suit the 
necessary coherences of Simons‘s maternal matrix beyond that of being female and 
heterosexual. Motherhood is viewed as neither natural nor fulfilling. Rather, children 
are figured as thieves and plunderers, infiltrators policing normal behaviour, who excite 
rage and frustration in their mothers and whose demands leave them worn out like a 
stuffed toy: Juliet thinks of her son: ‗When he played, as he was playing just now with 
the little horse, it felt as if he were stealing something from her‘ (AP, p. 31); Maisie‘s 
daughters ‗appeared to her as people who had come into the world to constrain and 
criticise her, to record her comings and goings from the concept of normal behaviour‘ 
(AP, p. 179), and Christine confuses her daughter‘s stuffed rabbit with herself: ‗Robbie 
was grey and worn out with Ella‘s need for him. He looked shapeless and insensate 
with the drudgery of love‘ (AP, p. 88). Stuffed rabbits do not have feelings; it is 
Christine who feels worn out by the drudgery of love. Domestic issues are decidedly 
not something that they have a ‗particular liking for‘.20 Juliet rages that her husband 
would not get the children up because ‗It was Juliet that did everything. Everything!‘ 
(AP, p. 14); and Christine fumes because while she cooked the dinner for the dinner 
                                                             
19 Barbara Johnson and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ‗A Black and Idiomatic Free Indirect Discourse‘ in Zora 
Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, ed. by Harold Bloom, Modern Critical Interpretations 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987), p. 75, original emphasis. 
20 ‗Predilection‘, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, ed. by John Simpson, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50186797?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=predilection&fir
st=1&max_to_show=10 , [accessed 19 June 2009] 
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party her husband ‗hadn‘t even put the children to bed!‘ (AP, p. 238). This rage and 
paranoia take place in their thoughts told in free indirect discourse indicated by the use 
of exclamation marks and is echoed by the narrator as evidenced by the choice of words 
like ‗constrain‘ and ‗insensate‘. Their resistance gestures toward a recognition that the 
demands of the institutions of marriage and motherhood contribute to their unhappiness 
and anger, and its exposure by the narrator via the telepathy that is free indirect 
discourse. Juliet, Christine, and Maisie have not yet realised the importance of 
embracing a subversive performance of their roles which might allow them to carve out 
the space for a different self that can inhabit the different roles without nullifying their 
sense of self, individuality, and personal value. Yet their struggle against marriage and 
motherhood is a form of subversion; it realises how ‗unnatural‘ these institutions are to 
individual women. 
A concern with how far short motherhood falls from the ideal, how incoherent it 
is to the assumptions about women that govern that ideal, permeates the novel. Solly 
Kerr-Leigh eloquently articulates the burden of motherhood and its ability to fragment 
one‘s sense of self. She is heavily pregnant with her fourth child and is weighed down 
with the responsibilities of her domestic life. Throughout her chapter, she struggles 
against the impending pregnancy and the care of her children to re-locate her self. Her 
sense of self feels particularly absent because of the embodied loss of autonomy, of 
self-will, that is represented by a pregnant body and the looming birth. Homo 
economicus is not adequate to describe the subjectivity of the pregnant body because it 
ignores interpersonal commitments and ‗the difficulty of resolving conflicts that arise 
between these commitments and personal aims‘.21 
Solly had felt before the way everything altered just before a child was born. It 
was how she sometimes thought it might be to approach death. […] And 
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although when the baby came it would restart it all with its unstoppable 
vegetable growth, there was a layer of Solly that was always irretrievably lost. 
She was depleted, of some aspect of experience, of history: it was torn from 
her, like the wrapping paper from a present. Generally she believed that this 
was what she had been born for. She was grateful that she had been able to put 
herself to such prolific use. And the children gave so much back to you, of 
course. She was like a sack stuffed with their love and acknowledgement, 
lumpy on the outside but full, heavy with interior knowledge. It was just that 
sometimes she tried to think about the past and couldn‘t. She couldn‘t locate a 
continuous sense of herself. It seemed to lie all around her in pieces, like the 
casings of Dora‘s Russian doll when all the babies were out (AP, p.125).  
This passage of free indirect discourse compares giving birth to dying, a part of Solly 
will be lost to the process; a part she will never regrow. The words ‗depleted‘, 
‗grateful‘, and ‗prolific‘ seem to be the narrator‘s words and imply a judgment of Solly. 
Does she truly think she was born for childbirth and that it is good to be put to use? The 
phrase ‗And children gave so much back to you, of course‘ uses free indirect discourse 
to infiltrate Solly‘s consciousness with the voice of societal norms: a cliché, a truism. It 
is what people say to recuperate motherhood; a well-used phrase to justify the burden 
and bother. The image of a well-loved mother as a bulging sack ‗stuffed‘ with her 
family‘s love is not a pleasant one. Mother is a lumpy old pillow. Solly has lost contact 
with her past selves and is doomed to live in the present, a present in which she is a 
misshapen, hollowed out husk with her self lying in pieces around her, transformed into 
babies. Julie Choi argues that ‗FID is commonly conceded to range between two poles 
of ironic distance and absolute empathy‘, and that often readers ‗have placed primary 
importance‘ on one or the other or ‗have insisted that the ―technique‖ works precisely 
because two voices are heard simultaneously‘.22 Cusk‘s narrator oscillates between the 
two poles in this passage. She is both sympathetic to Solly‘s discomfort and distant 
from it, in fact makes clear how foolish some of Solly‘s self-perceptions are: that it is 
good to be put to use.  
                                                             
22 Julie Choi, ‗Feminine Authority? Common Sense and the Question of Voice in the Novel‘, New 
Literary History 27 (1996),  p. 655. 
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Solly‘s self is not static, but grows and changes, fragments and divides, much 
like the voices portrayed through the free indirect discourse. Her sense of having lost 
contact with her self suggests a desire to find an identity that can encompass who she is 
now satisfactorily. She longs for a self that will allow her to feel at home in her own 
skin even when she is not alone in it. As I argued previously, the home is not 
necessarily a homely place; it is by Freud‘s definition uncanny and by Cixous‘s 
definition an androgyne: homely and unhomely are able to denote the same thing. 
Perhaps most disturbing and uncanny is when the unhomely home is a woman‘s own 
body and a woman‘s own self. Arlington Park‘s female characters feel that husbands 
and children empty them out and inhabit them. They make their home in the mother and 
it is no longer her home. Solly‘s husband, Martin, and her children lay claim to her 
body as if she were their hometown. She believes that: ‗For Martin, her body was like a 
village that over time had sprawled and grown until it became a bustling centre, cut 
through with new roads and modern developments, some of them unsightly. It had 
changed, but it was where he lived‘ (AP, p. 126). This is clearly free indirect discourse 
focalized by Solly and it is her perception of his view of her. She feels like his 
relationship with her body is one of location, ownership, and belonging, ways she does 
not or cannot feel about her own ‗formless, dissipated‘ sacklike body (AP, p. 126). 
Moreover, Solly muses that his body has remained the same; has not been overtaken by 
urban sprawl. She envies his ‗lean, untouched masculinity, his body that had never been 
plundered, the line that seemed to run from his toes to the top of his head. He was so—
flat. The children were flat too. She realised that Martin was continuous with his child 
self and she envied him‘ (AP, p. 126). She begrudges Martin a physical body and sense 
of self that echo who he has always been, that are not divided by the demands of family 
that seem to shout over those of the self. He has not only her body to inhabit like a 
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homeland, but his own recognisable body in which he remains comfortable and at 
home. Solly‘s lumpiness is contrasted by his flatness; her fragmentation with his 
continuous being. Solly envies him a sense of embodied self that is not compromised by 
being broken into pieces by babies.  
This embodied self that can accommodate multiple and potentially contradictory 
facets of identity is not the ‗allegedly feminine ―merging‖ of consciousness modelled 
on the mother who yields autonomous identity to identities-in-relationship‘ that Lanser 
relates was perceived by Woolf‘s critics.23 Rather, it is a subjectivity which can 
maintain a sense of self and autonomy while inhabiting the many gender positions 
garnered through relationship, Martin‘s wife and Dora‘s mother, that a woman might 
inhabit. Surprisingly, it is from the beginning of yet another relationship of caregiving 
and dependence, ‗new baby‘s mother‘, and the end of the physical occupation by her 
unborn child – from having yet another Russian doll removed from inside – that Solly 
regains a sense of her self. The birth of her child offers her a surprising alternative 
vision of her life: 
The baby was a girl. It was lucky, Solly thought – another boy might have 
sunk her. But instead, like a little podium or plinth, the baby gave her a new, 
higher view of the world. When she was with her, Solly remembered that she 
had turned against Martin and the children a little: it seemed to her to be a sort 
of advance, a development. She would not come down again from her plinth. 
She would live at that new angle to them – she was determined to. […] All the 
things there were to lose she had lost giving birth to the other three. So the 
fourth seemed more in the way of a credit: she loved it more and cared about it 
less. [… Paola] sent a piece of Italian lace for the baby, but Solly kept it for 
herself. She bought more bottles of the bath oil, too. These were her riches. It 
was a sideline, and everyone had to have one of those (AP, p. 145-146). 
Her final baby gives something to her rather than taking something away and she 
realises that separating herself from her family is progress, is necessary for her 
happiness. She must live at a remove from them; her self requires this distance. The 
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narrative voice enjoys the alliteration of ‗podium‘ and ‗plinth‘. They establish the 
distance as above her family with ‗plinth‘. ‗Podium‘ suggests that her separation gives 
her a sort of authority or place from which to speak. Her choices to keep the lace for 
herself and to have a sideline are her efforts at staking out her own life and her own self 
without abandoning the relationships she shares with her family. It is her sense of self 
whose situation is rendered with the contrast of loss and credit. Her dawning awareness 
that the way to negotiate these identities is to remove herself a little from them, to be 
true to what Solly wants as well as what ‗mother‘ and ‗wife‘ desire. The free indirect 
discourse allows the origin of the final line ‗and everyone had to have one of those‘ to 
be ambiguous. It appears to be a continuation of Solly‘s thought, but because the 
narrator‘s voice often leaks through, it reads as belonging to both Solly and the narrator. 
It is an assertion of a universal truth which would imply its provenance with a narrator 
fond of maxims, but it is also Solly‘s ‗truth‘. 
Solly‘s ability to ironically love her new child more while caring about it less is 
explicable via Julia Kristeva‘s reworking of D.W. Winnicot‘s notion of the ‗good 
enough mother.‘ ‗I would suggest‘, Kristeva argues, ‗that maybe the good-enough 
mother is the mother who has something else to love besides her child, such as her 
work, her husband, [or] her lovers. If for a mother the child is the meaning of her life, 
it‘s too heavy‘.24 Kristeva is not encouraging pathological selfishness in mothers or, 
needless to say, calling for universal child neglect. Rather, she is arguing that mothers 
need to be able to divide their interests between their children and the outside world. In 
other words, a mother must balance her caregiving responsibilities with autonomous 
activities. The ‗good enough mother‘ is a woman who has managed the conflict 
between autonomy and relationship – she loves her children and her self. Thus Solly‘s 
                                                             
24 Julia Kristeva, ‗Julia Kristeva in Conversation with Rosalind Coward (1984)‘, in The Portable 
Kristeva, ed. by Kelly Oliver (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 334. 
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chapter ends on a positive note; she has discovered her own subversive performance of 
motherhood. It is one that resists the maternal matrix‘s coherence of the ‗prioritisation 
of children‘. She has asserted her autonomy without throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater, so to speak.  
The narrator echoes this alternative reaction to the hopelessness, homelessness, 
and alienation from the self in the ‗mothers of schoolchildren‘ for whom she uses 
collective focalization. The free indirect discourse that attributes the same attitude and 
thoughts to numerous women identified only by their relationship of mother to children 
who attend school is defamiliarising. These are the thoughts that the narrator assumes 
these women to have, but whether they all have them is questionable. The mothers of 
schoolchildren have survived the early phases of childrearing. They now have a 
reprieve, provided by school hours, from the demands of children to find space for their 
autonomy, and have discovered, the narrator contends, some underlying ‗truth‘ of 
motherhood: 
The mothers of the schoolchildren […] weren‘t interested any more in things 
you could lose, in time or love or the feeling of a baby in your arms. They 
were interested in things that stayed with you for ever: houses, possibly 
husbands. And themselves, of course. What they wanted to avoid was 
destruction. Like politicians, they were interested in survival (AP, p. 154). 
The mothers of schoolchildren act as war veterans who understand what the mothers of 
younger children are struggling with, as well as what really matters. They have given up 
the grief over things that can be lost; their counterparts with younger children mourn the 
loss of their pregnant selves and the loss of their dependent infants while their pregnant 
counterparts mourn the loss of self that is brought about by the occupation and 
subsequent departure of an infant tenant. The mothers of schoolchildren realise that the 
self, unlike time, love, and children, is not something that one can lose. The phrase 
‗possibly husbands‘ is an ironic aside that calls into question the permanence of 
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marriage and the reliability of men. An attribution of source for this aside is difficult to 
ascertain. It might be the musing of the collective mothers of schoolchildren or it might 
be an ironic aside from the narrator introducing her own cynicism. Their desire to avoid 
destruction is perhaps ominous and the simile that compares them to politicians may 
trivialize the sentiment (is that the narrator being ironically distant?) but their interest in 
survival speaks to a knowledge of the necessity of subverting the all-consuming 
institution of motherhood by having other interests. Those with what the narrator deems 
a powerful understanding know that first and foremost one must find a way to survive, 
whatever and wherever that might be. In the midst of a bleak tale of the banality of 
suburban life a glimmer of something else makes itself known through ironic negation: 
a life outside of one‘s children that might simultaneously make one a better mother and 
a happier person and this finds its ‗expression‘ in multi-vocal narrative form.  
 Cusk‘s glimmer of hope affords her characters only the possibility of survival 
for she is not as optimistic as Kristeva. However, despite the ironic asides, or, as I have 
argued, because of them, the novel begins to offer an alternative to the empty misery of 
suburban motherhood. The performances of motherhood are subversive and disrupt the 
coherences of the maternal matrix through their ironic rejection of any redemptive 
reading of motherhood, yet does not reject it either. The narrator paints these characters 
with generous strokes of hopelessness and frustration and fixes them immovably in 
lives they find almost unliveable; but nevertheless, her ironic unreliability suggests a 
social critique and potential alternative. After the action of a single day, perhaps 
tomorrow will dawn differently. This new day can only bring a different relationship to 
motherhood and marriage when and if the women become aware that the ‗truth‘ of 
these institutions is that they cannot be transcended but only survived, and that survival 
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can only come from embracing a subjectivity that is both autonomous and in relation to 
others. 
Life in Division: Motherhood and When We Were Bad 
It is not possible to negotiate an autonomous subjectivity in all relationships. In 
Charlotte Mendelson‘s When We Were Bad, Frances‘s relationships to her husband and 
family of birth serve to deny her autonomy. One of the flaws that Meyers identifies in 
the homo economicus model of subjectivity is its underestimation of the importance of 
‗unchosen circumstances and relationships‘ to subjectivity.25 Families of birth are an 
example of relationships which one does not choose and thus cannot be accommodated 
by a model of a subject who is a ‗free and rational chooser‘. Frances‘s family resists her 
autonomy. They desire her to remain dependent and available to take care of their 
needs. She struggles to realise her autonomous desires without having to disregard the 
needs of her family, or completely disconnect from them. The free indirect discourse 
used throughout the novel serves to enact Frances‘s struggle to articulate and grasp a 
self divided between what she wants and what is expected of her by her family and how 
to contain her needs for autonomy within the confines of her relationships. 
Additionally, it exposes Frances‘s assumptions about the world and upsets the 
dichotomies she establishes between natural and unnatural, reasonable and 
unreasonable, normal and abnormal.  
Marriage, which in Western contemporary society is usually a ‗chosen‘ 
relationship, was not for Frances. She married the man her family wanted her to marry, 
but there is no sense in the novel that she has ever been in love with him or that the 
marriage, step-motherhood, or motherhood of her own child were ever things she chose 
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or desired. In fact, she does her best to limit her contact with her husband and children 
because she feels she is unable to perform these roles to anyone‘s satisfaction, most 
importantly to her own. Her marriage serves only to satisfy her mother and her husband. 
Kristeva theorises that marriage ‗insur[es] security by furnishing an identity marker 
(―you love me therefore I am, in moments of passion, too, also in time of illness …‖), 
the couple is a durable mirror, a repeated recognition. It sustains‘.26 Rather than the 
Cartesian ‗I think, therefore I am‘, the partner‘s love proves one‘s existence. However, 
if that love is not assured, if it is not part of the couple, then it cannot be relied upon to 
sustain identity. Thus Frances‘s ironic assertion in free indirect discourse that: ‗They 
were made for each other, the Rubins and her husband. Isn‘t she lucky to have them 
both? Really, she should be the happiest woman alive‘, ironically comments on how 
‗the couple‘ is made up of her husband and her mother and excludes her.27 Jonathan 
serves as a durable mirror of her mother. The love match of her husband and her family 
alienates her from both. The free indirect discourse undermines the meaning of ‗lucky‘ 
and of ‗happiness‘. They were made for each other, not for her. They may find 
recognition and reassurance of self, but she finds only negation.  
The free indirect discourse works, as well, to undermine the meanings of 
‗normal‘, ‗reasonable‘ and ‗natural‘. These are words that organise socially acceptable 
behaviour, but their use in the novel serves to highlight how prescriptive norms of that 
behaviour are. Ginsburg asserts that ‗FID, as a structure of undecidability, transgresses 
and violates binary oppositions and therefore raises serious problems in systems 
(literary and linguistic) built on such oppositions‘.28 One of the preoccupations of the 
                                                             
26 Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 
p. 227. 
27 Charlotte Mendelson, When We Were Bad (London: Picador, 2007), p. 37. Subsequent quotations will 
be taken from this edition and noted parenthetically in the body of the text. 
28 Ginsburg 1982, p. 133. 
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text is with ‗normal‘. Frances wants to be ‗normal‘. She wants her family to be 
‗normal‘. However, ‗normal‘ is impossible to achieve because what constitutes the 
norm is often defined by what exceeds it, by what is ‗abnormal‘. When Frances asserts 
that something she is doing is ‗normal‘, she is usually afraid that it is not: 
Frances knows she is lucky. It is emotion, purely, which makes her put down 
the glass she has been wrapping carefully in a double layer of napkin – how 
many grooms have severed an artery? – and claw a fragment of tissue from her 
sleeve. Crying at weddings is normal (WWWB, p. 8). 
She defines her crying as normal because she is well aware that it is not. She cries 
because marriage is, for her, not lucky or happy. The assertion of its normalcy is in free 
indirect discourse further reinforcing the irony of the statement and raising issue with 
its organisation of behaviour based on an impossible norm. It is not only her actions 
which she finds outside the norm. She begins to identify her perfect husband as 
transgressing what is usual for married men: ‗When she came in last night, he was 
asleep. Don‘t other men wait up for their wives, even to argue? Never mind, she thinks. 
All that is over. I am a good wife and mother and daughter and sister again. It does not 
matter now‘ (WWWB, p. 190). The free indirect discourse of the question ‗Don‘t other 
husbands wait up for their wives?‘ calls into question the normality of her marriage. 
The repetition of the ‗and‘ highlights how cumbersome her list of identities is, wife, 
mother, sister, daughter, and all demanding a performance that is ‗good‘. If Frances 
feels inadequate to the performance of normal femininity, normal marriage, and normal 
motherhood, this difficult to attribute voice is recognising that her situation is not 
normal. 
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The OED defines ‗reasonable‘ as ‗not irrational, absurd, or ridiculous; just, 
legitimate; due, fitting‘.29 Although Frances‘s rejection by her stepdaughters ‗seems 
perfectly reasonable‘ (WWWB, p. 132) and ‗it seems quite reasonable that they should 
hate her‘ (WWWB, p. 150), these statements of reason are ironic, implied by the use of 
‗seems‘. Frances might honestly believe that it is reasonable, but the overlap of the 
narrator‘s voice implies that she is, in Lydia Rainford‘s words, repeating this belief in 
such a way as to negate its value.
30
 Her stepdaughters‘ hatred and rejection are 
unreasonable. Frances is trying to get along with the girls; it is not fitting that she 
should be rejected or hated. Further, when Frances faces the prospect of returning to a 
life that she despises, her free indirect discourse continues to expose how unreasonable 
‗reasonable‘ really is:  
She had assumed that evolution, quite reasonably, had reserved Claudia‘s 
ferocity, her crusader‘s zeal, for her stronger, lovelier son and daughter. Now, 
however, at the thought of the flat and fearful life behind her, the dim 
compliant future ahead, fire starts to roll through her. She stands up, sword in 
hand (WWWB, p. 302). 
This assumption comes not from Frances herself, but from family lore that defines her 
good-for-nothing siblings as special and too talented to have to deal with everyday 
things. It is unreasonable that she be the compliant daughter; what is fitting is that she 
embrace her own ferocity and crusader‘s zeal, her own autonomy and independence, to 
avoid living a dim, compliant, dependent future. ‗Reason‘ has nothing to do with the 
way she was living her life; rather living an unfulfilling life is irrational, absurd, and 
ridiculous. The use of ‗reasonable‘ to define unreasonable realities foregrounds its 
                                                             
29 ‗Reasonable‘ ,in Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50218881?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=reasonable&first
=1&max_to_show=10, [accessed 24 November 2009] 
30 Lydia Rainford, She Changes by Intrigue Irony, Femininity and Feminism (Amsterdam and New York: 
Rodopi, 2005), p. 3. 
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ironic negation of itself and echoes the ironic negation of Frances‘s attempt to embrace 
the maternal matrix. 
The fallacy of ‗natural‘ is also called into question in the novel. ‗Natural‘ 
implies that something is ‗inherent in the very constitution of a person or thing; innate; 
not acquired or assumed‘.31 Frances is conflicted because mothering is difficult for her. 
‗Even watching him sleeping does not come naturally to her‘ (WWWB, p. 66). Frances 
struggles with the maternal matrix and its notion that in order to be a coherent mother, 
and by extension a coherent woman, one must have the ‗propensity and ability to rear 
children‘ as well as a ‗prioritization‘ of them. ‗Naturally‘, a coherent mother enjoys 
watching babies sleep because mothering is inborn and an essential part of what it 
means to be a woman – an identity as a selfless relater. The façade of nature occludes 
the reality that motherhood is a performance of nurturing that is learned by observing 
others. Frances flees her young son because ‗she does not know how to be natural‘ 
(WWWB, p. 291). However, as Frances begins to exercise more autonomy in her life, 
she discovers rebellion is something that is intrinsic to her: ‗Despite a lifetime of 
nightmares simply about being late, going AWOL comes naturally‘ (WWWB, p. 205). 
Motherhood does not feel natural, but running away does. Yet, when she flees her life, 
like a woman from a ‗novel that changes lives‘, she soon discovers that abandoning her 
child and her family is not natural either: ‗Shaking and crying are, she tells herself, a 
perfectly natural reaction to shock, as someone rescued from death might shake and cry. 
This is my cure, she thinks. It had to be dramatic and painful to work. There is no 
reason to think that escape was not the answer, after all‘ (WWWB, p. 272). Once again, 
‗natural‘ is being ironically negated. Frances‘s dawning awareness that fleeing 
                                                             
31 ‗Natural‘ in Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50218881?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=natural&first=1
&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=3&search_id=ieMc-ml4ei3-2663&hilite=00321540, 
[accessed 24 November 2009] 
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motherhood is not going to satisfy her allows her to entertain the notion of performing 
motherhood subversively. Such a performance would recognise that one is not born a 
mother, but becomes one and there is, therefore, more than one way to inhabit that role. 
Frances‘s performance may require that she embrace her natural skill at rebellion in 
order to enable her to execute motherhood in a way that she can find liveable. 
 The gendered and institutionalised roles of wife and mother seem to require a 
performance that could be made by any woman and Frances spends the majority of the 
novel struggling to be that universal woman, that universal wife and mother. However, 
the prescribed performance is impossible for her to persuasively enact. She knows, and 
suspects that everyone else knows, that she is not doing it ‗right‘, that her performance 
is not ‗natural.‘ Kristeva argues that Western society has an image of an ideal woman 
that is intertwined with versions of ideal motherhood rooted in the impossibility of the 
Virgin Mary, what Alison Weir terms ‗the archaic mother‘.32 This ideal woman 
complicates the possibility of a woman performing her gender in a way that allows her 
individuality. Kristeva theorises that:  
Insofar as she has a specificity a woman finds it in asociality, in the breaking 
of communal conventions, in a sort of asymbolic singularity. But at the same 
time, and as if in order to camouflage this truth, she spends her life in pretence, 
in playing out the roles of the nurse, wife, or idealized mother of artists, or the 
travestied companion of the brothers.
33
 
Women are individual and particular only when outside of their communities, when 
they are alone. Their performances as carers, wives, mothers, and companions act as a 
camouflage to their specificity and singularity. Kristeva argues that women‘s 
uniqueness is secret and underground, it is camouflaged by acceptable behaviour. What 
                                                             
32 Allison Weir, Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 178. 
33 Julia Kristeva, ‗The Subject in Process‘, in The Tel Quel Reader, ed. by Patrick Ffrench and Roland-
François Lack (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 150. 
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Frances, and the other women of the New Femininities fictions, is seeking is a way to 
be a specific and individualised woman while at the same time occupying the roles of 
wife and mother, to occupy all sides of herself at the same time so that her performance 
of wife and mother becomes specific and singular and not a pretence, playacting, or 
camouflage. She needs to negotiate a performance of the ‗good-enough mother‘, the 
‗good enough wife‘, and the ‗good enough daughter‘, if the ‗good enough‘ performance 
is one of balance between autonomy and dependence. For Frances, because her 
marriage is unloving and thus does not reinforce her self, the performance of wife is 
abandoned. Through free indirect discourse‘s raising of serious problems in systems, in 
this case the systems are the heterosexual and maternal matrices, the narrator 
foregrounds the necessity for a woman to be able to inhabit her self without having to 
perform an artificial version of gender roles.  
 Frances‘s realisation that she needs to seek a solution that allows for an 
individualised performance of motherhood comes to her as an epiphany in the bathtub. 
The themes of baptism, rebirth, resurrection, and purification are employed; themes that 
are often intermingled: death and rebirth, baptism and resurrection, purification and 
death. Frances has spent the previous days walking until she is exhausted as a way to 
try to escape her thoughts about what she has done by leaving her family. On the day of 
her revelation, she escapes to the bath to hide her distress from her landlady: 
Today she has walked too far: all the way to Fulham, for no particular reason, 
and all the way back. Her defences are lowered. She lies in the flimsy pink 
bath and suddenly an image of her son‘s knees, sweet silky moons of flesh, 
floats above her. She begins to cry, then to sob. Howls of pain bounce off the 
fibreglass until she remembers that her landlady is home and ducks under the 
water, letting her mouth fill until at last she is quiet (WWWB, p. 290). 
Bathing and water are symbolic of purification. This cleansing releases thoughts and 
images from which she has been trying to walk away. She is haunted by the physicality 
161 
 
 
of her son‘s knees, using metaphors of delicious food, ‗sweet, silky, moons of flesh‘. 
Ducking under the water and holding there until she is quiet is a symbolic drowning. 
The passage contains only brief asides of free indirect discourse, the ‗no particular 
reason‘ of the walk to Fulham and the metaphoric baby legs. These might be instances 
of straightforward narrative description, but they read like Frances‘s thought or the 
narrator‘s aside. Her landlady‘s concern through the door that she might be in labour 
introduces the motif of birth into the scene and when she sits up it is ‗like a corpse 
revived, water pouring from her hips and nipples‘ (WWWB, p. 291). She is resurrected, 
but the focus is upon the body parts that are associated with childbirth and mothering, 
hips and nipples. Her resurrection is a rebirth; she gives birth to herself as a mother, and 
to the knowledge that she can have an identity that includes motherhood, but that it will 
be different from the motherhood dictated by her husband and mother, different from 
the coherent mother of the maternal matrix. It is a performance that is specific to her. 
It is specificity that Frances seeks, an identity that is ‗Frances‘ and not 
exhausted by the more generic identities of Claudia‘s daughter, Jonathan‘s wife, or 
Max‘s mother. She is unsatisfied by the camouflage and pretence, she does not want to 
play the role of idealized mother or doting wife and dutiful daughter, she feels 
inadequate to these performances. Rather, she wants to be both her self and Max‘s 
mother: 
She could tell Claudia what she has only now realized, torn between kissing 
Max‘s head and wincing with impatience: that she will always be a little 
distracted, selfish, unrelaxed, but that she wants him, absolutely. Instead of 
waiting to be the mother she thought she should be, this is her, Frances, being a 
mother, and she can do it reasonably well (WWWB, p. 315-316). 
Motherhood is liveable for Frances when she allows herself to be both ‗Frances‘ and 
‗Max‘s mother‘ and accepts that she will not be perfect. The adverbs ‗absolutely‘ and 
‗reasonably‘ are Frances‘s thoughts in free indirect discourse. She continues to qualify 
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her narrative. She is willing to absolutely claim her desire for her son, but not to assert 
her abilities. Rather she fits her abilities into what is ‗reasonable‘. Frances has come to 
realise that it was not the relationship of mother that was unliveable, but the expectation 
of an idealized motherhood in which complete fulfilment as a woman is found in the 
body of a child. She did not find that fulfilment because it does not exist. Women who 
give the impression of the euphoric Madonna moment are camouflaging, playacting, 
and hiding their own specificity beneath the mask of the contented and beatified 
mother. 
 Frances is aware that motherhood is difficult for some women, that she is not 
the first to find it hopeless and unnatural, yet she chooses to isolate herself and keep her 
unhappiness a guilty secret. Through this shame and secretiveness, she becomes her 
own oppressor, her own jail warden. Foucauldian scholar Terry K. Aladjem argues that 
feminists need ‗to wonder about the specific ways in which women are subjugated or 
constitute themselves in power or, like the prisoners of Panopticon, how they might be 
―caught up in a power situation of which they themselves are the bearers‖‘.34 The free 
indirect discourse reveals Frances‘s internalisation of her family‘s ideology of the good, 
compliant daughter and uses it to repress her more rebellious thoughts and to convince 
herself to acquiesce to other people‘s wishes. Interestingly, Frances is most vulnerable 
to the speech of her husband and mother. The more someone talks to her, the more 
                                                             
34 Terry K. Aladjem, ‘The Philosopher‘s Prism: Foucault, Feminism, and Critique‘, in Feminist 
Interpretations of Michel Foucault, ed. by Susan J. Hekman, Re-reading the Canon series (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 290. She is quoting Eloise A. Buker, ‗A 
Feminist Deconstruction of Foucault: Hidden Desires and Missing Persons‘, Unpublished manuscript. 
Free indirect discourse has been accused of being a form of authorial panopticism because of its constant 
surveillance of its characters and its invasion of their privacy. However, such an argument is not fitting 
Mendelson‘s use of the device. See Dorrit Cohn, ‗Optics and Power in the Novel‘ and ‗Reply to John 
Bender and Mark Seltzer‘, John Bender, ‗Making the World Safe for Narratology: A Reply to Dorrit 
Cohn‘, and Mark Seltzer, ‗The Graphic Unconscious: A Response‘, New Literary History 26 (1995), p. 3-
37. 
34 Ginsburg 1982, p. 133. 
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likely she is to yield. It is as if she is vulnerable to an overabundance of language; that 
words suffocate her. Her resistance to ‗family time‘ is met by a litany of reasons that 
she should immerse herself in family. Neither her husband nor her mother acknowledge 
or yield to her desires. Instead, Frances acquiesces: ‗What can she do but surrender?‘ 
(WWWB, p. 86). ‗Why is she even resisting? No physical mishap, no friend in need nor 
professional crisis, could save her now. A family Seder must come first‘ (WWWB, p. 
126). She finds her resistance futile and capitulates to their wishes. The narrator‘s voice 
creates a chorus with Frances‘s – they both can see the ludicrousness of her reticence. 
Yet the narrator‘s echoing of Frances‘s realisation carries an ironic undertone – she is 
repeating the beliefs of the structure, in this case the utmost and unyielding importance 
of family, in such a way as to negate their value; thus implying that the real truth is 
another thing altogether: A family Seder might not have to come first.  
When Frances flees her family, her husband, and her son, she finds that away 
from familial pressures to camouflage herself and pretend to be the good daughter, 
wife, and mother. She is unsure who she is, what she likes, and what she wants. By 
trying to be the woman that her husband and family want her to be, she has lost touch 
with the woman that she wants to be. She attempts to reconnect with herself by 
collecting objects that appealed to her when she was a teenager: 
In the National Gallery shop this morning she found a cheap book full of her 
teenage favourites: prodding spears and lascivious vines, Bronzino‘s depraved 
Cupid, holy gleams of flesh. She has made it the base of a little temple to 
pleasure: a postcard of Battersea power station, disappointing red bean-paste 
cake from Chinatown, the paperbacks she has prescribed herself: Emma; The 
Curse of the Woosters (WWWB, p. 263). 
Her temple of pleasure seems to be made up entirely of things that befit a much younger 
woman, that appeal to a teenager‘s libido, and are ‗disappointing‘, a picture of an 
abandoned power station which, although ‗an icon on the London skyline‘ has been 
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‗left gutted and decaying after a procession of owners and failed development 
proposals‘, an untasty sweet from Chinatown, and novels of manners that speak to a 
bygone era.
35
 Someone is aware how childishly libidinal these teenage art favourites 
are, the description of the ‗prodding spheres‘ and ‗lascivious vines‘ calls attention to 
this, whether it is Frances being self-critical or the narrator exposing Frances‘s 
immaturity is unclear. This confusion highlights Frances‘s estrangement from self-
knowledge. Her discovery that she does not know who Frances the individual is 
anymore leads her to approach her life differently and seek to live her roles of mother 
and daughter in a way that accommodates her specificity; that takes into account her 
self. 
What finally makes mothering possible for Frances is doing it her own way, 
complete with all of her idiosyncrasies and neuroses. She can be both herself and a 
mother, if not a wife. She has recognised that her sense of self needs to be taken into 
account when she performs her social roles. She was too flexible and open to change 
and attempted to live a life dictated by Claudia‘s answers to these crucial questions. She 
finally accepts motherhood by asserting her need to be both autonomous and a mother 
and locating her own version of ‗the good enough mother‘. The free indirect discourse 
enacts this subversion of the binary oppositions that organised her life, because it allows 
the narrator and Frances to speak through each other and to chorus their voices as they 
seek a different way to approach the institutions of marriage and motherhood. 
                                                             
35 Maev Kennedy, ‗The Stately Wrecks of England‘, The Guardian, 25 July 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/25/artnews.art [accessed 26 November 2009]. Please note that I 
was unable to locate a novel entitled The Curse of the Woosters. Rather I found P.G. Wodehouse‘s The 
Code of the Woosters about Jeeves and Bertie Wooster and concluded this fictional novel belonged in the 
realm of a 1930s comedy of manners. 
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Tessa Hadley and the Imagination of Pleasure 
Tessa Hadley is concerned with the difficulty of finding a space for an autonomous self 
while maintaining the roles of wife, mother, daughter, and sister in her novel, Accidents 
in the Home. Like Heller‘s rethinking of the Bathsheba mythos in the previous chapter, 
Hadley, a Henry James scholar who lectures at Bath Spa University, uses her 
interpretation of James‘s method to rewrite Flaubert‘s Madame Bovary. In her 
monograph on James, Henry James and the Imagination of Pleasure, Hadley argues 
that ‗Flaubert‘s perception of Emma‘s want and of Emma‘s dreams is remote; the 
whole length of intelligence and self-consciousness yawns between the author and the 
character. Emma‘s story would sound quite differently, presumably, if she told it 
herself‘.36 Hadley‘s novel, I would like to suggest, does exactly this, imagines the story 
from Emma‘s perspective while placing it in a contemporary setting and makes use of 
the free indirect discourse that was innovated and perfected by both Flaubert and James 
as a forum for irony and a way to complicate the truthfulness of the narrative. Clare, 
Hadley‘s protagonist, is bored with marriage and motherhood like Emma Bovary, but 
she is also a PhD student in literature who is aware of the artificiality of the novelistic 
tropes she attempts to inhabit: adulterous wife, errant mother, and deluded dreamer. The 
novel is not a contemporary retelling of Madame Bovary, but rather reimagines that 
story for a different protagonist, with a different worldview, and to a different end. 
Flaubert‘s Madame Bovary is an anti-romance which works to dismantle the 
sentimental novel and its fantasizing heroine. For him, style was his chief concern and 
his aesthetic was, in David Cook‘s words, one of ‗hardness, coldness, and inanimacy‘ 
which strove to represent the unsatisfactory nature of the real which he found ‗ugly, 
                                                             
36 Tessa Hadley, Henry James and the Imagination of Pleasure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 120. 
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oppressive, and horribly void‘.37 As in the sentimental domestic novel, his female 
protagonist must die for her sins, but her death is not a redemption. Unlike the 
sentimental novel, there is no catharsis or sense of transcendence. Emma occupies a 
world in which change and transcendence are impossible. Flaubert rejects the 
sentimental; there is no romance in his unsatisfactory vision of bourgeois reality. James 
admired Flaubert, but was disturbed by his novels‘ lack of sympathy for their 
characters. James, in his novels and short stories, was distinctly interested in the 
sentimental, in emotions and relationships, and in the domestic. Hadley argues that in 
his later novels, James began to articulate a middle ground between the propriety and 
morality of the English novel tradition and the cynical, amoral European fiction 
tradition, in which to imagine a female pleasure that did not require her destruction. 
What the filter of James allows Hadley to do with Madame Bovary is to negotiate 
between the genres of anti-romance and the sentimental domestic novel without having 
to reject or ‗explode‘ either of them. Her novel is an effort to articulate her own middle 
ground between romance and cynicism in which to imagine an Emma Bovary whose 
female pleasure does not require her destruction nor does it guarantee her fulfilment.  
In an essay on Flaubert, James calls Emma ‗a victim of the imaginative habit‘; a 
trait shared by Hadley‘s Clare.38 Emma‘s imaginative habit leads to her destruction and 
death. Her desire for a life that resembles sentimental and romantic fiction, an 
impossibility, proves fatal. Clare‘s imaginative habit incorporates her knowledge of 
sentimental domestic fiction to imagine a life more pleasurable than her domestic 
drudgery as well; however it acts only to disrupt her life without destroying it. Through 
the use of what Dominic Head calls non-epiphanies, rendered through free indirect 
                                                             
37 David Cook, ‗James and Flaubert: The Evolution of Perception‘, Comparative Literature 25 (1973), p. 
299 and 293. 
38 Henry James, ‗Gustave Flaubert (1902)‘, in The Art of Fiction and Other Essays, ed. by Morris Roberts 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 132. 
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discourse that ironises her self-romanticising fantasies to expose in comic fashion how 
hard she has to work to create and believe in her epiphanies and to articulate the 
impossibility of a life without imagination and pleasure, Hadley‘s narrator undermines 
Clare‘s romantic visions of herself, but without rejecting the value of imagination, 
pleasure, and the sentimental. Hadley‘s refusal to reject these elements is informed by 
her perception that James also refused to reject them. In her monograph she argues that 
James, in his later novels, did not deny the value of the imagination of romance and its 
pleasures in the adulterous liaisons of his protagonists: 
The novels, of course, do not only record the sacrifice: they also enact the 
romance. If one merely reads the novels as chains of causation, then they 
certainly do have that story to tell, that sacrifice of the female buried deep 
within a certain masculine ideal. But […] because the late novels are 
essentially dialogic and not monologic, in the same movement of imagination 
which sees through and round such phenomenon, they also imagine its 
bottomlessness, its persuasive beauties, its pleasures.
39
 
James‘s later novels reveal a serious flaw at the root of the adulterous equation: the 
adulterous female sacrifices herself in order to fulfil her romantic partner. He risks very 
little while she risks everything. Yet James‘s imagination of the pleasure and beauty of 
these pairings allows two readings to coexist within the texts in constant tension: a 
moral reading that sees the revenge of the wronged partners as justified and a more 
forgiving reading in which the adulterous pair‘s desire for pleasure is validated. The 
experience of pleasure and beauty is valuable even if it is shortlived and ultimately 
ruinous. In his novels of adultery James does not discard the sentimental. 
The equation of the sentimental with manipulative, overblown, and 
melodramatic feminine concerns is, according to Suzanne Clark, inherited from a 
modernist rejection of the female novel tradition. She argues that the contemporary 
definition of sentimental is ‗connected loosely to a version of liberal humanism: valuing 
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the individual, intrinsic value, emotion or pathos, the endorsement of niceness and 
cooperation‘.40 It became a pejorative name for literature that pandered to the interests 
of a feminine audience. It is a term that continues to exist, but that now operates under 
erasure. Hadley allows the generic expectations of the sentimental domestic novel to go 
on being read, for example a desire for erotic fulfilment and the employment of two 
friends, one dark and one fair, who conceal rivalry under the veil of their friendship, 
while at the same time introducing qualities of the anti-romance, like the non-epiphany 
and the continual undermining of the protagonist, to be incorporated as well. This 
negotiation allows her to destabilise the romantic motivations of the sentimental 
domestic plot without fully rejecting them. For Hadley, as for Henry James, the 
sentimental is ‗still good to think with‘. Hadley does not simply reject sentimental 
domestic fiction, she is trying to preserve something of value – she sees through to the 
value hidden within the desire for pleasure and imagination and negotiates the different 
genres in order to reveal it. If negotiation allows an author to rethink and reimagine 
without having to reject; Hadley uses the language of the mainstream to tell new stories 
that maintain the pleasures of the old ones. 
Hadley argues that James used the language of the English novel tradition to 
talk about subjects that that tradition would never approach: adultery, pleasure, and 
passion. She asserts that early James wrote moralising novels that shied away from 
sexuality, but that in The Ambassadors he changes his mind and begins to negotiate 
between the moral and the pleasurable. In the novel, Strether resists acknowledging the 
nature of the relationship between Chad and Mme de Vionnet, but finally allows 
himself to recognise it and to imagine the pleasure and happiness between them. This 
novel represents James‘s reconciliation with the European tradition but without 
                                                             
40 Suzanne Clark, Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 12. 
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rejecting entirely the English novel tradition. Hadley argues that James sought a 
middle-ground between the two: 
‗[D]elicacy‘, the female-centredness of the English tradition, persisted as a 
value for James even into the late fictions; [… and] what interested him, again, 
was not the exchange of one system for another, but a perch between, a 
fictional medium in which both possibilities, a feminine-optimistic and male-
cynical, could be made real and co-existent, and neither of them offered as 
exhaustive.
41
  
In this way he sought ‗to create a language for womanliness which is not anchored in 
goodness, or chastity, or unsexuality […] What is really a radical development in late 
James is the convincing creation of a space and language in fiction for a womanhood 
liberated to kick over the traces with no more ado than a man‘.42 For Hadley, James‘s 
interest in imagination and pleasure represents a changing point and allows him to write 
novels that ‗perch between‘ optimism and cynicism to offer deep insight into how these 
strictures of femininity – decency, chastity, and purity – become entrenched in the very 
imagination of his female characters and how they can make choices that allow them to 
operate outside of these social mores. The choice to occupy a femininity that enjoys an 
element of freedom from these ideological burdens does not lead to a happy ending. 
The women end up alone, in exile, or yoked to a punishing paternalistic man.  
A resistance to the heavy consequences of trying to live outside of the strictures 
of propriety is one of the ways in which Accidents from the Home rewrites James 
himself. Clare is single at the end of her novel, but the price for her indulgence of her 
imagination, most particularly her imagination of pleasures which her husband and 
children cannot provide, is not that heavy and she does attain a freedom and space to 
realise a more autonomous self, even if that imagination of pleasure leaves her 
vulnerable to making the same mistakes that alienated her from that self in the first 
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place. After her separation from her husband, she can imagine the freedoms now 
available to her, but she cannot fully embrace them: 
But in the split seconds before she stood up and ran down the stairs to talk to 
him – they were like those elastic seconds that are supposed to be given to the 
drowning, to review their lives – she was sorry. Was this all the freedom she 
had meant, pulling on her wet jeans that morning? Love, again? All those 
emotional entanglements poised ready to fall into place: the jubilations and the 
raptures, the tugs and rendings and abasements, all quite outside the 
jurisdiction of her suspicious separate self. It would be good to refuse, to 
choose instead like George Sand retiring to Nohant after all those lovers the 
sounder happiness of gardening, cooking, children, books. It would be good to 
set out on the road like the old Tolstoy trying to leave the fraudulent fantasies 
of lust behind. Not going back to Bram, but not changing him for another man 
either.  
But that would have to wait, she thought. After all, she was only thirty.
43
 
It would be good to ‗kick over the traces‘ like a man or older woman, to resist ‗the 
jubilations and the raptures‘ always accompanied by ‗the tugs and rendings and 
abasements‘, but Clare is realistic enough to know that her imagination of pleasure will 
endanger the very freedom it enabled her to attain, will endanger her ‗suspicious 
separate self‘ to entanglements and constriction. In fact, the ‗sounder happiness of 
gardening, cooking, children, books‘ is exactly the happiness that she fled in favour of 
the imagination of the pleasure of ‗another man‘. She is aware that the retirements of 
George Sand and Tolstoy have been romanticised as if they were characters in a novel. 
Her realisation of the impossibility of abandoning the promise of a new relationship is 
conveyed in free indirect discourse which brings into relief the conflict between societal 
norms, young heterosexual women do not forego the love of a man, and personal 
autonomy.  
 Hadley‘s use of free indirect discourse resembles James‘s later style. Her 
narrator is not an overpowering presence whose irony serves to preach a message, judge 
her characters, or openly unseat them. Rather it is much more subtle, the undermining is 
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present, but done in such a way that it could well be Clare who undermines herself; her 
thoughts that expose her foolishness and vanity. Hadley connects this change of form in 
James, from an intrusive narrator to a subtler one, to his change of subject; to his 
interest in how the consciousnesses and imagination of women functions: 
There is plenty of mutual enlightened intelligence in the late novels, but 
transcendent it is not; it is contingent, vulnerable, temporary […] With new 
freedoms for James‘s heroines comes a loss of certainty; a free fall intimately 
related, of course, to the developments in James‘s form, where whatever was 
left of the controlling intrusive narrator and his containing ironies is sunk in 
the opaque subjective dialogic medium of the late fiction.
44
 
The moral of the story becomes less the point. He is no longer concerned with what is 
right or even true, but pays his attention ‗where experience is thick and turbulent and 
passionate‘.45 This interest in experience rather than ‗truth‘ or ‗rightness‘ differs from 
the sentimental domestic novel, it recognises the ‗contingent, vulnerable, temporary‘ 
where the sentimental novel has found transcendence, but it does not reject it. If Hadley 
is negotiating between the genres of anti-romance and the sentimental domestic novel, 
she is following in the footsteps she identifies as being laid down by James. 
Hadley distinguishes in James a sympathy and real interest in the 
consciousnesses of his female characters, one that contrasts greatly with Flaubert‘s 
approach. She argues that in the short story ‗In the Cage‘, his telegraphist has all the 
attributes of Emma Bovary, the girl‘s sense of unfulfilment is exacerbated by her 
awareness of the power of her aristocratic clientele, ‗her dreams feed off her hunger and 
her hunger feeds off her dreams in a spiralling drama of intense interior awareness‘.46 
However, he chooses to link the narrative inextricably with the self-awareness of the 
girl, ‗rendering a state of fantasising need that is nothing like Emma Bovary‘s delusion, 
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because it is so charged with sharp recognition of its own precariousness and fatality‘.47 
This description could be applied to Clare as well who is even more like Emma Bovary 
in that she is married and seeking pleasure and passion that is not forthcoming in her 
domestic life. If James imagines a character that is similarly ‗a victim of the 
imaginative habit‘, Hadley imagines a character that shares this habit and occupies a life 
that is similar to Emma‘s but also different. She is a bourgeois housewife dissatisfied 
with the drudgery of domestic life, but she is equally an academic in training and 
astutely aware of the fictionality of her daydreams of, ironically, occupying her own 
romantic novel:  
This was one of those moments given on earth like a promise of what‘s 
possible: the palely veiled creamy blue sky, the water glinting, the sunwarmed 
stone against her skin, the heat on her shoulders, the loved child happy playing 
in the earth, all the loved family spread safely and at their proper distances like 
a constellation, so that she in her place, part of it, was both holding and held. In 
literature though, Clare thought, there is a notorious problem with heavenly 
peace. It is well known that it can only be appreciated through the glass of loss. 
[…] It is only because Emma Bovary‘s provincial Normandy is in the 
irrecoverably lost past that what seemed to her banal and smothering seems to 
us charming, mysterious, desirable (Accidents, p. 53). 
Clare consciously compares her own reality to Madame Bovary which she reads as 
‗charming, mysterious, desirable‘, a description which runs counter to Flaubert‘s 
intention to represent a reality that was ‗ugly, oppressive, and horribly void‘. She 
recognises the perfection of the moment – that it is pleasurable, that family life can be 
satisfying if experienced at the right distance– but distrusts it not only because her 
literary mind insists it is precarious but because her literary mind will make it so. She 
experiences a real pleasure here, but she cannot fully enjoy it because she is waiting for 
her own novel to begin which will require a dramatic cessation of the simple pleasures 
and the imagining of a different kind of pleasure.  
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Accidents in the Home is greatly concerned with imagination; the word is 
repeated more than fifty times throughout the novel. Clare‘s husband, Bram's, greatest 
flaw is that he lacks imagination. Clare complains that ‗He knew things but he didn‘t 
invent things‘ (p. 68) and he resists her role-playing sex games which experiment with 
the power and pleasure of sexuality – powerful women, mostly taken from novels, 
making demands of men who must obey because of class. Clare‘s imaginative habit is 
plagued by what Hadley calls ‗female love-pathology, the melting and sacrificing, the 
cult of the man‘ which is a ‗debilitating habit of the female imagination‘.48 As a 
teenager, she believed that boys had an authentic seriousness which she could only hope 
to acquire through the gaze of a man: 
Her own passionate love for books did not count for freedom, it was too 
muddled with her life, she was searching too feverishly in her reading to learn 
how to live and what to be: things boys just knew without searching. The best 
you could hope for was to be able to break in on male objectivity and bathe in 
it cleansingly: what you desired was that the authenticating look of male 
seriousness would actually come to rest on all you were, and make you real 
(Accidents, p. 137). 
Despite marrying a man who is very serious and being bathed almost to the point of 
drowning in his seriousness, Clare assumes that her lack of fulfilment is because he is 
the wrong man. Her novel offers her other pleasures, the pleasures of dawn over a lake 
when the rest of the house is still sleeping, the pleasure of sitting by a lake on a sunny 
day while your child plays without any demands being made on you. Yet, it is not 
enough. Even in these moments when she recognises the pleasure, Clare feels 
‗repentant already that this was not enough, that there was always more that one 
greedily wanted, more than whatever precious thing it was that one held real and live 
and finite in one‘s hands‘ (Accidents, p. 54). She shares this ‗debilitating habit of the 
female imagination‘ with Emma Bovary, but for her it is not a fatal flaw; it does not 
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lead to her destruction. It allows her a certain measure of freedom even if it is a freedom 
that is ephemeral and vulnerable to the next whim of her susceptibility to ‗the cult of the 
man‘, to the desire to have a man make her real. 
In addition to exploring female susceptibility to ‗the cult of the man‘, Hadley‘s 
novel incorporates some of the tropes that she identifies as representing James‘s change 
of mind and interrogation of femininity, imagination, and pleasure. Strether, in The 
Ambassadors, changes his mind about the nature of the relationship between Chad and 
Mme de Vionnet and acknowledges its sexual nature. Hadley argues that this is the 
revolutionary moment of the novel: ‗It is Strether‘s recognition – fired, envious, 
perturbed; and his submission, eventually, to the flood of the realities of sensual 
pleasure and momentary happiness which cannot be explained or moralised or extended 
into an infinite future‘.49 It is revolutionary because James allows himself to approach 
the topic of adultery, a topic much explored in European novels but which was 
uncomfortable for the English tradition, without moralising or rejecting a value to that 
relationship. Marian, Clare‘s mother, experiences a Strether-like moment when she 
finds herself on the outside of a closed bedroom door and experiences, painfully, an 
instant when she imagines the pleasure that she has foreclosed on since her divorce 
from her husband twenty years ago; the pleasure of sexuality and the pleasure of 
femininity – it is ‗the flash of a crimson dress, and the door banged shut‘ that drives her 
to inconsolable tears (p. 112): 
One day there was a flash of crimson across the landing at the top of the stairs 
as Marian came in at the front door: Tamsin running out of Marian‘s bedroom 
(the only room with a full length mirror) in a crimson dress, a stunning full 
length dress in clinging satin cut on the cross over her hips, long black beads 
(Marian‘s?) whipping after her. A whirl of Tamsin like a paparazzo‘s snatch of 
a film star, loud laughter cut off, a door (Tamsin‘s bedroom door) pulled shut 
with a bang. Left for Marian on the wrong side of the door was the not-quite-
quiet of the shut out. From behind the door came warm and thick as dove-song 
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or slow-cooking, the burbling of silly talk, the up and down crooning of 
pleasure: not sex-noises, just pleasurable intimacy (Accidents, p. 110). 
She is shut out not only from the ‗pleasurable intimacy‘, but also from the pleasures of 
femininity clothed in a beautiful fitted dress, the object of appreciative attention from 
both an other and from oneself – for Tamsin is looking in the mirror when her mother 
comes home. Marian‘s imagination of pleasure reinforces the novel‘s concern with the 
value of such fantasies. The sound of their pleasurable intimacy is compared to ‗dove-
song‘ and ‗slow-cooking‘ and it is ‗burbling‘; sounds which carry their own pleasure 
and satisfactions. She has three moments in her chapter in which she imagines pleasure: 
first she imagines her father‘s pleasure on a lovely day but fears she might have 
imagined his death, then she imagines her daughter‘s pleasure at being young, beautiful, 
and desired, and finally she imagines her own pleasure in a dream about the accidental 
beauties of nature which can create a moment of perfection. All three moments are 
concerned with imagining not only pleasure, but the freedoms these pleasures 
accompany. 
Marian‘s imagining of Tamsin‘s pleasure is accompanied by an unease at 
Tamsin‘s connection with the boy hidden in her room. This connection is characterised 
similarly to the connection James uses for Adam and Charlotte in The Golden Bowl. 
Marian sees Tamsin as ‗leading him after her by the invisible silken cord. If Mark 
began talking to Marian about work and school then Tamsin tugged‘ (Accidents, p. 
109). A potentially apt description of the connection of new lovers, there is a menacing 
quality to this connection in the novel because Tamsin is twenty-five, ruthless, and 
disturbed. The boy is sixteen and innocent. The menace is increased by its resemblance 
to James‘s couple:  
[T]he likeness of their connexion would not have been wrongly figured if he 
had been thought of as holding in one of his pocketed hands the end of a long 
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silken halter looped around her beautiful neck. He didn‘t twitch it, yet it was 
there; he didn‘t drag her, but she came.50  
She follows at his whim because her adultery has been discovered and she is at his 
mercy. Maggie, through whose eyes we see this ‗long silken halter‘, imagines that her 
father is leading Charlotte off to her doom. Knowledge of this parallel heightens the 
danger of Tamsin‘s manipulation of the boy. However, Tamsin does not desire to lead 
the boy off to his doom, punish or destroy him, rather her desire is simply for his 
admiring gaze to validate her own narcissism.  
It is Rene Girard‘s contention that desire is mimetic. He argues that desire arises 
from the perception that an object is desired by someone else, often a rival, which 
creates a triangle. Girard explains that ‗[t]he impulse toward the object is ultimately an 
impulse toward the mediator‘.51 For Tamsin, her desire for the boy, for the boy‘s 
reflecting gaze, is ultimately a desire for herself; their love triangle is mediated by her 
self; it is made up of her self-love and his admiration. Emma Bovary‘s desire mirrors 
the desires of the heroines in her sentimental novels, she desires what they have and in 
the process to be a sentimental heroine. Clare appears to be mirroring the desires of the 
nineteenth-century sentimental domestic novels she reads, but her desire is actually 
mediated by her best friend, Helly. Clare wants whatever Helly has. Hadley argues that 
Girard‘s formulation of mimetic desire has interesting connotations for women‘s 
friendships and identifies a long novelistic tradition of the fair and dark friends who 
profess undying friendship but act to undermine and steal from each other because this 
is the only medium in which their rivalry can be realised: 
Of course The Wings of the Dove is by no means the first English novel which 
has two ‗heroines‘. Milly and Kate are created out of a stock of such 
contrasting pairs: Fanny and Mary, Emma and Jane, Hetty and Dinah, Becky 
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and Amelia, Maggie and Lucy. A distinct pattern emerges; one girl is dark and 
one fair, one vivacious and one compliant, one dangerous and one ‗good‘. 
They are often friends; but their relationship is vitiated by an uneasy 
apprehension on one side at least that they will somehow do one another harm 
[…] There is no acceptable mould into which their ‗competition‘ can be cast, 
as there might be if they were young men; it is not a part of the apparatus and 
expectation of femininity that girls should even playfully spar together. 
Therefore their concealed competition – their sense, often, that one has what 
the other wants – is dissimulated under all the appearances of a feminine cosy 
communion, the innocent sharing of shopping and confidences. But this in turn 
makes the anticipated betrayal loom all the more oppressively.
52
 
Competition for limited resources, eligible and desirable men, money, and attention, 
appears to lie at the very root of novelistic female friendships hidden by the ‗sharing of 
shopping and confidences‘. In the traditional formulation of this pairing, it is the fair 
girl who is compliant and ‗good‘ and the dark one who is vivacious, dangerous, and 
sexual. Hadley, however, allows both of her women to be sexual and flips the equation: 
Clare is dark, but compliant and settled. Helly is fair, yet sexy, adventurous, and 
vivacious. However, true to form, they each desire what the other has.  
From the very beginnings of their friendship when they are teenagers they want 
to live each other‘s life. They immediately ‗fell in love with one another‘s houses‘ 
(Accidents, p. 121). What Clare dislikes about her large, messy, bohemian household, 
Helly loves. What Helly resents about her orderly suburban home, Clare envies. They 
would gladly switch lives. For James‘s Milly and Kate their similar mimetic desire, 
Hadley contends, is the tragedy of the novel: 
The reality of the luck of each girl is made sharp, is made poignant, is made 
into the very essence of the desirable, by how much each would have given for 
the luck of the other. Each would have given everything: this is the last twist of 
that rivalrous process of co-definition that binds the girls fatally to one 
another‘s losses.53 
                                                             
52 Hadley 2002, p. 130. 
53 Hadley 2002, p. 142. 
178 
 
 
Milly and Kate would love to live each other‘s life: Kate would have loved to have 
Milly‘s wealth and Milly would have ‗given everything‘ for Kate‘s health. Hadley takes 
this novelistic trope and further reimagines it: her characters actually switch lives, 
acquire each other‘s form of ‗luck‘ and in the process avoid the tragic. Clare envies 
Helly‘s single life and imagines Helly‘s day as being much more enjoyable than her 
own: ‗The idea of such empty acres of solitude was a cooling balm against the 
promiscuous itch of Clare and Bram‘s crowded little house where every surface was 
greasy with touching and there was no lock on the toilet door‘ (Accidents, p. 117). A 
singular existence sounds like paradise to Clare whose life is inescapably occupied by 
others – she cannot even escape into the toilet. The novel does not use Helly as a 
focaliser and thus perception of her envy for Clare‘s settled life as a well-loved wife 
and mother must be extrapolated from her behaviour in the novel and her affair with 
Clare‘s husband. Through the course of the novel, the two women exchange lives: Clare 
becomes single with opportunities for more time to herself and Helly steps into the role 
of mother in Clare‘s family, holding the children‘s hands, deciding what to feed them, 
and shaping Bram to be a man she can desire. Instead of realising the error of her envy, 
as Emma Woodhouse does with Jane Fairfax, Clare attains the freedom for which she 
envied Helly. This exchange does not serve to teach Clare a lesson about the danger of 
taking ‗the precious thing it was that one held real and live and finite in one‘s hands‘ for 
granted. Clare does not envy Helly‘s place in her family nor does she desire to return to 
it. Clare finds the position of mother at the centre of her family ‗unimaginable‘ 
(Accidents, p. 241). Hadley‘s version of Milly and Kate is able to realise the change of 
luck for which their predecessors would have given everything. In the process, Clare 
escapes the triangle of mimetic desire; her desires are no longer mediated by Helly. 
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 Emma Bovary‘s triangle of mimetic desire leaves her with an unattainable 
longing to live a life like the lives led by romantic heroines. Her imagination of a 
pleasure she has read about in novels is her tragic flaw which propels her along a path 
to her eventual destruction. James calls her a ‗victim of the imaginative habit‘ and it is 
this imaginative habit that Flaubert is denigrating. Hadley negotiates the genres of anti-
romance and the sentimental domestic novel to find value in the imagination of 
pleasure. To this end she makes use of what Dominic Head, in a discussion of James 
Joyce‘s Dubliners, calls non-epiphanies, a device used in Madame Bovary. Head 
explains that ‗in the epiphanic moment an essential ‗truth‘ about character and/or 
situation is revealed in a flash of insight‘.54 However, in non-epiphanies there is ‗a lack 
of illumination in many of the epiphanies. The determining factor is the consciousness 
that is taken to be experiencing the revelatory moment, and this is considerably 
complicated by the destabilizing narrative technique of indirect free discourse‘.55 The 
moments that should be life-changing founder because the character is unable or 
unwilling to accept this truth and this shortcoming is revealed in free indirect discourse. 
However because it is in free indirect discourse it becomes unclear who is revealing the 
character‘s shortcoming: is it the narrator exposing his protagonist‘s silliness or is it the 
character herself revealing her own foolishness. Hadley uses her free indirect discourse 
to ironise Clare‘s self-romanticising fantasies, to expose how hard Clare has to work to 
create and believe in her epiphanies, and to articulate the impossibility of a life without 
imagination and pleasure. Through their use Hadley‘s narrator undermines Clare‘s 
romantic visions of herself, but without rejecting the value of that imagination. Emma‘s 
epiphanies fail because she occupies a hard and uncompromising world in which 
enlightenment is impossible. Clare‘s epiphanies founder because she is self-consciously 
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performing them aware that they are novelistic tropes. Head argues that non-epiphanies 
can be used as a way to reveal the shortcomings of ideological social systems. He 
asserts that ‗An overt challenge to this system would have been unacceptable, as the 
fuss over morality in Dubliners indicates, and it is through Joyce‘s subversion of 
literary convention that the consequences of this ideology are exposed‘.56 Hadley makes 
use of non-epiphanies to a similar end: to expose the consequences of the ‗debilitating 
habit of the female imagination‘, the ‗female love pathology‘ – ‗the cult of the man‘, 
but without having to destroy the feminine imagination. 
 Hadley identifies such intent to expose without destroying this habit of the 
female imagination in James‘s ‗In the Cage‘. Like James‘s telegraphist, Clare possesses 
‗a state of fantasising need that is nothing like Emma Bovary‘s delusion, because it is so 
charged with sharp recognition of its own precariousness and fatality‘.57 She 
understands how epiphanies are supposed to work, although she chooses to use the 
synonymous term ‗revelation‘, and seeks them out. Yet her knowledge of sentimental 
domestic novels makes her aware of their artificiality. When she considers trying to 
reconcile with Bram she pictures herself down on her knees begging him for 
forgiveness. She immediately considers her vision ridiculous because she has nothing 
for which to be forgiven and recognises it as a scene from a novel. Yet, its very 
ridiculousness is what convinces her it might be that long awaited epiphany that will 
reveal an essential ‗truth‘: 
But then ridiculous was just what one ought to expect revelation to be, that was 
the whole point. By definition it shouldn‘t show you anything you could 
deduce or arrive at by yourself. It didn‘t follow on from anything that had 
come before, and it changed everything (Accidents, p. 204). 
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Clare‘s definition of the function of epiphany shows an understanding of literary tropes, 
but the inanity of a flash of insight that can change everything, that does not arise out of 
one‘s own knowledge, foregrounds the fictionality of the epiphany. Clare‘s knowledge 
of novelistic techniques like epiphany means that her narrator can negotiate between 
using a generic convention of anti-romance within a sentimental domestic novel to 
perch between the destruction of its fantasising heroine and her fulfilment to create a 
contingent, vulnerable, and temporary freedom that arises from the imagination of 
pleasure. 
Clare longs for epiphanies that will show her how to get free of her sticky and 
domestic life for one that is romantic and autonomous. However, she is too intelligent 
and has read too many novels to be able to suspend her disbelief long enough to 
embrace her plan to beg for forgiveness. She realises that the errant wife‘s return to her 
marriage and to selflessness is just as much a novelistic trope as begging on one‘s knees 
or fleeing married life in the name of personal fulfilment: 
The first thought her mind reoccupied as she came to consciousness in the 
morning was this plan for her reconciliation with Bram. It seemed to her 
instantly factitious and false, sickening; a scene out of a novel, not out of her 
real life. She felt ashamed at her capacity for this kind of fantasy and at the 
danger she was always in of acting upon her fantasies and living by them […] 
Of course she was not going back, of course not. This was what she had left 
for, to have adventures in strange houses, to wake up by herself in rooms that 
weren‘t snugly and safely moulded to her shape, ugly rooms like dead shells 
inside which she would know herself more sharply alive (Accidents, p. 205). 
A return to domestic contentment is just as artificial and false as a life led seeking self-
fulfilment; they are impossible dreams. There is no domestic happily ever after as 
promised by sentimental domestic novels nor is self-fulfilment enough. Equally, her 
separation from her husband and children does not require her destruction or her 
complete self-abasement. Clare is aware of the extent to which her current situation was 
dictated by acting upon a fantasy, the fantasy that sexual escape could set her free from 
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the constricting bonds of her settled life, or fulfil her; the fantasy that life is like a novel. 
The repetition of ‗of course‘ suggests that she is trying to convince herself of the 
impossibility of that solution. Rather her solution is a freedom that is precariously 
perched between fulfilment and destruction, between romance and cynicism, constantly 
in danger of toppling into one or the other because of her inability to abandon ‗the cult 
of the man‘ and its promise to make her real. 
 Hadley negotiates between the genres of anti-romance and the sentimental 
domestic novel by reading Madame Bovary with the attention and sympathetic ear of 
Henry James. James's later works offer an example to her of the value of imagination 
and pleasure and the imagination of pleasure and the potential freedom they offer to a 
self desiring autonomy. However, this is a contingent and precarious freedom which is 
threatened by the very imagination that brought it into being in the first place. Clare is 
constantly in danger of surrendering her newfound freedom to a new man who might 
make her ‗real‘. 
The desire for a life lived in the middle between passion and practicality, self 
and mother, and assimilation and autonomy is what the New Femininities novels 
chronicle. Through their use of free indirect discourse and its ability to upset 
dichotomies, the novels are able to blur the binaries that serve to limit their characters‘ 
lives and allow them to try to find a particularised way to occupy their roles without 
sacrificing their sense of self. The rules of the institutions of heterosexual marriage and 
motherhood can seem insurmountable, but these novels suggest, some more 
optimistically than others, that subversive performances are not only possible, but 
essential to the characters‘ desires to find a liveable way to inhabit their gender roles 
that allows them to accommodate their selves. 
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Chapter Four: Untied Text: The Sense of an Ending 
The realisation that a performance of marriage or motherhood does not have to adhere 
to the rigid norms of femininity or to heteronormativity and that one can possibly 
accommodate one‘s self within the gender roles of wife and mother does not mean a 
tidy end to New Femininities fictions. Rather, these writers complete their works by 
raising questions instead of answering them. ‗Questions‘, in Edmund Gordon‘s words, 
‗can duck every kind of schema, and escape even the possibility of repudiation, cloaked 
as they are in uncertainty […]; they can take the place of answers‘.1 The New 
Femininities writers begin their novels by, to borrow Rachel Blau DuPlessis phrase, 
‗writing beyond the ending‘ because they write about characters who are, for the most 
part, already married, who have already achieved the end to their romantic quests; and 
instead of resisting the conventional endings of marriage and death completely or 
offering alternatives of social connection, woman-to-woman and mother-to-child, these 
novels negotiate between the two.
2
 Rather than providing answers to the question of 
what options women have between love and adventure, these fictions stage 
interrogations of the act of questioning itself. The New Femininities fictions, that is to 
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say, function in a perpetually interrogative mode. In so doing, they meet Cixous‘s call 
for women to write beyond the ‗ultimate-reserve discourse‘, that would declare ‗the 
end‘. 
Existing criticism celebrates Alice Munro above all for the way her stories resist 
closure. Her endings are variously characterised as ‗ambiguous‘,3 ‗indeterminate‘4, 
‗unfinished‘, ‗elliptical and interdictive and prohibitive of any gesture of ―summing 
up‖‘.5 Munro states that in the collection Hateship, Friendship, Courtship, Loveship, 
Marriage, she consciously chose to avoid answering questions; she ‗wanted to 
challenge what people want to know. Or expect to know. Or anticipate knowing. And as 
profoundly, what I think I know‘.6 Sunny, the friend of the unnamed narrator of Alice 
Munro‘s ‗Nettles‘, comments on the dissatisfaction of endings that seek to inspire 
suspense. She and her husband have just seen Bridge on the River Kwai. Sunny is 
unconvinced by the actions of the conclusion of the film; it is ‗too complicated‘. She 
argues that the story contradicts the characterisation of Alec Guinness‘s character in 
order to create suspense and drama. She believes that behaving ‗in character‘ would 
have more dramatic impact: ‗―Well, I think he just should have seen the wire and 
known what was going to happen and stayed on the bridge and got blown up with it. I 
think that‘s what his character would have done and it would have been more 
dramatically effective‖‘ (‗Nettles‘, p. 175). Rather than pander to audience needs for 
excitement and suspense, Sunny argues that endings need to be concerned with 
delivering a finish that is ‗true‘ to the characters that people the story, even if it means 
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frustrating audience satisfaction. L.M. Eldredge suggests that ‗because lives do not 
follow conventional plots, [fictions] which attempt genuinely to probe the lives of 
characters often end with an arbitrary turn of events that seems to flout tradition‘.7 
Munro flouts tradition in ‗Nettles‘. The story of potential romantic reconnection ends 
equivocally. ‗It would be the same old thing, if we ever met again. Or if we didn‘t. 
Love that was not usable, that knew its place […] Not risking a thing yet staying alive 
as a sweet trickle, an underground resource‘ (‗Nettles‘, p. 186-187). Although the love 
is ‗unusable‘, it is still ‗sweet‘ and a ‗resource‘, something pleasant that she can draw 
upon; its memory sustaining. Love is alluded to, but, the question that she chooses to 
answer, the resolution that her story offers, is an identification of the plant that the 
unnamed narrator and Mike encountered that caused rashes on their forearms, hands, 
and ankles. It was not the ‗big pinkish-purple flowers‘, the garish and noticeable plant, 
but ‗more insignificant plants, with a paler purple flower, and stalks wickedly outfitted 
with fine, fierce, skin-piercing and inflaming spines. Those would be present too, 
unnoticed‘ (‗Nettles‘, p. 187). It is more often the mundane and unnoticeable that leave 
their mark and not the garish and ostentatious; it is subtlety which can be the most 
devastating, in life and in conclusions. Why, though, does Munro choose to end a story 
about reconnection with information about the appearance of stinging nettles and not 
with a statement about the unnamed narrator‘s happiness? Does the unnamed narrator 
ever find connection; find a love that is useable? Munro resists offering completion in 
love as a conclusion to a story about disconnection. 
The narrator‘s comments about the sweet resource of unusable love that does 
not require they ever meet again subverts a particular sort of romance ending. As Carol 
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L. Beran suggests, ‗these references to the conventional closure of women‘s stories 
provide a sense that the story has ended while leaving the ending open‘.8 ‗Closed‘ 
endings conclude by attaining what H. Porter Abbott calls ‗closure at the level of 
expectations‘, by fulfilling generic parameters of a happy ending or of each character 
getting some form of justice, and ‗―closure at the level of questions‖, where the text has 
answered all of the questions that it raises‘; the reader leaves the text enlightened.9 
While open endings resist closure on either or both levels. John Gerlach argues that the 
term ‗open ending‘ is inadequate to describe Munro‘s endings, and I would argue, 
inadequate to characterise the endings of any of the New Femininities Fiction. ‗Stories 
often do end ambiguously, and we already have the serviceable term ―open ending‖ for 
such cases, but generally the choices for an open ending are primarily binary, rather 
than continuously indeterminate‘.10 The open ending leaves its reader with a choice of 
two solutions, either happiness or despair, either the governess is mad or the children 
are evil. Rather than offer an either/or choice, the New Femininities fictions raise 
numerous questions which resist simplification into either/or. Like the ironic voice they 
hover and represent a tactical aversion to the very notion of either/or. I will characterise 
the endings of these fictions as ‗interrogative‘ and explore the questions that the texts 
raise and refuse to answer. These are not texts that completely refuse closure and the 
conventional endings of women‘s novels; in fact, they negotiate with the familiar 
endings. These novels require their reader to formulate and digest the questions that are 
left unanswered. They negotiate the space between ‗open‘ and ‗closed‘ endings, 
traditional and postmodern techniques, to create a space in which the unanswerable of 
female experience can be interrogated.  
                                                             
8 Carol L. Beran, ‗The Pursuit of Happiness: A Study of Alice Munro‘s Fiction‘, The Social Science 
Journal 37 (2000), p. 331. 
9 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 53-54. 
10 Gerlach 2007, p. 149. 
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The Accidental negotiates the space between open and closed endings through 
the irresolvability of Alhambra‘s identity. To borrow an assertion Shari Benstock makes 
about The House of Mirth, ‗the moral directive of the novel remains an open 
question.‘11 Is Alhambra a hero? A destroyer? Or is she something in-between? Her 
presence that summer at the Smarts‘ vacation home and their discovery that she has 
stolen everything in their London home, down to the doorknobs, disrupts the Smarts‘ 
lives. Her role in the novel is as instigator of change and her narrative works against 
resolving the moral directive of her character. Demon or angel, what is interesting to the 
novel is irresolution and upheaval. Even without Alhambra‘s interference, the Smarts‘ 
lives were on the verge of collapse anyway; they were all escaping something when 
they went on holiday. Astrid is on the cusp of her teenage years and the huge changes 
that implies, Magnus sent an online video to his class that resulted in a classmate‘s 
suicide, Michael‘s sexual activities with his students are about to be revealed and cost 
him his academic job, and the families of Eve‘s literary subjects are preparing to sue her 
publisher for a share of the profits. The novel ends with everyone attempting to survive 
in the aftermath of these disasters, but resists a return to normalcy or a righting of all the 
wrongs. Most importantly for my interests, Eve has left her family to travel around the 
world and has thrown her mobile phone into the Grand Canyon. She does not have any 
money left nor does she have any plans to return to her family or to stay away. The 
novel closes without any closure on the level of expectations or on the level of 
questions. 
 The final section, ‗The end‘, allows each of the characters to meditate on ‗the 
end‘ and endings. For Astrid, coming back from holiday to an emptied house is not 
                                                             
11 Shari Benstock, ‗―The word which made all clear‖: The Silent Close of The House of Mirth‘, in 
Famous Last Words: Changes in Gender and Narrative Closure, ed. by Alison Booth (Charlottesville 
and London: University Press of Virginia, 1993), p. 246. 
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devastating or disastrous. Rather, it opens up possibilities for change and to make things 
different. She is angry at her mother for leaving and for not being better at handling the 
robbery and the loss of her career as a historical ‗faction‘ writer: 
It was doorknobs that were the end for her. The end is presumably different for 
everybody. Astrid thinks now that this is rather a disgusting end, doorknobs. 
It‘s the end, her mother kept saying after that. The absolute end (The 
Accidental, p. 218). 
Doorknobs do seem an odd choice for the final straw, for the discovery that makes 
everything else seem unbearable. Doorknobs can mean an end, if they are locked and 
the door is closed, but they also imply beginnings: a way in. Eve‘s end is Astrid‘s 
beginning: ‗Except that it isn‘t the end. How can it be the end of anything? It‘s just the 
beginning. It is the beginning of everything, the beginning of the century and it is 
definitely Astrid‘s century, the twenty-first century, and here she is, here she comes‘ 
(The Accidental, p. 234). She finds the robbery liberating. Her family can redefine itself 
by choosing differently in furniture, clothing, and future actions. If her family has spent 
the novel on the verge of personal disasters, she has been on the cusp of a new era in 
her life and she is hopeful of the possibilities open before her. 
 Eve‘s response to the robbery is a re-evaluation of her self-definition. Her trip 
around the world is a midlife gap year, time off from her life and her responsibilities. 
The loss of her job and of the objects that made her house her home, and a reflection of 
her, leave her feeling that she lacks an identity and she realises that identity is much 
more fluid than she had previously recognized. Entering her completely empty house is 
devastating, but allows her to rethink who she is and who she wants to be: 
What was happy? What was an ending? She had been refusing real happiness 
for years and she had been avoiding real endings for just as long, right up to 
the moment she had opened the front door on her own emptied house, her own 
cupboards stripped of their doors, her own unpictured walls and unfilled 
rooms, no trace of her left, nothing to prove that Eve Smart, whoever she was, 
had ever been there at all (The Accidental, p. 295). 
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She questions the notion of a happy ending, breaking it down into its constituent parts. 
She realises that she has been resisting both endings and happiness. Her emptied house 
has been evacuated of all evidence of her self and stands for her own disappearance. In 
effect, Alhambra has stolen Eve‘s sense of self. However, this loss of her sense of self 
has the potential to be liberating. Eve can reinvent herself as whomever she likes. The 
novel chooses to leave unanswered who it is Eve will choose to be.  
Alhambra‘s first-person narration of her origins and the meanings of her name 
serve as a frame for the text. Her conception narrative opens the novel; she begins at the 
beginning and explains how her conception has contributed to who she is: ‗From my 
mother: grace under pressure; the uses of mystery; how to get what I want. From my 
father: how to disappear, how to not exist‘ (The Accidental, p. 3). She begins her ending 
by summarising these same details: ‗I was born. And all that. My mother and father. 
And so on‘ (The Accidental, p. 305). She reiterates the different meanings of her name 
that she had chronicled earlier in the novel and concludes with the destruction by fire of 
the cinema for which she is named. ‗It‘s a derelict old cinema packed with inflammable 
filmstock. Got a light? See? Careful. I‘m everything you ever dreamed‘ (The 
Accidental, p. 306). This final sentence is enigmatic. Is she saying she burnt down the 
cinema? Is she equating herself with the cinema full of incendiary contents? Her 
presence as a morally ambivalent character, whose role may be that of angel or demon, 
rescuer or instrument of destruction, seems echoed in this sentence but without 
determining on which side of the binary of good and evil she falls. In fact, she is a 
character who hovers between the two, neither kind nor cruel, but both, neither helper 
nor hinderer, but both. The novel‘s interrogative ending, just like Alhambra, resists 
binary organization and insists on being ‗continuously indeterminate‘. It negotiates with 
the teen coming-of-age narrative where a child concludes her story perched on the brink 
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of a new maturity and the novels that change lives genre of adult women walking away 
from an unsatisfying life, and, as I argued about its unreliable narration, situates itself 
within a tradition of realist narratives. 
 The ‗classic realist‘ text is most commonly associated with a ‗closed‘ ending 
concerned with closure and resolution of all questions and fulfilment of all 
expectations; Smith has clearly negotiated with the genre utilising what works and 
refusing what does not, closure. Catherine Belsey says that classic realist texts often 
follow a pattern, one recognisable to readers, and part of the pleasure of the classic 
realist text is its predictability. The tales often revolve around murder, war, a journey or 
love. These are the Bildungsromans and courtship novels, the boys‘ adventure and 
mysteries: 
But the story moves inevitably towards closure which is also disclosure, the 
dissolution of enigma through the re-establishment of order, recognizable as a 
reinstatement or a development of the order which is understood to have 
preceded the events of the story itself.
12
 
She contends that this reinstatement of order might even be a new order, but that it is 
‗always intelligible because familiar. Decisive choices are made, identity is established, 
the murderer is exposed, or marriage generates a new set of subject positions‘.13 Belsey 
further connects this resolution and return to order as ‗closing off in the process the 
sense of danger to the reader‘s subjectivity‘.  14 Everyone is happily married, the good 
are rewarded and the evil punished. Often there is an epilogue that moves ahead of the 
narrative by a few years and sums up the fates of all the major characters. Frank 
Kermode terms this ‗the old ending that panders to temporal expectations, the sort 
described (in its comic mode) by Henry James as ―a distribution at the last of prizes, 
                                                             
12 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 64-65. 
13 Belsey 2002, p. 69. 
14 Belsey 2002, p. 69. 
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pensions, husbands, wives, babies, millions, appended paragraphs, and cheerful 
remarks‖‘.15 By choosing to end interrogatively, I am arguing, the New Femininities 
fiction resists offering order, calls into question the very binaries upon which order 
rests, and interrogates the ideology of gender and femininity.  
Belsey calls ‗interrogative‘ a text that requires ‗the reader to produce answers to 
the questions it implicitly raises‘.16 An interrogative text consistently draws attention to 
its status as fiction interrupting the sense of sinking below the surface of a novel: 
‗Further‘, she contends, ‗if the interrogative text is illusionist, it also tends to employ 
devices to undermine the illusion, to draw attention to its own textuality. The reader is 
distanced, at least from time to time, rather than wholly interpolated into a fictional 
world‘.17 I.A. Richards famously posited that ‗A book is a machine to think with‘.18 
Interrogative texts take this role seriously. For my purposes, Umberto Eco‘s definition 
of an ‗open work‘ is a useful expansion on Belsey‘s interrogative texts because he is 
concerned not only with what the text does, but with how it does it. In order to be 
considered an ‗open work‘, a text must negotiate between rejecting the conventions of 
traditional texts and preserving them in such a way as to maximise their potential to 
convey ideas and to illicit thinking on the part of their readers. He argues: 
In fact, one might say that rather than imposing a new system, contemporary 
art constantly oscillates between the rejection of the traditional linguistic 
system and its preservation – for if contemporary art imposed a totally new 
linguistic system, then its discourse would cease to be communicable. The 
dialectic between form and the possibility of multiple meanings, which 
constitutes the very essence of the ‗open work‘, takes place in this oscillation.19 
                                                             
15 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), p. 22, quoting Henry James, ‗The Art of Fiction‘ 
16 Belsey 2002, p. 84. 
17 Belsey 2002, p. 84-85. 
18 I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 1. 
19 Umberto Eco, The Open Work, trans. by Anna Cancogni (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989), p. 60. 
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Rather than completely rejecting the language and methods of its predecessor, Eco‘s 
‗open work‘, and my use of ‗interrogative ending‘, negotiate between rejection and 
adherence in order to make possible the articulation of something new. Rosemarie 
McGerr argues that Eco‘s ‗open texts‘ are texts that frustrate expectations in order to 
place ideological givens into question; thus allowing them to openly approach truly 
revolutionary undertakings. ‗Rather than seeking to impose one point of view or to 
draw conflicting elements into a unified whole,‘ she asserts, ‗an open work offers 
multiple perspectives on a problem and traces them either to diverse conclusions or to 
none at all‘.20 The language of the conventional ending is still useful to think with and 
allows the novelist to not only question the certainties herself, but to encourage her 
reader to question them as well.  
 By raising questions that they refuse to answer, the interrogative endings of the 
New Femininities fictions allow them to keep their secrets. In his essay ‗Shibboleth: For 
Paul Celan‘, Jacques Derrida argues that all texts keep secrets. He posits that when a 
‗cipher‘ or puzzle within a text reveals itself to the reader, ‗this is not in order to say to 
us: I am a cipher. It may still conceal from us, without the slightest hidden intention, the 
secret which it shelters in its readability. It moves, touches, fascinates, or seduces us all 
the more‘.21 Literary puzzles are not just there to be solved. They also engage and 
ravish the reader, and they do so precisely because they are ultimately textual: their 
surface ‗readability‘ is all that ‗shelters‘ the secret. That readability is all that is there. 
However, one cannot peek behind its curtain. As J. Hillis Miller explains: ‗a true secret, 
if there is such a thing, cannot ever, by any means, be revealed‘.22 This is because 
                                                             
20 Rosemarie P. McGerr, Chaucer’s Open Books: Resistance to Closure in Medieval Discourse 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), p. 7. 
21 Jacques Derrida, ‗From Shibboleth: For Paul Celan‘, in Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 405. 
22 J. Hillis Miller, ‗Derrida‘s Topographies‘, South Atlantic Review 59 (1994), p. 17. 
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literature is ‗a matter of surface without depth. The reader cannot go behind it, or 
beneath it, or before and after it. Literature keeps its secret, but on the surface‘(18). 
There are no other witnesses who could be cross-examined, no prisoners one could 
torture, to reveal the truth of the novels or the truth of femininity: only the words on the 
page. 
The New Femininities fictions all without question keep their secrets and imply, 
through their interrogative endings, that discovering these secrets is impossible and is 
not their goal. They are much more interested in gesturing to the irresolvability of 
textual puzzles and feminine identities. I concentrate on the interrogative endings of 
these texts because the final sentence usually fulfils a need for profundity or for the 
conveyance of some universal truth; a need which these texts frustrate. David Lodge 
argues: ‗The last sentence of any story acquires a certain resonance merely by virtue of 
being the last‘.23 Thus, endings to fiction are important. Alison Booth argues that this 
emphasis on resonant final words is apparent even where a novel resists this power. 
‗But even when the end does not pretend to have the last word, the emphasis will fall 
there for the reader‘.24 Marianna Torgovnick argues that ‗endings invite the 
retrospective analysis of a text‘ and that often this final sentence is able to achieve 
defamiliarization and allows one to ‗feel the essence of things‘: 
If we expand Shklovsky‘s idea slightly and apply it to endings and closures, 
we can then say that, in major fictions, effective endings command a novel to 
‗stand still here‘ in a way that defamiliarizes and makes us feel anew the 
artfulness of a fictional structure, the essence of some human experience, or 
both.
25
 
                                                             
23 David Lodge, The Art of Fiction (London: Viking, 1993), p. 226. 
24 Alison Booth, ‗Introduction‘, Famous Last Words: Changes in Gender and Narrative Closure, ed. by 
Alison Booth (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1993), p. 12. 
25 Marianna Torgovnick, Closure in the Novel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Library, 1981), p. 
209. 
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However, endings for women have historically and conventionally been limited. Booth, 
expanding on Kermode‘s ‗sense of an ending‘, asserts that women characters in 
nineteenth-century novels face ‗a sense of few endings‘.26 Booth argues that nineteenth-
century ‗novelistic endings […] have seldom been anything more than double or binary 
choices for most female characters – seldom as various as the middles of novels‘ 
allowing her either romance or silence.
27
 Women‘s endings have been confined to 
marriage, death, and motherhood; often the three fates meaning the same thing – silence 
and an end to female ambition. Booth contends that: ‗Whether it is primarily generic or 
societal convention that decrees that even the most talented or ambitious heroine must 
marry or perish, the textual effect is that genre and ideology conspire against the figure 
of the woman‘.28 U.C. Knoepflmacher adds to the sense of few endings recognised by 
feminist scholars ‗a third element: the profound yearning for a return to primal origins 
that inevitably gets released whenever the writers finds it difficult to collapse the 
binaries of sex or to resolve the clash of generations, classes, and spheres of competing 
interests‘.29 He reads this as a return to the mother, a return to being mothered, or a 
quest to locate a lost mother. This return to dependency signals the end to the quest plot 
in the intimacy, privacy, and silence of the mother-child dyad. 
 Paradise negotiates between these few endings. Hannah spends her novel 
nostalgic for the mother-child dyad. longing for her mother. However, her narrative 
ends in alcoholic dementia, in complete mental dissolution, and in a series of 
hallucinations. Thomas Jones asserts that ‗The novel itself has two endings – one 
hellish, the other paradisal […] but neither is more real than the other, and both are 
                                                             
26 Booth 1993, p. 3-4. 
27 Booth 1993, p. 2. 
28 Booth 1993, p. 3-4. 
29 U.C. Knoepflmacher, ‗Afterword‘, in Famous Last Words: Changes in Gender and Narrative Closure, 
ed. by Alison Booth (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1993), p. 352. 
195 
 
 
transitory: her life has disintegrated (finally, entirely) into alcoholic confabulation‘.30 
One hallucination has her trapped in a rehabilitation facility feeling like she is coming 
back to herself after a particularly large blackout and that not only is she not ‗Hannah 
Luckraft‘, but she is bereft of joy. The other fantasy is that she is in a hotel room 
waiting for her lover with a bottle of alcohol.  
I reach into my holdall and find the full bottle of Bushmill‘s undisturbed: that 
marvellous label: the long, slim door that leads to somewhere else. When 
Robert has finished, when he steps through, pink with scrubbing, wrapped 
snug in a towel, then we‘ll lie on the bed together and we‘ll talk, we‘ll tell each 
other everything. I‘ll ask him to bring through the glasses and then we‘ll begin 
(Paradise, p. 344). 
This fantasy is her happy ending in the romance plot, with her two loves, Robert and 
whisky. This ending harkens back to the beginning of the novel. She is in the same 
hotel with a bottle of Bushmills. It serves to negate the events of the novel, as if they 
were all perhaps brought about by alcoholic confabulation. The final phrase ‗and then 
we‘ll begin‘ suggests that a reader could simply start the novel again  
Such circularity is echoed in Hannah‘s frequent blackouts. She comes to herself 
and has to begin again drawing conclusions about where she has been and what she has 
been doing, or ‗how me and myself have been getting along lately‘ (Paradise, p. 25). 
Even here she exhibits an awareness of her divided selves, of Hannah and the drinking 
voice and their complicated relationship. Hannah‘s alcoholism makes her prone to 
double endings. She remembers events concluding in a variety of ways. In an airport 
shop looking at DVDs, she comes across one entitled Lesbian Tarts Having Sex, a title 
that she finds ludicrous. She tries to make a joke to the counter man by saying that the 
title ‗seems a bit vague. I mean, I wouldn‘t want to end up buying something I wasn‘t 
sure of. Does it have harpsichords?‘ She remembers that when the man asked if she 
                                                             
30 Thomas Jones, ‗Intimate Strangers‘, London Review of Books 26.9 (2004), 26 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n19/thomas-jones/intimate-strangers/print [accessed 6 June 2011], paragraph 6. 
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knew what she could do when she informed him that she did not intend to buy the porn, 
she either responded by leaving quietly or she responded ‗―Fuck myself and make a 
video of it called Fucking Myself.‘ (Paradise, p. 10-11). Either ending strikes her as 
possible.  
I can remember both endings which is tricky. But I think I‘m more convinced 
by the first. I think I told him I had no desire to make a purchase and then left. 
However it played out, there were no children anywhere near me a that stage – 
I would never have used offensive language and referred to sexual acts had 
there been any young folk present. I have standards (Paradise, p. 11). 
However it ends, she likes to believe that she behaved responsibly. Despite the evidence 
that she steals from people, sleeps with men she finds repulsive, and otherwise causes 
trouble, she tries to maintain a sense of herself as a good person. She argues that 
blackouts are beneficial, that they allow one to ‗dissolve your bleak points and blur 
your edges: if you didn‘t they would hurt. So continuous minor blackouts are fair 
enough‘ (Paradise, p. 19). However, she soon contradicts herself when she begins to 
face the consequences of not being able to narrate the past events of her life. ‗This is 
how my stories stop, they peter out into more and more lists and I find myself saying or 
far too often and thinking that a life rich in possibilities is not, in other ways, 
perpetually delightful‘ (Paradise, p. 29, original emphasis). Blackouts allow her to 
escape from unpleasantness and drudgery, but their cost is very high. Hannah‘s dual 
worlds are both fantastical and horrific, thus the ending of her novel in a living death 
and/or the happy ending of the romance plot is fitting. However, because these endings 
are connected to alcoholic dementia, neither one seems particularly real or conclusive – 
her novel does not end in marriage, motherhood, or death. 
 Booth‘s assertion that expanding the possibility that a novel can end differently, 
make use of endings that are not confined to death, marriage, and motherhood, serves a 
feminist purpose and opens up the possibility for a reconception of the potentiality of 
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women. ‗Should we not therefore claim that to shatter the sense of few endings, to open 
the closed narrative of female development, is to propose a more open judgment of 
women in all their difference?‘31 However, it is not only in novels that the sense of few 
endings for women is available. It is echoed in psychoanalytic theories of female 
development. DuPlessis asserts that the conventional nineteenth-century ending of 
marriage, death, or motherhood is echoed by Freud‘s theory of ‗normal femininity‘. In 
order to achieve this ‗normal‘ femininity, young women must put away ambition, 
defiance, and activity: 
Freudian theory puts a high premium on female passivity and narcissism and 
on the ‗end‘ of husband, home, and male child. As for the quest or individual 
aspiration, Freud poignantly realizes that the achievement of femininity has 
left ‗no paths open to [a woman] for further development‘. 32 
Freud seems to take the conventional woman‘s ending as the way things are for women, 
reinforcing and empowering its ideological authority. Femininity requires the young 
girl to abandon her individuality and embrace an identity in relation to a man, as 
obedient daughter, wife, and mother to, of course, a son. DuPlessis argues that 
‗twentieth century women novelists‘ resisted this foreclosure of identity and worked to 
posit alternatives: ‗In the work of twentieth-century women, the marriage plot, with its 
high status in novels, and the quest plot of punishment for female aspiration were 
displaced, eroded, or removed from the center of the novel‘,33 with the use of ‗such 
narrative strategies as reparenting, female bonding, including lesbian ties, mother-child 
dyads, brother-sister pairs, familial transpositions, the multiple individual, and the 
transpersonal protagonist‘.34 These novels offered a different type of connection, but 
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one that was no less in line with feminine identity being founded on relationships with 
others: this alternative merely offers a different set of others.  
Notes on a Scandal resists the plot of settled domesticity; Barbara longs for the 
conclusion in female community and female-to-female connections. However, the 
novel negotiates with the notion of female community. Barbara believes that she and 
Sheba have created a dyad. After a showdown over Sheba‘s possession of pornographic 
photographs and her sculpture of herself and Connolly as mother and child, Barbara 
feels that Sheba can be allowed some freedom because ‗she knows, by now, not to go 
too far without me‘ (Notes, p. 244). These are the final words of the novel, but her 
confidence that she has become indispensable is unconvincing. It is open to 
interpretation whether she and Sheba are the united pair that she believes them to be; 
whether Sheba feels part of a dyad and whether she wants to be the child that Barbara 
mothers. The novel ends before Sheba returns and therefore leaves open the possibility 
that she may not come back.  
 The possibility that she might leave is suggested by the disturbing way in which 
Barbara speaks to Sheba after the scandal has broken. She begins to speak to Sheba as if 
she were her child: ‗―You‘re going to be all right, darling,‖ I said, stroking her hair. 
―Barbara‘s here‖‘ (Notes, p. 244). Barbara believes that she has Sheba‘s best interests at 
heart, but she infantilises her for selfish reasons and not purely for reasons of creating a 
female community. Barbara requires Sheba‘s dependence to guarantee that she 
continues to have a place to stay and someone in her life. As the novel concludes, 
Barbara is planning to move herself and Sheba to Scotland to stay in Sheba‘s mother‘s 
house, but she is concerned that their dyad might fall apart:  
Since then, various hitches in my brilliant plan have occurred to me. For one 
thing, I‘m not sure if the terms of Sheba‘s bail will allow her to travel so far. 
And even if they do, Sheba may refuse to let me go with her. I have been 
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trying to prepare myself for this possibility, but the thought is intolerable. How 
will Sheba manage on her own? Who will do the shopping and cook her 
meals? Who will make sure she showers every day? I‘m not sure I can bear it 
if I have to go back to being on my own again (Notes, p. 240). 
Barbara is aware that her plan relies entirely on other people acquiescing, both the law 
and Sheba, to her wishes. Her concern for Sheba‘s well-being rings false. The activities 
that Barbara worries will go undone are tasks that Sheba has been doing for years, not 
only for herself but also for her family. The final sentence exposes Barbara‘s real 
anxiety: what is truly intolerable to Barbara is not Sheba‘s helplessness without her, but 
her own aloneness without Sheba. She wants female community and connection no 
matter the cost.  
 In order to bring Sheba around to relying entirely upon her, Barbara breaks her 
down by destroying all of the visual representations of Sheba‘s relationship with 
Connolly: pornographic photographs of the couple and a mother and child sculpture 
Sheba works on for weeks which casts her as the mother and Connolly as the son. 
Barbara is particularly revolted by the sculpture: ‗For me it was an utterly obscene 
object‘ (Notes, p. 241). I would argue that she finds it obscene because if she were to 
have sculpted it, she would cast herself as the mother and Sheba as the child. She takes 
great pleasure in destroying the sculpture: 
The sculpture wasn‘t nearly as tough or as dense as I had expected. I missed it 
with my first swing but as soon as I actually made my target, I crushed the 
boy‘s torso straight off. Tiny splinters of clay flew through the air. One large 
shard landed in Eddie‘s compost heap. I glanced up at one point, and saw 
Sheba watching me from her window, a solemn Victorian wraith. I waved 
cheerfully and then I went on. With my second blow I took the top of the boy‘s 
head off cleanly, like an egg. Within five minutes, there was nothing left but 
Sheba‘s crossed legs and a small jagged remnant of her abdomen (Notes, p. 
243).  
Her first successful blow is aimed at the boy whom she despises. She characterises 
Sheba as ‗a solemn Victorian wraith‘ which highlights Sheba‘s diminished state, she is 
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a ghost of herself. A ‗Victorian‘ wraith was often ‗[a]n immaterial or spectral 
appearance of a living being freq. regarded as portending that person‘s death‘.35 Sheba 
stands in for both her own ghost and the foretelling of her demise. The reduction of 
Sheba‘s sculpture and her symbolic body to crossed legs and a remnant of abdomen 
works metaphorically. Barbara possesses a destroyed version of Sheba; the ruined 
Sheba of the end of the novel is a mere remnant of what she was. Crucially, these acts 
of destruction of the sculpture and photographs make Barbara feel that she possesses 
Sheba and she takes her into an embrace that resembles the statue of mother holding 
child: ‗After the photographs were cut up, I went to her and took her very gently in my 
arms. Sheba‘s body is so slender these days, one feels one could almost crush it‘ (Notes, 
p. 243). She enjoys this power she now has over Sheba, a physical superiority which 
makes her able to crush her, but like a good mother, she chooses to touch her gently. 
This is not DuPlessis‘s empowering female community, this is a community of one 
woman dominating another and benefiting from her destruction and loss of family. The 
unlikeliness that Sheba will stay with Barbara suggests that this ending is equally 
unsatisfactory. Female community does not necessarily mean a safe place for a 
transgressive woman to find sanctuary, but could mean her victimisation at the hands of 
a predator. 
I would question whether resolution in a new parent-child dyad, lesbian 
romance, or an escape into motherhood are solutions that offer a woman the freedom of 
individuality that she had to sacrifice in order to embrace her feminine identity. These 
endings offer a utopia of female centeredness, female connection, and female 
empowerment that is just as fantastical as the happy ending in marriage or heterosexual 
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romance. I will structure the remainder of my analysis of the interrogative endings of 
the New Femininities novels around the three nineteenth-century endings that feminist 
scholars have identified for female characters: marriage, death, and a return to primal 
origins which I will read as a return to the beginning. However, these novels negotiate 
the conventional endings in such a way as to call into question the notion of a return to 
the ‗normal‘, the satisfaction of the romantic ending, and the sense of resolution that 
novels may impart. For the most part, they resist the modernist solution of female 
connection and the transpersonal protagonist, strategies that point to utopic possibilities 
for women. They leave their reader questioning, which is exactly the goal of the 
interrogative text. 
Unmarriage: Resisting ‘Happily Ever After’ 
The marriage ending to conventional novels is troubling to feminist literary 
scholars because it serves to curtail the heroine‘s freedom, bring her narrative to an 
abrupt halt, and in the process silence her. She hands over her identity and 
independence to become the pliant wife. Karen Newman argues that ‗Marriage, almost 
inevitably the narrative event that constitutes a happy ending, represents in [feminists‘] 
view submission to a masculine narrative imperative that has traditionally allotted 
women love and men the world‘.36 The courtship novel, with its happy marital ending, 
serves to reinforce the ideology that a woman‘s ultimate goal is love and marriage while 
men have the potential to rule the world. Novels did not create the myth of women‘s 
marital fulfilment, but rather served to perpetuate it, along with, as DuPlessis argued, 
Freud and other social commentators. Hadley, Mendelson, and some of Munro‘s fiction 
negotiate the marriage ending by concluding their texts with the married female 
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protagonist leaving her marriage, but without rejecting the possibility that she will soon 
return to a settled domesticity with another man. They end in a state of ‗unmarriage‘ a 
term used by Alexander Welsh to name the evasion of marriage as an ending in order to 
achieve openendedness: 
When Dickens [in the ending to Little Dorrit] uses the language of ‗vanishing 
point‘ and ‗termination‘ for marriage, when he immediately invokes the ‗mere 
waste and darkened sky‘ that lie beyond, he builds into the narrative the two 
endings paraded before the readers in Les Misérables and many other novels. 
These are not merely difficulties with words: marriage provides a dramatic 
ending to a novel precisely because of the contradictions of desire that it 
proclaims. If we think of famous novels that do not have dramatic endings, 
they are often works like Tristram Shandy, or Ulysses, or Dead Souls […] 
which evade marriage as an end […] There is nothing like unmarriage, an idea 
that realists have always toyed with, to express openendedness.
37
 
Clearly, the happy ending in marriage proves problematic even to a realist like Dickens 
who enjoyed achieving both closure at the level of expectations and at the level of 
questions. By simply choosing to resist the tidiness of the marriage ending, Welsh 
asserts that Sterne, Joyce, and Gogol achieve a conclusion that is not dramatic and 
which defies closure. The unmarried status of the female protagonists of the New 
Femininities fictions proves problematic as well, although I would argue it is an 
intentional quandary. Unmarriage lacks the permanence of marriage, the characters are 
left in a liminal state with the possibility of coupling wide open before them; they are 
only temporarily unmarried . The unsatisfying quality of the unmarriage ending invites 
the questioning of the satisfactions of the marriage version. 
There is a long history of resistance to the ending of a novel in marriage even in 
realist novels that do not seek undramatic endings. Thackeray and Flaubert, Torgovnick 
argues, ‗both shrewdly perceived the conventional social values expressed by happy 
endings in which hero marries heroine and everyone who deserves to lives happily ever 
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after […] But they were unwilling or unable to share those values‘.38 Their form of 
realism could not countenance the easy promises of the ‗distribution of last prizes‘. 
Thackeray and Flaubert wrote a form of realism that was unable to support the happy 
ending in marriage and divine justice because of its lack of verisimilitude. David Lodge 
argues that: 
The marriage knot is the primary symbol of happiness, of the optimistic idea 
that the nice and the good are one and shall inherit the earth. Conversely, the 
novelist‘s refusal to tie the marriage knot between hero and heroine expresses a 
bleaker and more pessimistic view that life rarely conforms to our desires, or 
our notions of justice
39
. 
A resistance to the marriage knot then proves to be a resistance to the wishful thinking 
of the conventional novel ending. Life is unfair and cruel and happiness elusive. This 
pessimistic view, for the authors of the New Femininities fictions, works to raise 
questions about the nature of narrative satisfaction. Would it be more satisfying if these 
female characters returned to their husbands at the end of the narrative or if they found 
true love in someone else‘s arms? What does it mean when a novel resists love as the 
ultimate goal and fulfilment of a woman? However, these texts do not completely 
renounce romance or the possibility of future domestic satisfaction, they do not fully 
reject marriage or love or human connection. They suggest that marriage, love, and 
human connections, as well as the breaking off of these connections, do not guarantee 
satisfaction, and that there is no satisfactory conclusion to the domestic novel. 
Mendelson‘s Frances ends her novel questioning the status quo of middle class 
domesticity: she embraces motherhood but walks away from marriage, possibly into the 
arms of a new lover, her vicar landlady. Fulfilment and satisfaction in this new life is 
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possible, but the novel ends before it is found. Perhaps ominously, the most dominating 
part of Frances‘s life has been her overbearing rabbi mother and a new relationship with 
a female vicar could be seen as a replacement, another powerful woman who wants to 
tell her who and how to be. Both women are religious authorities as well as mothering 
presences. How is the replacement of one mother figure for another a solution? The 
satisfactions the novel brings reside in the changes that Frances makes; she refuses to 
continue living her unliveable life. However, these changes are equivocal, she makes 
the big gestures, leaves her husband, stands up to her mother, but she continues to be 
unsure and uncomfortable with her own inabilities to conform to expectations; she 
continues to be the same person who lived her life in fear of making mistakes and not 
being adequate to the roles expected of her.  
 Frances does not plan her escape from her family. She just gets up from the 
table at a family party and walks out the front door. This impulsive desertion of her 
husband and son leads her to meet Gillian when she rents a room in her flat. Frances 
admires Gillian‘s calm demeanour and practicality. Yet, although she appreciates 
Gillian‘s strength, she reveals an unease as well. She transfers this unease to the canvas 
bags that Gillian encourages her to take with her when she goes to her mother‘s house 
to retrieve her son Max‘s things: 
Max is heavy and the enormous canvas bags Gillian insisted she bring entwine 
themselves lovingly around her legs, trying to keep her back. 
No, she tells herself. Don‘t think like that. She will carry them with 
pride, she decides as she climbs on and on (Bad, p. 309). 
For Frances love is restrictive. It tries to hold her back. The inanimate bags are 
characterised as ‗entwin[ing] themselves lovingly around her legs, trying to keep her 
back‘. They personify a love that is interfering and controlling, a love that impedes her 
resolution to confront her family and her fears. Is it Gillian‘s love since Frances has 
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brought them at her behest? Frances is revealing her awareness that Gillian may be just 
as likely to take control of her life as her mother and husband always have. Frances 
resists this realisation, silences it; she tells herself no. Instead she shifts her thinking to 
hold Gillian‘s love as a weapon against her family: ‗Having Gillian behind her is like 
going into battle with a superior gun‘ (Bad, p. 312). Approaching her family is a battle 
for which she must arm herself. She sees her relationship with her mother and her 
husband as antagonistic. The relationship with Gillian is attractive because it is her 
choice. She has not entered into it through accident of birth or by arrangement of her 
family. The novel complicates this relationship by allowing the possibilities of happily-
ever-after and stuck-in-the-same to coexist.  
 Frances vacillates between feeling strong and independent in her choices and 
almost paralysing anxiety at what she has done to her family especially her son, Max. 
Her concerns mean that she selects the palliative items of baby care, favourite books, 
stuffed animals, and adorable pyjamas. Items that will soothe both her son and her own 
sense of having injured him grievously with her selfishness and inadequacies:  
There is room only for essential babyware: not his towelling bath chair but a 
chewed spider book; the favourite pyjamas she has not allowed herself to dress 
him in, lest he became sweeter and she more vulnerable; a selection of 
hedgehogs and elephant seals because she does not know which will comfort 
him when he misses the rest of his family, when the terrible wound she has 
inflicted begins to show (Bad, p. 310-1). 
Frances‘s impracticality arises from her sense of guilt at taking control of her life. 
Mendelson resists transforming Frances. She gives her the strength to change her life, 
but there is no miraculous escape from neuroses. Frances will never be confident or 
sure that she has not made a horrible mistake. She will continue to feel the pressure to 
conform to her mother‘s expectations of her even if she no longer wants to be who 
Claudia wants her to be. Her visit to her parents‘ house is timed so that she will avoid 
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her mother, but Claudia is home ill: ‗It is extraordinarily difficult not to tell her Max has 
missed her, not to put up a hand to civilize her own hair, but she resists‘ (Bad, p. 314). 
Her urge, in her mother‘s presence, is to tame or domesticate her hair; to make her 
appearance seem to conform to the domestic norms expected by her mother. While she 
continues to be someone constantly second-guessing herself, her happiness will remain 
contingent and elusive; she will remain dependent on the opinions of others as the 
gauge of her own performance of self. 
 Frances‘s self-doubt arises from her belief that she falls short of her mother‘s 
example, that she fails to embody her mother‘s confidence and self-assurance. 
However, Frances and Claudia are very much alike. They both spend much of their time 
worrying about catastrophes striking their loved ones and making small concessions in 
a bid to ward them off. Claudia hides her self-doubt and fear away under her persona of 
domineering religious and familial leader. Claudia only finds relief from this fear in the 
knowledge of her imminent death: 
Then something occurs to her. Tonight, if it is going to happen tonight, there is 
no time for news of bicycle accidents or heart attacks. For the first time in her 
life she is safe from fear. Her own death is the worst thing she has to face. This 
is, at last, happiness […] She begins to write – who knew that it would be quite 
so difficult? – Emily, Simeon, Frances, Leo and Norman, most of all Norman, 
the love letters that they deserve (Bad, p. 321). 
Claudia finds happiness when the worst thing she can imagine happening is her own 
death. Happiness is no longer having to worry about other people‘s worst-case 
scenarios. Frances might find comfort in the knowledge of this unrealised affinity 
between herself and Claudia. Frances is paralysed (or at least incapacitated) by her 
fears, while her mother uses fear to drive herself. Unfortunately, Claudia refrains from 
allowing Frances to see this similarity or from showing her how to find strength in fear 
rather than only weakness. The novel resists the re-establishment of the mother-child 
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dyad, the reconciliation of their relationship that would enable Frances to emerge a new 
woman. However, it leaves the question open: what will Claudia‘s love letter to her 
daughter say and will it make a difference in how Frances perceives herself? The novel 
negotiates between an ending in the freedom from marriage and in female connection 
and chooses not to foreclose either possibility. 
Hadley‘s Clare‘s choice of unmarriage is in response to the unromantic reality 
of settled domesticity and the tension of attempting to live one‘s life in a way that fulfils 
one‘s husband‘s desires and not one‘s own. Clare is a woman who longs to believe in 
the novel‘s traditional promise that happiness lies in the love of a man and blames 
domesticity‘s failure to fulfil this promise on the man with whom she has settled. 
Hadley resists an ending that would allow Clare either fulfilment in the arms of a new 
man or the feminist realisation that she does not need one. In an interview with Alex 
Clark, Hadley argues that she consciously chooses to leave the questions her novels 
raise unanswered. ‗―Fragmentary is what there is,‖ she says, and she resists the 
temptation of a Dickensian-style wrapping-up of loose ends‘.40 Clare will continue to 
struggle with her desire to find love and her awareness that novels make empty 
promises. 
The ending of Accidents in the Home acts as an epilogue after the demise of 
Clare‘s marriage to Bram. Clare has not walked away from motherhood, but finds that it 
is a preoccupation that is difficult to hold on to when she is not with the children. Her 
fair counterpart, Helly, is marked by her foray into domesticity. She has gone from 
‗[h]er usual beauty […] a kind of remote and dazzling performance‘ to a ‗fragile 
tentativeness‘ (Accidents, p. 140 and 242); the price for her of the love of a man and 
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settled domesticity is a loss of identity. Because the novel is a negotiation with the 
sentimental romance genre, Hadley does not foreclose the possibility that Clare will 
find further romance, but the novel leaves this an open question. If the romance plot is 
unfulfilling and the adultery plot uncomfortable and humiliating, what is left? Is Clare 
just headed into another self-obscuring relationship or will her relationship with Tony 
prove fleeting leaving her completely ‗unmarried‘? Hadley does not definitively reject 
love as a reward for a woman, but works to raise the question of how satisfying it is as a 
conclusion to the quest of an adult woman. The novel ends just in time to leave these 
questions open, to avoid deciding for its reader whether love compensates for limitation 
in the world.  
Virginia Woolf, in reference to the romance plots of Jane Austen‘s fiction, 
argues that in order to achieve the tidiness of the marriage ending, the novels require a 
severe limiting of the character‘s opportunities. Built into the very notion of romance is 
female limitation. She asserts that Austen‘s ironic voice is in response to this limited 
world that is required for the certainty of the marriage ending and that it reassures its 
readers that the world is safe and predictable enough to be ridiculed:  
The writer adopts an ironic attitude to her creatures, because she has denied 
them so many adventures and experiences. A suitable marriage is, after all, the 
upshot of all this coming together and drawing apart. A world which so often 
ends in a suitable marriage is not a world to wring one‘s hands over. On the 
contrary, it is a world about which we can be sarcastic; into which we can peer 
endlessly, as we fit the jagged pieces one into another.
41
 
Marriage plots work, Woolf implies, by joining two incongruent pieces together. 
However, Hadley‘s novel is concerned with the aftermath of the coming together of just 
such dissimilar pieces. Marriage is unable to assure the happy ending and in fact the ill 
fit is worthy of attention. Clare‘s inability to abandon the faith she has placed in love is 
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supported by her fascination with romance novels. Her recourse to novels of adultery is 
in an attempt to figure out why she has been denied the happiness guaranteed by 
marriage in courtship novels. The adultery novels offer a bleak portrayal of women who 
seek love extramaritally, but Clare ignores the misery of these novels in favour of the 
intensity and romance they promise. 
 Clare‘s status as not only a reader but a professional-reader-in-training places 
her in an intriguing position, as I have argued earlier. She both wants to believe in the 
myth of female fulfilment through love and knows that the novels are reinforcing 
ideology that works to keep women in domesticity and assuage the sting of the 
limitation of their options. Yet she clings to her novels in the aftermath of the break-up 
of her marriage. A bomb threat at the library means a separation from her comforting 
books that ‗she had already begun the process of taking […] in through her skin and 
making them her own‘ (Accidents, p. 239) and a confrontation with the repercussions of 
her new status as unmarried mother: 
Clare clung onto her books for a reluctant moment […] Her afternoon without 
them looked bleak. Then as people obediently and without any sign of panic 
began to file out through the doors and down the stairs she caught sight in the 
crowd of an intensely familiar little knot of people: her own three children out 
with Bram and Helly. It was a dizzying sensation, to see the little knot from the 
outside whose inside feel she knew so vividly (Accidents, p. 239). 
She experiences a sense of vertigo and defamiliarisation at the sight of her family which 
brings into relief her alienation with family life. The little family of which she has 
previously been the centre is both familiar and unfamiliar. Her longing to be a part of it 
has also been complicated. She finds that ‗It looked utterly desirable – and 
unimaginable – to be part of that family‘ (Accidents, p. 241). Although she longs for the 
connection, she does not want to return to the centre of that particular knot. That it is 
both desirable and unimaginable connects it to her belief in novelistic tropes. The 
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promise of fulfilment through the love of a man or the love of children is both desirable 
and unbelievable.  
 Clare‘s yearning for her family causes her to follow them and torture herself 
with their sense of wholeness without her, with Helly in her place. She consoles herself 
with the knowledge that the children are resisting Helly‘s overtures, that she is 
irreplaceable, but pursues them nonetheless: ‗Clare willed them not to turn round and 
see her as if her survival depended on it, and yet she could not tear herself away. This is 
the worst thing I‘ll ever feel, Clare thought; this is the worst moment I‘ll ever have, 
about leaving‘ (Accidents, p. 241). The exaggeration of this phrase with its use of 
superlatives, ‗the worst moment I‘ll ever have‘, makes it ring false. She is, much like 
Madame Bovary, romanticising her guilt. If life were a romance novel, then this 
moment would be the worst, but in the real world of her novel, the truth is less 
romantic. Her guilt is fleeting and life quickly distracts her, again much like Emma 
Bovary, and comfort is found in consumerism and material objects. She is not diverted 
from her guilt by drama or romance, but by a simple browse in a fashion boutique. 
Looking at clothing that she does not need consumes her thoughts and draws her away 
from dwelling on her own misery or the misery of her children. ‗She wandered into a 
crowded clothes shop and was immediately deeply absorbed in serious consideration of 
skirts, tops, trousers. How could this be? Why wasn‘t she considering rather the lostness 
of her children without her?‘ (Accidents, p. 243). Hadley resists allowing Clare to 
assume the role of the tortured and repentant adulteress or to romanticise her despair. 
She negotiates with the story of Madame Bovary, Clare behaves much like Emma, but 
resists the punitive ending in death. Clare will simply go on romanticising her life, 
feeling guilt, and escaping into the temporary pleasures of consumerism. 
211 
 
 
 If Clare is suddenly a creature of the material world who can easily forget the 
heartache of motherhood by shopping for a top, Helly has assumed the role of obedient 
wife and meek mother. She is the cautionary tale of the woman who succeeds in finding 
love through adultery. Her reward is a blurring of her own identity, a loss of her own 
sharpness and individuality. Her relationship with Bram is changing both her physical 
self, which was glamorous and polished, and her personality, which was self-centred 
and sassy. Domesticity washes away her vibrancy and mutes her self-assertion – she 
begins to look like Bram: 
She looked different, as if Bram‘s absorption in her was actually changing her 
into a creature of his kind of flesh. Her face was pale and scrubbed clean, she 
didn‘t have make-up on, she was letting her hair grow out into its natural light 
brown, her eyes seemed wider apart and paler and startled. Without wanting to, 
Clare imagined this face with its new fragile tentativeness against the pillows 
of her old bed (Accidents, p. 242). 
Settled domesticity changes a woman, washes her out, mutes her individuality until she 
begins to resemble her partner. Helly‘s boldness has been subdued. She is now weak, 
perishable, and hesitant. The ‗startled‘ look of her eyes suggests that domesticity is 
frightening. Allowing her hair to grow out begins to make physical the transformation 
of Helly, the fair friend, into the dark friend through the assumption of her position in 
the domestic pair. Each wants what the other has, but finds that the desired life requires 
just as many compromises to one‘s sense of self. 
 Clare‘s ending is equivocal. She has the freedom she desired, the ability to buy 
impractical tops that are ‗ironic and flattering at once‘, which make her feel ‗veiled, 
mysterious‘, and which allow her to imagine a new self ‗with the gift of her powerful 
veiled knowingness‘ (Accidents, p. 244). She has always admired Helly‘s wardrobe and 
now she has the freedom from Bram‘s influence to create her own collection of 
glamorous clothes. However, she is becoming embroiled in a relationship with her 
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Ph.D. supervisor that endangers this very freedom and sense of the possibility of 
inhabiting new selves: 
Mostly Tony was a problem. He didn‘t want to meet her children, and he 
didn‘t want her to move in. She was on the edge, the very edge, of being 
desperate about him, of stepping off from the safe ground of her self-
possession […] 
She stopped in the rain and looked around for a phone box so that she 
could call him. She felt the need to reassure somebody that she had survived: 
even though there hadn‘t actually been any disaster‘ (Accidents, p. 245). 
Tony‘s refusal to play house with her and her children jeopardizes her self-possession. 
His resistance is the very thing that intensifies her desire for him. Clare still longs for 
human connection and harbours the belief that the love of a man may make her real. 
This ending raises many questions: Is the disaster the bomb threat or the breakup of her 
family? Has she concluded that the end of her marriage to Bram is not a catastrophe? Is 
the danger of her loss of self-possession another disaster, another accident in the home, 
lying in wait? Hadley embraces the fragmentary and resists answering these questions. 
Again an ending in unmarriage finds its protagonist on the verge of a new life with the 
potential to make a new and different world or to fall back into the loss of self-
possession in the name of love. 
Death and the Matron: Endings as Natural Termination 
If the happy marriage that concluded the courtship novel of the nineteenth century 
served as the reward for the ‗good‘ woman, the woman who adhered to the social and 
moral codes of her time and surrendered herself to the silence of marital bliss, death 
was the punishment for the ‗bad‘ woman, the woman who transgressed societal norms 
through adultery or the loss of virginity or excess passion. DuPlessis argues that in 
nineteenth-century novels any woman who falls outside of what is expected of her, who 
refuses to be silenced, or insists upon expressing herself, must die. DuPlessis contends 
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that the death of the female protagonist in nineteenth-century novels is necessary 
because there is no alternative community in which the stain of her inequity will go 
unnoticed or be accepted. She asserts that twentieth-century novels were able to 
imagine female communities and chose to end in ‗community and social 
connectedness‘.42 Death in the New Femininities novels serves as a new beginning. 
Mothers, husbands, and brothers die while the female protagonists are not punished by 
death, but renewed; allowed to choose to make serious changes or to continue on as 
they were before the death of their loved one. Myerson‘s use of the death of a child 
differs, however it does not require the destruction of the bereaved mother, she must 
find a way to carry on. Additionally, female communities are not the solution for these 
protagonists for whom both hetero- and homo-social communities are equally hostile 
and treacherous. These novels end without punishment in death or the attainment of 
self-affirming female communities of tolerance.  
Kermode does not see the ending in death as necessarily a punishment, but 
rather argues that all endings are a symbol of mortality and act to humanize death 
reflecting ‗our deep need for intelligible Ends‘.43 Readers are attracted to stories that aid 
in meaning making and assuage the desire for death to make sense. The reader‘s 
pleasure lies in the sense of closure that death implies:  
Men, like poets, rush ‗into the middest,‘ in media res, when they are born; they 
also die in mediis rebus, and to make sense of their span they need fictive 
concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems. 
The End they imagine will reflect their irreducibly intermediary 
preoccupations. They fear it, and as far as we can see have always done so; the 
End is a figure for their own deaths. (So, perhaps, are all ends in fiction, even 
if represented, as they are for example by Kenneth Burke, as cathartic 
discharges).
44
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Men are born and die in the middle of their stories and desire fiction to give them 
endings that make fleeting lives seem to be meaningful. The ending of a novel is a 
practice form of death and carries the potential for cathartic release. Enright makes uses 
of fictional death to suggest the possibility of change and liberation for her female 
characters. However, this death is not closure, it opens her novel; her novel concludes 
with pregnancy and the promise of new life. J. Hillis Miller calls death ‗the most 
enigmatic, the most open-ended ending of all. It is the best dramatization of the way an 
ending, in the sense of a clarifying telos, law or ground of the whole story, always 
recedes, escapes, vanishes‘.45 Rather than give meaning to what came before, death can 
merely offer a sense of an ending and not closure at the level of questions. 
I will make use of John Gerlach‘s ‗natural termination‘ to discuss novels that do 
not end in a physical death, but which terminate at a logical point. As Gerlach argues, 
‗If the subject of a story is a character‘s entire life, death is the natural termination, 
except, of course, for first-person narratives.‘ He continues, ‗Other forms of natural 
termination are less radical: sleep, for instance, provides a natural close, and certain 
activities, once begun, imply natural ends‘.46 A novel written about a journey could 
predictably end when the journey ends. Or a novel written over the span of a day could 
reach termination as the sun rises on the next day. Natural termination endings seem 
apt, fitting, and tidy. Closure has been reached at the very least on the level of 
expectations. Gerlach asserts that ‗Closure at this level has an automatic and undeniable 
quality‘.47 However, the New Femininities fictions complicate even the logical 
conclusion in death, the end of a journey, or the finish of the tale the protagonist tells. 
These natural terminations serve to raise questions: If death is too melodramatic, what 
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is the punishment for a married woman who is unhappy but not adulterous? Does the 
conclusion at journey‘s end necessarily imply an undeniable closure? What if nothing is 
resolved or the protagonist has decided to go home and change nothing? These novels 
problematise natural termination which they expose is, in effect, artificial termination.  
The death of Veronica‘s brother is the impetus of the action of Enright‘s novel. 
Her family gathers for his funeral, as does Veronica‘s dissatisfaction with her domestic 
life. His death sets Veronica on a journey to discover what it is that she wants. The 
novel ends as she decides to buy a plane ticket to return home and to her old life; her 
journey about to end offers a natural termination. The final paragraph leaves her in a 
metaphoric freefall right before she hits the ground that is her life:  
Gatwick airport is not the best place to be gripped by a fear of flying. But it 
seems that this is what is happening to me now; because you are up so high, in 
those things, and there is such a long way to fall. Then again, I have been 
falling for months. I have been falling into my own life, for months. And I am 
about to hit it now (The Gathering, p. 260-1). 
Although, the freefall is metaphoric, there is no doubt her fear is real. How can she take 
up that life again? How can she return to live that life after the journey on which she has 
been? How can a return to marriage and motherhood, with a new baby, that she believes 
will be male, be satisfying? How can it resolve this novel? The answer is that it cannot, 
that the novel is resisting exactly this kind of closure; embarking on a new life or 
embracing the seductions of ‗unmarriage‘. The novel ends before the natural 
termination of Veronica getting on a plane or arriving home. She could change her 
mind and keep travelling. She could never return home. Enright resists the closure of 
the natural termination and ends just before Veronica‘s return so that the questions will 
remain unanswered and suggest that there is no satisfactory conclusion to Veronica‘s 
quest.  
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 Veronica is still searching in her final chapter for a solution to her 
dissatisfaction with domestic life and the discomfort of marriage. Her belief that she 
may be pregnant is one option she explores to anchor her in her life. She tries to believe 
in motherhood as the role around which to organise her life: ‗I bow my head and try to 
believe that love will make it better, or if love won‘t then children will. I turn from the 
high to the humble and believe, for many seconds at a time, in the smallness and the 
necessity of being a mother‘ (The Gathering, p. 228). Motherhood is unable to bear this 
weight of justifying everything for more than ‗many seconds at a time‘. She recognises 
that it occupies a space which bridges the binaries of high and humble. It is both a 
‗higher‘ calling, a vocation, and the most humble and humbling role a woman occupies. 
Veronica is a metaphoric thinker and attempts to make symbolic acts to draw a close to 
her indecision. She equates the process of bathing and changing her underwear with 
discarding her life away from her family: ‗I wake again, and shower. I put on new pants 
and leave the old ones in the bin. I discard this other life, and leave the hotel behind‘ 
(The Gathering, p. 257). She longs for the simplicity that such a symbolic gesture 
offers. Dirty underpants become her life in flight from domesticity; the return is as easy 
as stepping into a new pair.  
 However, her return and her journey are far more complicated than a changing 
of clothes or a cleansing of her body. The pull she feels from home, from her family, is 
a strong and visceral one. She equates it to the pull of blood, and the leaving and 
returning of people to their families with the circulatory system. People circulate around 
the globe always coming and going from the ones they love:  
I look at the people queuing at the till, and I wonder are they going home, or 
are they going far away from the people they love. There are no other journeys. 
And I think we make for peculiar refugees, running from our own blood, or 
towards our own blood; pulsing back and forth along ghostly veins that wrap 
the world in a skein of blood. This is what I am thinking, as I stand in the 
queue in the Gatwick Village branch of Accessorize with my two pairs of flip-
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flops, that sport at the plastic cleft a silk orchid for Emily, and for Rebecca a 
peony rose. I am thinking about the world wrapped in blood, as a ball of string 
is wrapped in its own string. That if I just follow the line I will find out what it 
is that I want to know. 
Towards or away (The Gathering, p. 258). 
People in a queue become blood and veins. Blood will answer her questions. Their 
possibilities, returning to or fleeing from their own blood, are binaries. A traveller either 
does one or the other. Yet, Veronica is, in many ways, still doing both. She is both 
trying to escape the pull of her blood and longing to return to it; longing for 
reconnection. The image of the world as a ball of string wrapped in blood reinforces her 
position of bothness, she believes that she can find what it is she wants to know if she 
follows the line, but because it is a sphere she would be forever coming and going, 
towards and away from her family.  
 Veronica‘s conclusion concerns her realisation of and reconciliation with the 
‗bothness‘ of her life. She is coming and going. She is both happy and unhappy. 
Importantly, if her husband hates her, he also loves her and if her life is unliveable it is 
also liveable. She confronts this bothness when, after spending much energy on what 
she does not want, she confronts the reality of what she does want: 
But I do not want another destiny from the one that brought me here. I do not 
want a different life. I just want to be able to live it, that‘s all. I want to wake 
up in the morning and fall asleep at night. I want to make love to my husband 
again. Because, for every time he wanted to undo me, there was love that put 
me back together again – put us both back together. If I could just remember 
them too. If I could remember each time, as you remember different places you 
have seen – some of them so amazing; exotic, or confusing, or still (The 
Gathering, p. p. 260). 
She uses repetition to clarify what she wants. She repeats ‗I do not want‘ for the 
different life, the other life. She repeats ‗I want to‘ for the life she has been living, 
bringing into relief the satisfactions of the life she has been resisting. If Tom longs to 
destroy her, he also puts her back together, again a binary is confused; is lived in 
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bothness. She repeats ‗If I could remember‘ and connects it with a metaphor of life as a 
holiday or journey to foreign locales. This implies that memories can be mapped and 
described in order to aid in their retention. Life, love, and marriage are a journey 
characterised by locales of differing interest. The adjectives she chooses to describe 
these locales are not all complimentary. The locations are ‗amazing‘, go beyond 
expectations, but they are not necessarily amazing in a positive way. ‗Exotic‘ finds 
attraction in the strange or foreign, while ‗confusing‘ carries negative connotations of 
the insecurity of being perplexed or bewildered. ‗Still‘ is almost the opposite of 
‗confusing‘, it means ‗undisturbed‘ or in ‗a state of deep and quiet calm‘.48 These 
adjectives can encompass her experiences of life, love, and motherhood. They are all 
unexpected or go beyond expectations, they can be strange and perplexing, calm and 
attractive. What the novel cannot offer is a solution in which everything is on the 
positive side of the binary, satisfying, fulfilling, and liveable.  
Veronica, pregnant with a new child and ready to re-embrace motherhood and 
marriage, is falling back into her life at the end of the novel. This ending is equivocal; 
she has not returned to and fully embraced domesticity, motherhood and marriage, these 
roles have not proven to be redemptive, she has not died for deserting her family nor 
has she found a female community of support. By resisting an ending in the natural 
termination that her return home at the end of her journey would have constituted, the 
novel raises questions about the adequacy of the return to the status quo to conclude a 
domestic novel while simultaneously not rejecting domesticity as an acceptable and 
liveable way of life.  
                                                             
48 ‗Still‘, in Concise Oxford English Dictionary, ed. by Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson, 11th edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 1417. 
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Resistance to Closure: Circularity 
Enright uses natural termination as a way to question the status quo and the value of 
female connection and community without rejecting either. Other New Femininities 
fiction makes use of circularity, a return to the beginning, to negotiate hegemonic 
femininity and the possibility of any sense of resolution. Torgovnick asserts that 
circularity occurs ‗[w]hen the ending of a novel clearly recalls the beginning in 
language, in situation, in the grouping of characters, or in several of these ways‘.49 
Circularity implies a closed circle, but Cusk, Myerson, and Smith‘s texts return to their 
beginning, come full circle, without resolving the issues and questions that they raise. 
They have what Gerlach refers to as ‗pure circularity without progress‘.50 They return to 
their beginnings but little has been noticeably changed. 
 Circularity is often a return to the beginning in language, imagery, or in theme. 
It implies a return to ‗normalcy‘ or a righting of wrongs. However, a circular ending 
may do just the opposite and reassert that the wrongs are still wrong and the status quo 
remains upset. Torgovnick argues that this multi-faceted form of ending can be used to 
accomplish almost any novelistic endeavour: 
A circular ending may suggest growth and change in a character by showing 
him behaving differently in a situation similar to that which began the novel, as 
in The Ambassadors; or it may show stagnation or stasis in a character, as in 
L’Education sentimentale. It may return to the novel‘s initial themes in order 
to resolve them (as in Middlemarch), to repeat them (as in Vanity Fair), or to 
reaffirm an ambivalence developed throughout the novel (as in The Scarlet 
Letter). Alternatively, a circular ending may be largely a formal element, with 
little thematic significance. A circular ending can be used to give a novel a 
consolatory, relatively happy ending, a bitterly ironic and unhappy one, or 
something in between.
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49 Torgovnick 1981, p. 13. 
50 John Gerlach, ‗Closure in Henry James‘s Short Fiction‘, Journal of Narrative Technique 14 (1984), p. 
63. 
51 Torgovnick 1981, p. 199-200. 
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Her final assertion that the circular ending can be used to give a novel ‗something in 
between‘ the happy ending and an ironic unhappy one is how it is used by Myerson. 
She suggests something in between change and stasis and reaffirms the ambivalences 
that structure her novel. Her ending proves to be neither happy nor unhappy, but rather 
open to interpretation, confusing, and cryptic. Her circularity is more akin to the 
roundness of a spiral than to the completeness of a circle.  
 Woolf was attracted to endings that did not imply completion. Anna Snaith 
argues that Woolf consciously chose to end her works in ways that refused closure and 
that allowed her texts to end quietly without trying to lay claim to profundity or 
morality. She chose instead to allow the strands of her thought to remain multiple rather 
than be unified into one foremost idea: 
Jacob’s Room ends with ‗confusion‘ and an old pair of shoes (JR, p. 247), the 
penultimate sentence of The Years includes the uncertainty ‗And now?‘ (Y, p. 
413) and Between the Acts concludes with a beginning. In all these cases, 
Woolf frustrates the desire for closure. She wanted to be comfortable without 
such a conclusion: to be able to come away from a text without having to bind 
the multiple strands of thought into one.
52
 
Myerson and Cusk‘s novels emulate the ending that is confused, uncertain, and that 
returns to equivocal beginnings. Like Woolf, they leave resolution and closure to the 
interpretation of the reader and make it elusive and difficult to determine. They work to 
raise questions and offer few solutions and in the process call into question the price of 
the ‗normal femininity‘ of Freud and romantic novels and what constitutes adultery.  
Arlington Park concerns the price of ‗normal femininity‘ in suburban London. It 
ends at a natural termination like the novels of the previous section, but makes striking 
use of circularity. The novel‘s action takes place over the course of one day, from 
                                                             
52 Anna Snaith, Virginia Woolf: Public and Private Negotiations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2000), p. 158. 
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midnight to midnight, and the ending repeats the opening image of couples walking 
home in the dark after a night out. This return to the images of the beginning suggests 
that all days in Arlington Park are virtually identical. It concludes at the end of 
Christine Lanham‘s dinner party and watches her guests depart. However, the final 
paragraph focuses in on Christine and her husband, Joe, and undermines any sense of 
closure that the format of a novel that covers twenty-four hours might imply. Christine 
begins her party annoyed at her husband for his indifference to the preparations and the 
settling of the children. She resents his ability to work in his workshop while she 
prepares the dinner, and that he has enough time to take a shower and to enjoy their 
guests, while she must cook the meal. Her resentment of her husband triggers a 
meditation on the relationship between the genders. She wonders if his privilege to 
remain aloof from the party preparations is what people ‗meant when they talked about 
sexual inequality‘:  
It had never seemed worth the bother to Christine, trying to sort it out when it 
was all so much of a muchness; but now she wondered whether that wasn‘t 
exactly what kept you in your place, this acceptance of things, so that you were 
forever going round and round in a circle and never getting anywhere. If you 
accepted things, where were you meant to go when it got unacceptable? Who 
were you meant to tell? There had to be room for change – there had to be 
room for contingency! (AP, p. 238). 
She realises that her acceptance of Joe‘s privilege and exemption from responsibility for 
household duties is what defines their relationship and keeps her trapped in the 
sameness of domesticity. She longs for variety and surprise, and the space in which to 
do something different. She wants to be able to tell someone that the division of labour 
is unacceptable, but who does she tell? She cannot tell Joe. 
Joe is a bigot, a sexist, and an elitist. The husbands of Arlington Park tend to be 
well-meaning buffoons who take part in childcare, support their wives‘ eccentricities, 
and attempt to be gentle, sensitive men. Joe is an unapologetic bully and thief who 
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enjoys a more traditional relationship with his wife. The final paragraph that sees her 
potentially connecting with him is made more uncomfortable by the amount of 
antipathy they have shown each other throughout their chapter. As the guests stand to 
leave, a feeling of anxiety begins to build at the realisation that Christine will be alone 
with Joe. She is desperate for them to stay and watches them until they are out of sight 
and then turns to her husband:  
Joe was still standing in the hall. His face was full of expression. It was like a 
little stage with all sorts of things being acted on it. It was as if everything had 
made its way there, everything she knew: it had all found its way to Joe‘s face 
as a form of safekeeping, the whole world of herself concentrated on this little 
stage.  
She did her dance again, snapping her fingers. Joe looked at her with 
bottomless eyes. 
‗Come here,‘ he said (AP, p. 248). 
This scene could be read as a seduction or a reconnection between the spouses. 
However, the use of ‗bottomless eyes‘ implies danger of drowning, emptiness, and 
sorrow. It is said of the eyes of dying men and starving children, as well as of the eyes 
of dangerous and powerful people in novels of fantasy. Furthermore, it is a well-used 
cliché in contemporary romance novels, bodice rippers, to describe the eyes of the 
desired other, usually for sexy and sexualised women, but for male objects of desire as 
well. This ending is what Kermode identifies as the Shklovskian ‗illusory ending‘: 
Shklovsky speaks of the ease with which the reader may be induced to supply 
his own ending by the provision of some observation about the scenery or the 
weather; he calls this ‗illusory ending‘. Such endings have nothing to do with 
raveling or unraveling; they simply say the cold got colder, or the plain 
stretched out interminably.
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Although the scene does not concern the landscape or the weather, its enigmatic 
meaning indicates that it too has nothing to do with the ravelling or unravelling of the 
plot and does not contribute to closure at the level of questions or expectations. In fact, 
                                                             
53 Frank Kermode, ‗Sensing Endings‘, Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 33 (1978), p. 146. 
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it raises more questions than it answers and is completely unexpected. Is this about her 
surrender to her life: allowing herself to be projected onto the screen of her husband; 
allowing herself to be defined by him? Or does reconnection require her to project her 
world onto him; to read him as the safekeeper of her experiences, to read him as a safe 
place? To envisage her world on his face requires effort, volition, to see herself in him, 
to make this a connection. His eyes are open to interpretation – she can read them 
however she wants. Does his ‗Come here‘ mean seduction or menace? Perhaps it is 
both, menace and seduction, as her world becomes small enough to fit on his face. The 
novel only raises these questions; it refuses to answer them. Like characters of romance 
novels, the domestic novel requires limitation and marriage serves as compensation for 
this limitation. The ending is unsatisfactory because marriage is an unsatisfactory 
compensation for the limitation of identity and a woman‘s world imposed by 
domesticity. 
The female protagonist of The Story of You compensates herself for the loss of 
her child and the subsequent loss of connection with her partner with an imaginary 
lover. The novel strikingly uses circularity as a structure. It opens with: ‗It begins with 
snow, the story of you‘ and closes with: ‗It‘s the story of you and it stretches both ways, 
into past and future, and it begins right here and now, with snow‘ (The Story of You, p. 
1 and 312). Her haunting by, or delusional creation of, her lover arises from her grief at 
Mary‘s death, but how an imaginary lover is equivalent to or fills the void left by a 
child is confusing and unclear. The imaginary lover is the young man she had an intense 
experience with twenty years before. The novel raises the questions: what constitutes 
adultery? Is it adultery if your affair is imaginary? Is romantic love able to stand in for 
maternal love? Can it help one heal after the loss of a child? Both the lover and her 
daughter felt like the love of her life, but are these two loves interchangeable?  
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 Mary‘s death has unseated her mother who avoids speaking of her. Grief, 
adultery, and reality have all become confused for Nicole and her imaginary affair has 
concrete effects in her life. Before she discovers that her lover died before their first 
reunion, she confesses the affair to her partner, Tom. She does not admit to him that the 
affair was a delusion, that she imagined her betrayal, that her straying was all in her 
head. She is willing to bear the weight it has in their relationship: 
I think that Tom and I are happy now – our family feels happy – most days I 
am perfectly happy, as long as I don‘t try to stop and question that happiness 
too much. Too much thinking. It took me a long time to understand how hard 
and deeply I loved and needed Tom, but I did, I do. In the end it‘s entirely in 
your own hands – it‘s what you decide to let yourself feel that matters. It‘s how 
much love you decide to give, not what you spend time imagining you ought to 
get back. I think I believe this, certainly I try to. I do believe I hurt him deeply 
and, though I don‘t think I could have done otherwise, not at the time, still I‘m 
so very sorry for that, I‘m sorry it has to be a hard fact lodged between us for 
ever like that in our mutual past (Story, p. 309). 
Nicole still seems emotionally and mentally fragile. She continues to slip back and forth 
in time using the language of tense: ‗I did, I do‘. However, she realises that her love 
affair was an imagining of what she ‗ought to get back‘ that distracted her from her 
feelings of grief for her child and her need of comfort from her partner. Myerson uses 
the generality of ‗you‘ to great effect in this novel. ‗You‘ is not simply her imaginary 
lover or her lost child. The ‗you‘ of this passage is the implied audience ‗you‘, the 
listener ‗you‘, as well as Nicole‘s ‗I‘. ‗In the end its entirely in my own hands – it is 
what I decide to let myself feel that matters. It‘s how much love I decide to give, not 
what I spend time imagining I ought to get back‘. As the novel concludes, ‗you‘ begins 
to slide into ‗I‘. Her final assertion that ‗It‘s the story of you and it stretches both ways, 
into past and future, and it begins right here and now, with snow‘ is actually the 
beginning of the story of ‗I‘, the story of Rosy. For this novel the answer to the question 
‗who does she mean by ―you‖‘ is unimportant because the story is about Nicole‘s 
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telling of it, about her making sense of her life and how to go on living it in the wake of 
her daughter‘s death. She imagined walking away from her life into adultery, into self-
fulfilling, self-loving fantasy, but ultimately that was not a satisfactory conclusion. 
Instead, the story concludes by stretching into the past and the future and beginning at 
its conclusion; its conclusion pointing the reader back to its beginning. It resists 
answering the questions that it raises about adultery, romantic love, and maternal love, 
and utilises pure circularity without progress – the story goes nowhere, it does not 
matter, what matters is the telling. 
 The New Femininities fictions embrace uncertainty. They negotiate between the 
conventional sense of few endings for women, marriage, death, and a return to 
beginnings, and the twentieth-century alternatives of social connection, woman-to-
woman and mother-to-child. Rather than providing answers to the question of what 
options women have between love and adventure, these fictions stage interrogations of 
the act of questioning itself. The New Femininities fictions, that is to say, function in a 
perpetually interrogative mode. In so doing, they meet Cixous‘s call for women to write 
beyond the ‗ultimate-reserve discourse‘, that would declare ‗the end‘. 
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Conclusion 
I neither want to confine you to kitchen quarters nor even suggest that it might 
be desirable. But I do think that many of us have become alienated from the 
domestic sphere, and that it can actually make us feel better to claim back 
some of that space, make it comforting rather than frightening. In a way, 
baking stands both as a useful metaphor for the familial warmth of the kitchen 
we fondly imagine used to exist and as a way of reclaiming our lost Eden […] 
This is what baking, what all of this book, is about: feeling good, wafting 
along in the warm, sweet-smelling air, unwinding, no longer being entirely an 
office creature; and that‘s exactly what I mean by ‗comfort cooking‘ […] The 
good thing is, we don‘t have to get ourselves up in Little Lady drag and we 
don‘t have to renounce the world and enter into a life of domestic drudgery. 
But we can bake a little – and a cake is just a cake […] This isn‘t a dream; 
what‘s more, it isn‘t even a nightmare.1  
Nigella Lawson, How to be a Domestic Goddess 
The New Femininities fiction make use of formal techniques of an unreliable narrator, 
an ironic voice, free indirect discourse, and an interrogative ending in order to call into 
question the certainties around which gender identities are fashioned and to undermine 
the ideology of marriage and motherhood that serves to limit women‘s lives. Their 
authors use narrative form to echo the contradictions of postmodern femininity and to 
talk about and respond to feminist theory and in so doing suggest that rather than being 
a binary, feminism and femininity can be ways of negotiating each other. These texts 
share a concern with challenging the fundamental contradictions that are inhabited by 
                                                             
1 Nigella Lawson, How to be a Domestic Goddess (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000), p. vii, my 
emphasis. 
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domestic femininity and highlight the stalemate that has continued from the late 1970s 
when second wave feminism fell silent on domesticity. Because of the contradictory 
nature of contemporary femininities which have to encompass so many roles with 
conflicting interests, New Femininities fiction‘s protagonists must be able to 
countenance contradiction. In this way, they would appear to be negotiating a feminism 
akin to the third wave feminism described by Shelley Budgeon which ‗insists on the 
necessity of straddling binaries and working with the contradictions that result‘.2 New 
Femininities fiction accommodates the revolutionary within the traditional validating 
domestic white middle-class femininities as disruptive. 
As a way of concluding this dissertation, I would like to examine a debate about 
domesticity and feminism that broke out in the British press in September 2000 that 
illuminates the issues that the New Femininities fictions negotiate. This debate was 
predicated around the release of Nigella Lawson‘s cookbook, How to be a Domestic 
Goddess. Much like the debates about the small-scale domesticity of the British 
woman‘s novel, there is a certain amount of free publicity inherent in a controversy 
being connected to a product that is available for sale. Muriel Gray‘s remarks drew 
attention to the Orange Prize and the newspaper columns dedicated to decrying 
Lawson‘s assertion that anyone could be a domestic goddess as anti-feminist served to 
publicise her book. In this debate, however, feminist and postfeminist attitudes to 
domesticity were revealed in all their contradictoriness and discomfort. Baking became 
associated with domestic slavery, misplaced nostalgia, and time-consuming hard work 
and Lawson is characterised as out of touch with ‗real‘ women‘, a ‗con-woman‘, and a 
                                                             
2 Shelley Budgeon, ‗The Contradictions of Successful Femininity: Third-Wave Feminism, Postfeminism 
and ‗New‘ Femininities‘, in New Femininities: Postfeminism, Neoliberalism and Subjectivity, ed. by 
Rosalind Gill and Christina Scharff (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 280. 
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‗proud hausfrau‘.3 At the time that her cookbook was released, Lawson‘s husband was 
dying of cancer, a fact that gets mentioned in the majority of articles. However, the 
emotions that her rehabilitation of baking aroused meant an ambivalence that turned 
quickly into outright dismissal. Gillian Glover notes that ‗Lawson moved from 
―heroine‖ to ―smug cow‖ in the time it takes to coddle an egg. So the labelling goes on. 
Mother, Madonna, whore or just irritating bint with an out-of-date haircut‘.4 The 
dichotomies set up here reveal the oppositional thinking surrounding domesticity: 
‗Mother‘, with a capital ‗M‘, and ‗Madonna‘, which should figure on the ‗heroine‘ side 
of the binary, are epithets, thus all the terms become synonymous with ‗smug cow‘. 
These are identities much like ‗housewife‘, that the New Femininities fiction resist.  
 Suzanne Moore argues that baking, for Lawson, is ‗the new therapy‘, ‗I don‘t 
blame her for wanting to escape into a world where if you only stick to the right recipe 
everything comes out as it should‘.5 However, Moore is ambivalent about the media 
coverage of Lawson‘s performance of domestic femininity as possible and desirable for 
all women: ‗What I do mind, though, is the way that she has been cleverly marketed as 
some kind of role model for women, albeit in a rather arch way‘.6 Anna Burnside claim 
that Lawson‘s baking book appeals to women who wish life could be simple enough to 
smoothly transition from work to home with style and aplomb. ‗Women who feel torn 
                                                             
3 Nicola Tyrer , Julie Myerson, and Sophie Parkin, ‗Who wants to be a domestic goddess anyway?‘, 
Daily Mail (London), 19 October 2000 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&ris
b=21_T12922051084&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T1292205
1088&cisb=22_T12922051087&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=138794&docNo=3 [accessed on 7 
August 2011], 
4 Gillian Glover, ‗New Sex and Old Dusters‘, The Scotsman, Wednesday 20 September 2000 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&ris
b=21_T12922001237&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=701&resultsUrlKey=29_T12922
001232&cisb=22_T12922001254&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=146174&docNo=725 [accessed 7 
August 2011], paragraph 12-13. 
5 Suzanne Moore, ‗Did we fight for the right to bake?‘, Mail on Sunday, 22 October 2000 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/uk/nexis/search/homesubmitForm.do [accessed 7 August 
2011], paragraph 15-16. 
6 Moore 2000, paragraph 15-16. 
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between the demands of career and family, who are grown up but have not grown old, 
want her life‘.7 However, ‗[f]or women who don‘t buy Vogue, never mind contribute to 
it, Lawson is less of an inspiration and more of a reminder of how many compromises 
they have to make‘.8 Thus while these working mothers might want her life, they find 
their desire just increases their dissatisfaction; the illusion she creates that ‗the 
shopping-and-chopping life of domestic goddess 2000 [can be] so painless and 
delightful‘ highlights the pain and unpleasantness of the conflict between home and 
work. Kate Carr asserts that Lawson‘s title is ironic, but ‗[n]ot everyone understood the 
irony of the title‘.9 Nicola Tyrer is one who does not read any irony, ‗there is no joke 
intended‘10 she attests, and she wonders if ‗the real reason women hate baking is 
because cake-making epitomises our status as domestic slaves? Most men secretly love 
the idea of a Stepford wife, programmed to eager servitude, be it sex or baking‘.11 The 
equation of ‗baking‘ to domestic slavery is a tremendous leap. Even without Lawson‘s 
insistence that she does not want to confine anyone to the kitchen, and her notion of 
‗comfort cooking‘ which implies self-soothing and choice, baking is perhaps one of the 
least coercive acts of domesticity. No one ever has to bake. Bread and other baked 
goods are affordable and readily available. 
Some of the columnists read Lawson‘s cookbook as part of a pattern of texts 
encouraging women to aspire to an über-domesticity. Martha Stewart‘s Living 
magazine, Cheryl Mendelson‘s Home Comforts: The Art and Science of Keeping 
House, and Rita Konig‘s housework column Domestic Bliss: How to Live are often 
                                                             
7 Anna Burnside, ‗Lessons from a Goddess‘, The Sunday Herald, 3 September 2000 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20000903/ai_n13952172/ [accessed 7 August 2011], 
paragraph 8. 
8 Burnside 2000, paragraph 12. 
9 Kate Carr, ‗Let them bake cakes‘, The Times, 4 October 2003 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk.tto/life/article1717842.ece [accessed 7 August 2011], paragraph 1-8. 
10 Tyrer, Myerson, and Parkin 2000, paragraph 7. 
11 Tyrer, Myerson, and Parkin 2000, paragraph 20. 
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cited as examples of texts that dictate perfectionism in cleaning and a one-upmanship 
(or one-upwomanship) in decorating as an expression of power and control. Glover 
argues that ‗there‘s [not] anything new in the glorification of domestic chores. Think 
back to all those 1950s home-and-hearth ads deliberately designed to lure the war-
emancipated woman back to the kitchen sink with images of frilly aprons and smiling 
children‘. 12 Does she really believe that Nigella Lawson is attempting to lure feminism-
emancipated working women home? If anything, Lawson‘s argument is more akin to 
the ‗having it all‘ arguments of the 1980s that implied that women could be 
breadwinners, bread bakers, and vixens in the bedroom; that work and family could be 
compatible. Lawson‘s cookbook incites Suzanne Moore to say ‗Never mind Mrs 
Pankhurst and Simone de Beauvoir. Never mind the right to vote and the right to an 
independent existence, what modern women now demand is the right to bake the 
perfect cupcake‘.13 I would argue that Lawson is not repudiating feminism, in fact, she 
assumes that most women are successful enough in the public sector to afford the help 
at home that would make time in the kitchen a site of respite in a hectic world rather 
than being yet another place filled with people and responsibilities making demands on 
women‘s limited time. 
Throughout this dissertation I have been arguing that domesticity is a problem 
which feminism is unable to resolve. What I would like to tease out of the debate 
around Lawson‘s cookbook is the difficulty these columnists, and feminism in general, 
has with domesticity so that anything connected to the domestic cannot be an 
acceptable activity for women. Joanne Hollows asserts that ‗The hubbub raised by 
journalists over Nigella Lawson‘s How to be a Domestic Goddess frequently assumed a 
straightforward choice between feminism and domestic femininity in which feminism 
                                                             
12 Glover 2000, paragraph 4. 
13 Moore 2000, paragraph 1-4. 
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could be the only ―rational‖ response‘.14 By presenting the two options, feminism and 
domestic femininity, as choices, the debate reinforced their status as a binary 
opposition. Hollows asserts that this binary division between feminist and housewife 
lies at the heart of second wave feminism because the feminist‘s very identity was 
‗predicated on an escape from ―home‖, so it was predicated on a distance from the 
woman who lived there, ―the housewife‖.15 This opposition meant that ‗[d]omesticity 
and a suburban ‗home‘ were things associated with the feminist‘s ‗other‘, and therefore 
needed to be kept at a distance‘.16 This problem with domesticity, as I have been 
arguing, underlies the debates about heterosexuality and the difficulty of squaring a 
feminist identity with a heterosexual relationship because settled heterosexuality often 
means a domestic arrangement. Imelda Whelehan asserts that ‗[h]eterosexuality 
dominated the debates in the Women‘s Movement – both in its association with male 
power and institutional practices of oppression, such as marriage, and in debates about 
how women might seek liberation through sex‘.17 The question of how to square 
heterosexuality with feminism was left ultimately unanswered and ‗[f]eminist politics 
became increasingly silent on the topic, leaving women to negotiate privately the best 
solutions they could‘.18 It is the implication that a long-term heterosexual relationship 
means a return to the role of housewife, if only on a part-time basis, that frustrated a 
solution. Feminism continues to maintain an equivocal relationship to domesticity and 
to the domestic novel. 
                                                             
14 Joanne Hollows, ‗Can I go Home yet? Feminism, Post-feminism and Domesticity‘, in Feminism in 
Popular Culture, ed. by Joanne Hollows and Rachel Moseley (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2007), p. 
106. 
15 Hollows 2007, p. 100. 
16 Hollows 2007, p. 101. This ambivalence to home and motherhood was a middle-class phenomenon, 
working class and black women found the family to be ‗a refuge‘ against a harsh world. Maroula 
Joannou, Contemporary Women’s Writing: From The Golden Notebook to The Color Purple 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 43. 
17  Imelda Whelehan, The Feminist Bestseller: From Sex and the Single Girl to Sex and the City 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), p. 132. 
18 Whelehan 2005, p. 101. 
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Postfeminism‘s very definition is tied up with issues surrounding domesticity. 
Those critics who want to dismiss postfeminism as evidence of a backlash against 
feminism highlight its association with domesticity and figures like Nigella Lawson. 
Yet, as Lesley Johnson and Justine Lloyd argue, it is ‗clear that the tensions for women 
between achievement and domesticity have not been resolved by a story that calls on 
women to leave their ―home selves‖ behind.‘19 However, Hollows argues that it 
continues to be an issue that is ignored, ‗critics use a more positive conception of post-
feminism by avoiding domesticity‘ through a concentration on fashion and youth 
cultures.
20
 Thus domesticity is a pivotal issue, but one which feminists are only capable 
of associating with patriarchy and oppression. Therefore, ‗[w]hile we might know quite 
a lot about what emerges between feminism and youthful femininities, and between 
feminism and the single girl, what emerges between the feminist and the housewife 
remains largely unexplored‘.21 However, it is this territory that the New Femininities 
fiction explores, the world of postmodern domestic femininities, which Hollows argues 
‗need to be understood in relation to the lifestyle choices through which fractured 
middle-class identities are formed‘.22 Marriage, motherhood, and a role beyond the 
home are all lifestyle choices, but they are choices fraught with contradiction and in 
need of negotiation.  
Laura Kipnis identifies the binary opposition of feminism and domestic 
femininity as a choice between ‗The Feisty Feminist or the Eternal Feminine‘ and 
points out that ‗the truly fascinating question is how it came about that whichever one 
you chose, what was once construed as a liberation movement somehow ended up 
                                                             
19 Lesley Johnson and Justine Lloyd, Sentenced to Everyday Life: Feminism and the Housewife (Oxford 
and New York: Berg, 2004), p. 15. 
20 Hollows 2007, p. 104. 
21 Hollows 2007, p. 104. 
22 Hollows 2007, p. 99. 
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producing more dichotomies and more impasses‘.23 Rather than being emancipated, 
women are confined by more binary oppositions. However, Kipnis argues that these 
dichotomies are an illusion: 
Once women were faced with the vaginal-orgasm-versus-clitoral-orgasm 
dichotomy; now women are faced with the motherhood-versus-career 
dichotomy. These may sound like different kinds of dilemmas, but in fact they 
have structural similarities, and a similar underlying logic. To begin with, we 
have the same cast of characters: the womanly other-directed dependent type 
versus the masculine-identified striving autonomous type. And in both cases, a 
socially organized choice masquerades as a natural one, manufacturing a big 
dilemma where one doesn‘t have to exist.24 
The underlying logic that motherhood means a ‗womanly other-directed dependent 
type‘ and career the ‗masculine-identified striving autonomous type‘ is exactly the logic 
that the New Femininities fiction‘s protagonists are struggling against, deconstructing, 
and bridging. Their narratives are about the fact that the boundaries between these 
binaries are illusory, they can be straddled; one can be a mother with a career, 
dependent and autonomous, and inhabit both femininity and feminism. This is not an 
emancipatory literature because no matter which side one occupies, femininity or 
feminism, or both, no one is free. All of these identities make demands and negotiating 
these demands is what constitutes postmodern femininity. 
 The New Femininities fictions are aware of the rhetoric surrounding postmodern 
femininity and domesticity. Eve, in The Accidental, has withdrawn from her domestic 
and work obligations. She spends her days shut away in a garden shed procrastinating 
her next book and her evenings failing to connect with any members of her family – she 
finds she ‗almost couldn‘t bear to sit in the same room‘ as her son because he reminds 
her so much of his father, Adam; her daughter infuriates her so much she believes that 
Astrid ‗deserved to have no father, just as Eve had done most of her life, and was lucky 
                                                             
23 Laura Kipnis, The Female Thing: Dirt, Sex, Envy, Vulnerability (New York: Pantheon, 2006), p. 4. 
24 Kipnis 2006, p. 70. 
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to still have a mother at all‘ and her husband Michael ‗come[s] home smelling, yet 
again, of someone else‘ (The Accidental, p. 184). Rather than deal with these issues and 
conflicts within her family, she justifies her withdrawal by parroting the postfeminist 
language regarding the difficulty of being a woman: ‗It is very very hard work indeed, 
she answered, to be a woman and alive in this hemisphere in this day and age. It asks a 
lot, to be able to do all the things we‘re supposed to do the way we‘re expected to do 
them‘. In order to meet these expectations, women need, ‗Talent. Sex. Money. Family. 
The correct modest intelligence. The correct thinness. The correct presence‘ (The 
Accidental, p. 85). To which her internal interlocutor responds, ‗Isn’t that a bit feeble?‘ 
The litany of unfair societal expectations of women is not an acceptable excuse for 
withdrawing from one‘s family and from one‘s work commitments. The domestic 
goddess is an unliveable ideal, but her opposite, the comatose woman is equivalently an 
inadequate subject position. 
The New Femininities fictions negotiate the phenomenon of the domestic 
goddess and the conflicted relationship that women feel with her. The desire to perform 
domesticity in a fashion that shames other women is cancelled out by the fact that its 
performance is often unglamorous. Clare, in Hadley‘s Accidents in the Home, begins 
the novel preparing a delicious lunch for houseguests aware that her performance of 
domesticity is a skilled one that will show up her best friend: ‗The onion soup, with 
Parmesan toasts baked in the oven, would be delicious. (It was). And Helly couldn‘t 
cook‘. Yet, she fears that ‗her limp T-shirt which had soaked up the smells of the onion 
soup she was making for their lunch‘ and that ‗everything brilliant and savoury about 
her might appear to have drained into that onion soup, leaving her wan and dull and 
domesticated‘ (Accidents in the Home, p. 4). The process of cooking the soup has 
boiled out her difference; the adjectives ‗brilliant‘ and ‗savoury‘ could describe the 
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onions and other ingredients before they became soup. Her act of competent domestic 
femininity comes at the expense of her performance of polished femininity. Domestic 
goddess is a complicated performance since, in order to qualify as a ‗goddess‘, one 
must look stylish, fresh, and in control despite spending a few hours in a warm and 
humid kitchen.  
Being a domestic goddess is not just about cooking, although that was Lawson‘s 
use of the term. Domestic proficiency includes the management of the household: 
husband, children, and the house and is one of the ideals that the protagonists of New 
Femininities fiction negotiate. The trip Veronica, from Enright‘s The Gathering, takes 
to retrieve her brother‘s body for the funeral reveals that she is not indispensable: ‗all 
the ways you thought you were vital are not even vaguely important. Your husband can 
feed the kids, he can work the new oven, he can find the sausages in the fridge, after 
all‘. In fact, she discovers her role as household manager exists only because the other 
members of the family choose not to take responsibility for themselves. ‗[I]t is just as 
you suspected – most of the stuff that you do is just stupid, really stupid, most of the 
stuff you do is just nagging and whining and picking up for people who are too lazy 
even to love you, even that, let alone find their own shoes‘(The Gathering, p. 27). 
Veronica is made to feel taken for granted, stupid, and ultimately useless by her 
performance of domestic goddess rather than that she is basking in familial warmth. In 
Cusk‘s Arlington Park, Amanda feels that the compensation for her domestic drudgery 
falls short: ‗Why was her solemn undertaking to spend her life with James and Jessica 
and Eddie repaid in her husband‘s stained underwear in the laundry basket and his hairs 
from shaving in the sink, in her children‘s discarded emotions?‘ (Arlington Park, p. 80). 
Lawson‘s domestic goddess might be a lovely role if women did not have children and 
husbands; if the cakes were only for invited houseguests who would be polite and leave 
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in a timely manner. Instead, domesticity is much more about chores, dirty underwear, 
lost shoes, and distilling one‘s very essence to make meals for others too lazy to do it 
for themselves. The vision of the domestic goddess is an erroneous one. However, these 
novels are not rejecting the domestic. Unlike the CR novels, they do not hold out the 
options of a job or an education as ways to escape the domestic because they already 
have these things and are still mired in the daily grind of cleaning, feeding, and 
emotional receptacle. Nor do they offer the option of walking away because children 
and responsibility will follow them wherever they go. 
Work has been figured as the road to empowerment for women, but for working 
mothers their commitments mean that often while fulfilling one responsibility they are 
feeling guilty about not taking care of the other. The New Femininities fiction expose 
this contradiction. Mendelson‘s Francis attempts to combine work and home life by 
‗working at home‘. However, this only serves to increase the pressures of both 
responsibilities: ‗Wednesdays are generally the worst days. She works at home, reading 
frantically all morning and into the night to make time for the afternoon of childcare 
[…] Usually it grinds past in a daze of guilty clock-watching‘ (When We Were Bad, p. 
114). Combining the two, rather than increasing her enjoyment by being able to do both 
at the same time, decreases her satisfaction with either role. She must read frantically 
because her childcare duties are exerting pressure, and during childcare she feels 
stressed not to be working. The solutions that are supposed to square feminism and 
domesticity are no less fraught than complete submersion or complete abandonment of 
the domestic. The protagonists do consider trying to escape their domestic lives. The 
Story of You‘s Rosy finds the state of her house after a weekend away to be almost 
unbearable. ‗A bowl of Weetos – the last hurried thing eaten by Fin the morning we left 
– still sat by the sink and because he hadn‘t finished the milk, its sour smell, combined 
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with the mustier one of cat, punctured the room‘. Her disconnection from herself is 
exposed by the fact that she realises how she feels by hearing herself. ‗I hate this place, 
I heard myself say […] I just need to be out of here, I said as quietly as I could, and was 
slightly shocked to realise I meant it‘ (The Story of You, p. 110). But, of course, what 
the spoiled milk in the Weetos bowl proves is that the demands of domesticity are 
always there when one returns; they can wait and they do. One can never really go 
away forever. 
 If this recognition of the permanency of the domestic for mothers characterises 
the majority of New Femininities fiction, so too Alice Munro negotiates leaving and 
staying in her stories. One of the narratives that Alice Munro revisits often in her short 
stories is the story of the divorcee, and often her protagonist leave her marriage at 
second wave feminism‘s peak. While it seems that leaving marriage should allow 
women to walk away forever and act as a neat and tidy solution to matters of 
unhappiness and entrapment, Munro offers a critique. The price of that freedom is great 
and it is not a truly ‗free‘ freedom. The nameless narrator of ‗Nettles‘ situates herself 
and her circumstances within the time of second wave feminism: 
I had moved for the newfangled reason that was approved of mightily but 
fleetingly and only in some special circles – leaving husband and house and all 
the things acquired during the marriage (except of course the children, who 
were to be parcelled about) in the hope of making a life that could be lived 
without hypocrisy or deprivation or shame (‗Nettles‘, p. 168). 
Feminism seemed to promise that a walking away from domesticity and ‗male-
identified‘ lifestyles would mean a life lived without hypocrisy, deprivation, or shame. 
However, when children are involved, women do not get away without ties that pull 
them back. Her neatly tying up the children and their care into packages that can be 
‗parcelled about‘ is wishful thinking. The separation from her children requires 
hypocrisy, because her freedom means her children are entrapped in a scheme of shared 
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custody, deprivation because she can only afford to live quite simply and she misses her 
children, and shame because she must ignore the pain of separation. When she returns 
to her flat after returning her daughters to their father, she sweeps everything they left 
behind into a garbage bag, ‗And I did more or less the same thing every time I thought 
of them – I snapped my mind shut. There were miseries that I could bear – those 
connected with me. And other miseries – those connected with children – that I could 
not‘ (‗Nettles‘, p. 170). Her mental garbage bag allows her to contain the anguish of her 
distance from her daughters. Walking away from the domestic is impossible because its 
concerns follow; one even ends up tidying away uncomfortable emotions into mental 
rubbish bins. 
Women on the outside of the domestic rather than feeling lucky to be spared the 
contradictions and conflicts, long to be on the inside. The two New Femininities novels 
in which the protagonists are not embedded in the domestic, Heller‘s Notes on a 
Scandal and Kennedy‘s Paradise, exhibit envy for those domestic lives. Though the 
women engrossed in domesticity dream of an escape, those outside of it long to be 
overwhelmed by the detritus and demands of others. Hannah‘s lifestyle choice, her 
alcoholism and transitory nature, means, she has decided, that she will never have 
children. A good decision to make, of course, but it is a decision that fills her with 
anguish whenever she is reminded. Her brother‘s announcement of his impending 
fatherhood drives Hannah into a flurry of self-pity because she believes that she could 
be different if she had a child. ‗They never will walk through their days, hemmed in 
with the scent of a child they haven‘t got, won‘t have, can‘t have […]They don‘t hold it 
growing and wasting in them like a frozen mist – the impossible baby, the one who 
would let them be tender‘ (Paradise, p. 105-106). Perhaps the notion of having a baby 
in order to find an ability to be caring and less selfish is ludicrous, but for Hannah the 
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inside of the domestic tangle of mother and child seems a lovely place. Barbara, whose 
loneliness drives her, finds Sheba‘s house simultaneously revolting and alluring:  
There was a level of disorder in the place that I doubt I could ever tolerate. 
And yet, there was something in the disarray that was enviable. When you live 
alone, your furnishings, your possessions are always confronting you with the 
thinness of your existence. You know with painful accuracy the provenance of 
everything you touch and the last time you touched it. The five little cushions 
on your sofa stay plumped and leaning at their jaunty angle for months at a 
time unless you theatrically muss them. The level of the salt in your shaker 
decreases at the same excruciating rate, day after day. Sitting in Sheba‘s house 
– studying the mingled detritus of its several inhabitants – I could see what a 
relief it might be to let your own meagre effects be joined with other people‘s 
(Notes, p. 99). 
Barbara longs for human connection and translates that connection to a material plane. 
It would be a relief to mingle with other people, to have other people inside the walls of 
her privacy. Whereas her domestic counterparts are fed up with the dirty underwear, the 
sour milk, and the lost shoes, she longs to have someone to make a mess so that she can 
clean up. The image of theatrically mussing up her cushions because she is frustrated 
that they never move and in fact, the fact that her cushions do not get flattened for 
months at a time means that she does not make use of her ‗stuff‘, that she longs for 
another so that she can use her own things. New Femininities fiction recognises both 
the allure of domesticity and its conflicts and contradictions. Unlike the feminist fiction 
of the 1970s, it does not seek to solve these contradictions and unlike chick lit of the 
1990s and 2000s it will not ignore them in order to offer a happy ending. 
 The New Femininities fiction negotiates not only traditional forms of fiction 
writing, but also the issues of the sociohistorical context in which they were written. 
Their authors use narrative form to echo the contradictions of postmodern femininity 
and feminist theory and suggest that feminism and femininity can be ways of 
negotiating each other. These texts negotiate a feminism akin to third wave feminism 
which ‗insists on the necessity of straddling binaries and working with the 
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contradictions that result‘25 while exposing that same feminism‘s neglect of the 
domestic. The New Femininities fiction share with third wave feminism a recognition 
of the value of contradiction and, by confronting issues of domesticity and motherhood 
that proved insurmountable to second wave feminism and are ignored by 
postfeminism‘s focus on the young and fashionable, illuminate their inadequacy to 
discuss the lives of adult women, domestic femininities, and the contemporary domestic 
novel. 
                                                             
25 Budgeon 2011, p. 280. 
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